1979 Interview with Landsdale. Part 2

-Again, no mention of narcotics during the American Era.

-@30:15' drugs, gambling prostitution 

-@34:28 Warlords, Militia, plots against Deim. 

-French plan to grant independence, stop paying militias

-Attack on palace

Thanks Roger, I am digging into Landsdale's story right now.

Ed Lansdale’s Black Warfare in 1950s Vietnam

By Marc D. Bernstein 
2/16/2010 • Vietnam Point of View

Colonel Edward Lansdale, chief of the CIA's Saigon Military Mission, meets with Ngo Dinh Diem after the CIA entered Vietnam in 1954 to help the pro-Western Vietnamese wage political-psychological warfare. (Douglas Pike Photo Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech Univ.)

He was, for some, the genius cowboy who sometimes skirts the rules to achieve the just goals of Western democracy; for others, the embodiment of an arrogant foreign policy gone dangerously wrong.

A bit miffed at his last-minute orders to proceed directly from the Philippines to Vietnam, with no time to return home to Washington to prepare for his new covert mission or visit his family, Colonel Edward Lansdale flew into Saigon in the rattling bucket seat of an amphibian aircraft from the 31st Air-Sea Rescue Squadron. It was the first available flight out of Clark Air Force Base to Saigon, and the crewmen agreed to take him if he didn’t mind the extra flight time while they performed their patrol over the South China Sea. It was June 1, 1954, and as he sipped coffee from a paper cup he thought about what lay ahead. He’d heard about the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and knew that the French and Viet Minh were working out a peace settlement in Geneva, but beyond that, his knowledge about the country was slim.

It was at a meeting convened in the Pentagon six months earlier to discuss Vietnam that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had turned to Lansdale and told him, “We’re going to send you over there,” to which Lansdale replied, “Not to help the French!” No, he was reassured,  he would help the Vietnamese put down the Communist-dominated Viet Minh in Indochina. Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, joined with his brother in backing Lansdale to serve as the founder and chief of the CIA’s Saigon Military Mission (SSM), which was to quietly enter Vietnam and help the pro-Western Vietnamese wage political-psychological warfare.

The CIA was willing to give Lansdale, a San Francisco advertising executive before World War II, great latitude based on his success in black operations in the Philippines from 1950-53. A U.S. Army officer who transferred his commission to the Air Force after the war, he had helped the Philippine army put down the Hukbalahap (Huk) rebellion. Philippine Communists formed the guerrilla group originally to fight the Japanese in World War II. After Huk efforts to participate in the postwar government were rebuffed and a reportedly fraudulent election took place in 1949, the Huks began their guerrilla war to overthrow the U.S.-backed government. In waging war against the Huks, Lansdale wielded a wide array of counterinsurgency and psywar tools, some playing upon Filipino superstitions. One such successful unconventional tactic exploited villagers’ belief in vampires, another on ghosts of dead Huks. In Lansdale’s “Eye of God” campaign, suspected guerrillas living in a village were targets of psywar teams that surreptitiously painted a menacing eye on a wall facing the suspect’s hut. Although most notorious for these types of psywar operations, it was primarily Lansdale’s application of advertising principles and media manipulation that led to the honest election of Ramon Magsaysay as president in 1953.

But Vietnam was a different country with much different problems.

Nevertheless, during his first two years there, Colonel Lansdale would solidify his top position in the pantheon of shadowy American psychological and unconventional warriors. He would become for some the prototype of the genius cowboy who sometimes skirts the rules to achieve the just goals of Western democracy; for others the embodiment of an arrogant foreign policy gone dangerously wrong in Southeast Asia. In either case, the “Chief,” as reports on his exploits referred to Lansdale, had an enormous impact on Vietnam in the pivotal months that followed the stinging defeat of the French, setting the stage for the deadly drama that would play out in the turbulent two decades to come.

After Landing at Tan Son Nhut air base in Saigon, Lansdale hitched a ride into the heart of the city to the home of Lt. Gen. John W. “Iron Mike” O’Daniel, who was the post chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Saigon. The MAAG had been established in 1950 by President Harry Truman to work with French forces in Indochina.

Lansdale’s selection as the man to run paramilitary and political operations against the Viet Minh in Indochina shouldn’t have come as too much of a surprise to the dapper 46-year-old, however. After all, he had served the previous year as a psychological warfare adviser on an evaluation team tour of French Indochina, headed by General O’Daniel. Lansdale’s observations, recorded in several memoranda on the nature of Asiatic insurgencies, dissected the Communists’ successful tactics, and underscored the French and American lack of fluency regarding counterinsurgency.

“There is general conviction that the Viet Minh has ‘national spirit’ on its side and that the Franco-Vietnamese forces do not,” Lansdale wrote in one memorandum. “This is the result of successful psychological-political warfare by the Viet Minh. There has been no effective psychological warfare by the Franco-Vietnamese forces to expose this as a myth.” Lansdale was intent on understanding, and applying, the psychological aspects of warfare against Communists. In Indochina, he aimed to use black propaganda and urge the French and their Vietnamese allies to seize the initiative in countering the Viet Minh’s hold over the people.

In Saigon, Lansdale took on the cover of an assistant air attaché at the U.S. Embassy, an arrangement that allowed him to work with both the ambassador, Donald Heath, and General O’Daniel’s MAAG. When Lansdale announced himself at the embassy, however, the diplomatic staff was indignant; the SMM was not the only CIA operation in town. A regular CIA station, responsible for traditional intelligence and spying, also existed, separate from Lansdale’s unit. The station chief, Emmett McCarthy, considered Lansdale to be an amateur. McCarthy insisted on control of all secret communications with Washington, and Lansdale had to comply because he had no independent communications channel. An intense rivalry developed. Eventually, after Lansdale quietly complained to Secretary of State Dulles about him, a more amicable station chief, John Anderton, replaced McCarthy.

For the first month after arriving in Saigon, Colonel Lansdale was the entire SMM staff. Then on July 1, Major Lucien Conein, an experienced covert operator who had been in the OSS and who had jumped into Vietnam to help guerrilla forces fight the Japanese during World War II, joined Lansdale’s team.

But the Chief faced some daunting challenges. Since Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the Independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam in September 1945, the xenophobic Vietnamese had only two choices: Support Ho’s Viet Minh republic or their French colonial masters. Addressing this, the French had created a partially autonomous government, called the State of Vietnam, headed by the aging playboy emperor Bao Dai. Although it had a governing body called the Chamber of Deputies, none of its members had any real constituency. Most Vietnamese hated the French and felt little loyalty to Bao Dai, who lived in France.

As the Geneva negotiations, which had convened in early May coinciding with the fall of Dien Bien Phu, progressed, the State of Vietnam’s French and American backers scrambled to shore up its legitimacy and capability. Ngo Dinh Diem, a well-known Catholic, anti-Communist nationalist residing in Europe, was appointed by Bao Dai—with U.S. support—as prime minister on June 16.

 Good First Impressions with Diem

The day after Diem’s arrival in Saigon on June 25, Lansdale paid a visit and presented the new prime minister with an unofficial, “personal” paper full of actions he could take to handle the rapidly changing situation in his country. The Chief’s ideas included immediate steps to integrate all non-Communists military and paramilitary forces into a national army, encouragement of nationalist groups to participate in the political process and the institution of agrarian and economic reforms to make the government more responsive and effective. As his aide translated the letter to the prime minister, Lansdale recalled, “Diem listened intently, asked some searching questions, thanked me for my thoughtfulness, folded up the paper, and put it in his pocket.” Thus, as he had done with the Philippine leader Magsaysay, Lansdale quickly gained Diem’s trust and became his closest American confidant.

But how could he assist Diem in setting up a unified nationalist government in the south when none of the hundreds of sects, with their clandestine organizations, competing ideologies and armed camps, were interested in supporting a new government? Lansdale knew that Diem initially controlled virtually nothing and needed to quickly solidify his grip on power and improve the functioning of his government. Realizing that the army was the strongest and the only unifying factor in bringing a nationalist government to Vietnam, Lansdale set to work, conferring with officials such as Defense Minister Phan Huy Quat and General Nguyen Van Hinh, chief of staff of the Vietnamese National Army. Lansdale became an unofficial adviser to Captain Pham Xuan Giai, head of the 5th Bureau (G-5), the psychological warfare department of the Vietnamese army general staff, and immediately set about to establish a school to train the Vietnamese troops in psywar as well as to enhance their image among the Vietnamese people.

Lansdale fervently believed it was necessary for Diem’s government to appeal directly to the Vietnamese population, and he planned to employ classic psywar tactics to enhance those efforts. “If the Viet Minh have sold the idea of being anti-French, the Vietnamese can sell the idea of being anti-Chinese and prove that the Viet Minh are controlled by Chinese,” he had written in a memorandum. Lansdale was convinced that the Viet Minh had waged a successful psychological campaign by word-of-mouth, and he was determined to counteract it through the use of his own word-of-mouth rumors, black leaflets and other psywar methods. The colonel also believed that he would be able to convert many of the Vietnamese who had fought with the Viet Minh against the French but who didn’t necessarily want to be Communist—they just wanted French rule to end.

Meanwhile, at the Geneva Conference, the French and the Communists finally reached an accommodation on July 21, 1954. With the effective cease-fire date of August 11, the U.S. military personnel ceiling was to be frozen at its existing number. Lansdale had to scramble to beat the deadline to beef up his SMM. Word quickly went out and 17 additional CIA officers were recruited, including Army Lt. Col. Gordon Jorgenson as Lansdale’s second-in-command. Many of these recruits held rank in the U.S. military as well as the CIA and had experience in paramilitary and clandestine intelligence operations, but, as Lansdale grumbled, none besides him had served in psywar operations.

“I still had no office, but I had been assigned a small bungalow on Rue Miche near the heart of town the week before,” Lansdale wrote in his autobiography. “Gathering my newcomers at the bungalow, I described the situation to them. They were to be trainers in counter guerrilla warfare, but the French had yet to give permission for U.S. training of the Vietnamese in subjects known by the team. They would have to be patient and wait.”

The Chief split his staff in half and put Conein in charge of the SMM team sent north, which would temporarily operate out of Hanoi with two objectives: develop a paramilitary organization that would be in place once the Viet Minh took over; and sabotage the Communist government. The southern team based in Saigon focused on trying to help Diem establish a stable government.

In addition to the cease-fire, the Geneva Accords stipulated that there was to be a phased disengagement of the French Union and Viet Minh forces, and the 17th Parallel was established as a dividing point; the Viet Minh would regroup north of the line, and the French forces would regroup in the south. With the French departure, the State of Vietnam was to become fully independent. After a period of two years, a unified national election would be held in 1956 that would determine the governance of all of Vietnam, north and south. Ho Chi Minh was confident he could win in such an election, but the French and Americans believed that Geneva’s two-year window would give them the time needed to build a viable nation in the south that could win over enough of the Vietnamese to elect a Diem-led government—one that would be open to U.S. influence.

The Geneva Accords’ Article 8 was key to achieving that goal. It declared that for a period of 300 days everyone in Vietnam could freely decide “in which zone he wishes to live.” Lansdale saw this as a “Geneva-given” chance for large numbers of Vietnamese to move from the north before the Communists took over. He hoped to be able to influence 2 million to migrate to the south, giving Diem the upper hand in the Geneva-mandated 1956 vote.

Rumors, Black Leaflets & Fortune Tellers

To effect his scheme for persuading northerners to move south, Lansdale needed to convince them that their living conditions would soon deteriorate under Communist rule. Working closely with the U.S. Information Service, Lansdale’s team began a disinformation campaign wherein Vietnamese G-5 soldiers dressed in civilian clothes were sent north to local marketplaces to spread a rumor that the Viet Minh had made a deal to allow Chinese troops into the north again, and that those troops were terrorizing the Vietnamese, raping women and stealing. To help sell the idea, villagers were reminded of how Chinese troops had behaved after World War II and were so frightened that many of them packed up and moved south. The rumors were so convincing that Lansdale reportedly received a query from officials in Washington, asking him if there was any credence to the report that two Chinese regular divisions were in north Vietnam.

Building on the successful rumor campaign, the SMM started printing and covertly distributing “black leaflets” that were purportedly from the Viet Minh. These leaflets gave instructions to citizens on how they should conduct themselves when the Viet Minh takeover of Hanoi occurred in October. Included in the disinformation was the Viet Minh’s program for “monetary reform.” The leaflet ignited anxiety that gained momentum among the populace.

Within two days of the leaflet’s distribution, the Viet Minh currency reportedly fell to half its previous value. At the same time, the number of North Vietnamese registering to emigrate south tripled. The Viet Minh leadership, which quickly understood what was happening, took to the airwaves to denounce the bogus leaflets. But, as a testament to the effectiveness of the ruse, many Viet Minh and their supporters were convinced that the Communists’ radio denunciations themselves were actually a psychological warfare trick undertaken by the French.

With this one black leaflet, Lansdale’s team was able to sabotage the Viet Minh currency and subvert Viet Minh population-control efforts. It also managed to throw rank and file Viet Minh cadre into a state of confusion and disarray—just weeks before they were to assume control of Hanoi.

Another extremely effective SMM project aimed at convincing northerners to migrate capitalized on the widespread Vietnamese belief in astrology and superstition, and leveraged Lansdale’s background in communications and advertising. Noting the popularity of soothsayers among the general populace and an absence of any publication that carried their predictions, he struck on the idea of printing an almanac of predictions for 1955 from well-known astrologers and noted fortunetellers. His team sought out and paid leading Vietnamese astrologers to make predictions about coming disasters that would transpire coincident with the Viet Minh takeover of northern Vietnam.

While the almanac predicted prosperity for those in the south, it foretold of hardship and calamity in the north, including bloody reprisals against villagers resisting Viet Minh economic and agrarian reforms. These almanacs were smuggled deep into Viet Minh territory, and to enhance their credibility, they were offered for sale rather than distributed for free. As Lansdale predicted, they were then passed along throughout the north, and the almanac proved to be an especially big seller in the main refugee port of Haiphong. Indeed, the almanac proved to be so popular among the Vietnamese that it had a second printing and turned a profit, which Lansdale used to subsidize his other operations.

Knowing firsthand the power of the press, Lansdale sought to destroy the largest printing presses in Hanoi, and in September the northern SMM team raced to the site, only to find that the Viet Minh had already placed security guards at the plant.

In an effort to destabilize the north’s infrastructure, Conein’s people in Hanoi attempted to sabotage the transportation systems—contaminating the oil supply of the city’s bus company and taking initial action to impair of the north’s railroad system. Lansdale also wanted to sabotage the north’s power and water plants, and its harbors and bridges, but the U.S. adherence to the Geneva Accords prevented such action. Nonetheless, the team did compile detailed notes to use for future paramilitary operations against those potential targets. Conein’s team left Hanoi along with the last French troops to depart the city on October 9, 1954.

To discourage northward migration from the south, the SMM concocted another black leaflet, purporting to originate with the Viet Minh Resistance Committee, that was distributed in southern Viet Minh zones by Vietnamese National Army soldiers disguised as civilians. It helpfully informed people heading to northern Vietnam that “they would be kept safe below decks from imperialist air and submarine attacks.” The missive also instructed refugees to bring warm clothing with them. The “warm clothing” reference was then carefully coupled with a word–of–mouth rumor campaign that Viet Minh were being sent into China to work as railroad laborers. Lansdale wanted Viet Minh supporters to remain south of the 17th Parallel voluntarily so they could be “re-educated later.” He also hoped—by getting their families to resist—to stop the abduction of other young men to the north by the Viet Minh.

The vast majority of the Vietnamese Catholics lived in the north, and many of them required little convincing to move south for a new start under the anti-Communist Catholic Diem. But Lansdale was taking no chances. For those on the fence, the SMM spread rumors that Catholics would be arrested and executed in the north, and that even “the Blessed Virgin Mary had gone south.”

In the end, the SMM efforts contributed to a massive flow of northerners to the south. An estimated 900,000 sought transport to the south, which in turn led to a huge refugee problem as thousands of registrants flooded the Haiphong port for passage. This situation provided Lansdale another prime opportunity to get international publicity and support. Ultimately, several nations volunteered to provide assistance and, along with ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, transported refugees south in “Operation Passage to Freedom.”

In return, only about 90,000 people left southern Vietnam for the north. Even so, the SMM took advantage of the northbound refugee flow to facilitate infiltration of Vietnamese agents who had been trained for future operations against the Hanoi government. The movements of the paramilitary teams and their supplies were made under the pretense of working with refugees. While Lansdale’s SMM was successful in smuggling men and supplies from Saigon to sites in the north, these Vietnamese paramilitary groups actually achieved very little.

As the Chief saw it, this massive influx to the south would have a material effect on the Geneva-mandated Vietnam-wide plebiscite specified for the summer of 1956. Ultimately, while Lansdale fell short of the 2 million he hoped for, the transfer served to bring the populations of northern and southern Vietnam into closer balance, at about 12 million apiece.

Diem Solidifies His Grip

Knowing his most important mission was to solidify Diem’s grip on power and improve the functioning of his government, Lansdale worked diligently to coerce and bribe many of Diem’s southern opponents into at least tacit support for the new south Vietnamese leader. He thwarted a plan by the Vietnamese National Army’s chief of staff to launch a coup against Diem, and he made significant cash payments to several leaders of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects to buy their support. The powerful Binh Xuyen criminal organization, which, with Bao Dai’s consent, controlled much of Saigon, proved the most difficult to deal with. Lansdale played a leading role in influencing key Cao Dai General Trinh Minh The into realigning with Diem after The had temporarily thrown his weight behind the Binh Xuyen in March 1955. With The’s support, Diem sent the army into the Cholon area of Saigon in April to brutally crush the sect.

As Diem’s support and power in the south grew and solidified, he was emboldened to undermine and erode Bao Dai’s political standing, and to make known his refusal to countenance the Geneva-mandated all-Vietnam election in 1956 that would likely pit himself against Ho Chi Minh. Lansdale was encouraging Diem that his prospects in such an election were good, and Western allies were hopeful that it would be the Viet Minh that would pull out of the accord, but Diem had other ideas.

On the anniversary of his installation as prime minister in July, Diem announced his intention to hold a referendum in October to determine the future of the country in the south. A week later, declaring a free and fair election with Communist participation impossible, Diem proclaimed, “We will not be tied down by the [Geneva] treaty that was signed against the wishes of the Vietnamese people.” France-based Bao Dai objected and ultimately removed Diem from his government, but was rendered impotent in Diem’s campaign against him. In early October, Diem announced the referendum, with himself and Bao Dai facing each other in the election, would take place October 23.

Hoping for an outcome similar to Magsaysay’s in the Philippines—a widely recognized fair election—Lansdale told Diem he would likely win overwhelmingly and that he should avoid rigging the vote. But that was not to be the case, and in an election fraught with intimidation and ballot stuffing, Diem emerged victorious with more than 98 percent of the vote. He was, however, thereafter viewed by many as morally compromised and corrupt.

While the United States had little choice but to accept and support Diem, even Lansdale’s immense efforts could not, in the long run, maintain American support for the leader in whom so much was invested. Diem would stand as America’s imperfect anti-Communist mainstay in Saigon until his overthrow and assassination in November 1963—green lighted by the Kennedy administration.

Without the assistance of Lansdale and the black operations of his CIA team, Diem’s success in achieving power and giving birth to the Republic of South Vietnam would have been highly unlikely.

Lansdale remained in Vietnam until the end of 1956, but would return in the 1960s as a major general. He was one of the first Americans to recognize the truly unconventional nature of the war in Vietnam, and his expertise in applied psychological warfare would not be matched by any other American officer. Edward Lansdale’s SMM operation in Vietnam only became known to the public with the release of the Pentagon Papers and the declassification of other confidential Pentagon documents in 1971.

Marc D. Bernstein is a freelance writer specializing in World War II, Korea and Vietnam. He is the author of Hurricane at Biak and numerous articles on modern military and naval history.

On 5/20/2005 at 0:47 PM, Ron Ecker said:

It's interesting that Hunt's autobiography Undercover skips from 1962, when Hunt went to work for Tracy Barnes in the Domestic Operations Division, to the summer of 1964. About two years of Hunt's life disappear, nothing of historical consequence having taken place during that time.

Ron

Interesting. Ashton Gray makes a similar observation about G. Gordon Liddy.

http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?/topic/9146-g-gordon-liddy-and-marathon-oil—1962-to-1963/

"G. Gordon Liddy was in the FBI from 1957 until September 1962, and prior to resigning in September 1962 had been involved in COINTELPRO. In his autobiography, "Will," he leaps from 1962 to 1965 with hardly a nod to anything in between except Too Much Information about the rhythm method, birth control pills, the Catholic religion in relation to all of that, and his crisis of faith."

8 hours ago, Chris Davidson said:

Let's connect that "pivot" angle of 17deg43min30sec from shots 2+3 to the magic bullet.

That's the same angle that was used for the magic bullet before the street slope was added into the equation.

Amazing that the "pivot" angle was derived using an average angle spanning 15 frames.

There is no magic bullet, but there sure is a magic angle.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwrExtVD005ONUtUSGVkVFA0d00/view?usp=sharing

 

 

 

12 hours ago, Chris Davidson said:

If you want to confirm the street angle shenanigan, look no further than the plat (upper-left) where the two distance span measurements are entered (28+24.5) = 52.5ft.

At the bottom, those same calculations as the previous graphic will yield a base distance of 52.72ft.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwrExtVD005OOWNhYmZsREcyTm8/view?usp=sharing

 

 

 

 

 

14 hours ago, Chris Davidson said:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwrExtVD005OR0dvMnlEUlQ3UVE/view?usp=sharing

Thank you David H and Michael C.

This is somewhat complicated to explain, but I'll try to make it as easy as possible.

The early determination of shot locations were designated on the SS plat of Dec5,1963 along with the FBI revision in Feb 1964.

They were labeled as Shot 1,2,3 but what they didn't label with a number (say 4) is the shot at extant z313.

I'll only deal with the shots labeled 2,3 to begin with.

The plat is on top and the calculations for those two shots below.

In the upper left hand corner is the description of the angle that was added to the "pivot" location.

Since there were two determinations of the street angle, 3deg8min(3.13degrees) and 3deg9min(3.15degrees), I used the final determined angle (Plat of May 1964) of 3.13degrees.

The shot labeled #3 is the location I have previously described as occurring down near Altgens position.

The plat dimensions above match the calculations below for the triangles formed in shot 2 and 3.

The only difference between shot 2 and 3 is the angle of 3.13degrees (14.595-17.725) which is described as the street grade. 

17deg43min30sec = 17.725 degrees

 

 

 

 

 

 

On 5/12/2017 at 4:19 PM, David G. Healy said:

nice job Chris(s), David J., etal....

Agreed!

53 minutes ago, Thomas Graves said:

You have?

LOL

And I DID.

7 minutes ago, Thomas Graves said:

Like Michael Clark said about himself somewhere, I don't have much to add but I do like to "bump" old threads.

Ack

Edit... I've come a long way...!

And I DID ask.

2 minutes ago, Chris Newton said:

Considering "the bomb" shenanigans and with the Isrealis and all the Assassinations and Coups that were the CIA modus Operandi. I'd put JJA and AWD on equal footing as possible co-conspirators along with someone in Military Intelligence.

That's a dozen theories rolled in to one.

thats a lot to unpack. 

I was hinting at an isolated dog-leg on a chunk of the JFKA.

Cheers,

Michael

12 minutes ago, Chris Newton said:

Per John Newman in "Oswald and the CIA" it has to go as high as J.J. Angleton, does he report to someone or is he a principal?

Sounds like a Principal to me.

Assuming a possible reading, largely informed by Mr. Varnell, but in no way implying that I understand my rendition as his, I am musing on the following.

Stratospere-level "Deciders" ( I'll just put Dulles at 35,000 feet, for arguments sake) get that job down to Hunt, and the likes. Algleton is bypassed and is the victim of a distraction campaign. On 11-22-63, he gets blindsided; and he can never admit to that.

Bang-zoom! 

JA is owned,; and the CIA can say that it was not a top-down operation.

????

I re-issued it . It was quickly mocked ridiculed and derailed. So I tried a different format.

Edit*** moderators have cleaned this thread-up. 

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32262642.pdf

------------------------------

p.25

Connection with Dallas criminals.

Informant advised that David Yaris brother formally was a boss of the criminal organization in Dallas Texas.

---------------------------

P.26.

David Yaras owns an interest in 8–1 industrial uniform company. Patrick is a partner of Rocco Pallanza, a in 000.

------------------

P.27

meetings at OC in San Francisco

p.3 informant advised in November 1963 that in September 1963 there was a meeting at the Mark Hopkins Hotel in San Francisco and present was David Yaras, his son Ronald, Leonard Patrick, Louis Tom Dragna, and Nicolo Licata. Dragna is a La Cosa Nostra member and Licata is an underboss of the Cosa Nostra in the LA area. Several weeks later the same group met again and present was Ernest Debs , an LA county supervisor who is a close friend of California Governor Pat Brown and allegedly a pay off man for big people in LA.

Nick "Old Man" Licata (February 20, 1897 - October 19, 1974) was an Italian American mobster who was the Boss of the Los Angeles crime family from 1967 until his death in 1974.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nick_Licata_(mobster)

------------------------

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32576427.pdf

Licata, DeSimonne

------------------

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32576148.pdf

1965 Dallas FBI memo on Rome Joseph Francis Civillo investigation

------------------

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/docid-32576426.pdf

1965 FBI memo on Colombo family meeting in Fla. 

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10135-10047.pdf

To*: Teheran

Routine Plargyle

For Ambassador Helms from Maury

Refs:

A. Dir 477397

B. (redact) 17-8 21979

C. (Redact) 21990

1. At Senate armed services committee party 13 December, I asked Tom Korologos, Deputy Assistant for Legislative affairs, if he could throw light on bigger problem. He said in confidence Baker had discussed agency/Watergate matter with him and made clear that Bakers central hang up is thesis advanced by Copeland and St. George that agency staged Watergate in order to entrap plumbers. Korologos indicated Baker may have been particularly influenced by Copeland allegations. 

2. On December 13, Lyle Miller, with Baker's permission, received 190 page transcript of Martinez testimony before Baker. In general, Martinez account of significant developments consistent with agency testimony and records available to Baker. Moreover, Martinez said Sturges denied allegations which St. George attributes to him. However, Martinez did state to Baker that he consider tradecraft of plumbers unbelievably faulty. From this Baker apparently infers that his faulty tradecraft was deliberate on part of at least one of participants who sought thereby to lead other participants into trap. Martinez flatly denied St. George allegation that he was "anyone's double agent."

3. Understand another advocate of the "Entrapment" theory, (not necessarily entrapment by CIA, but merely entrapment by a mysterious "third force") is Ed Henley, former OGC staffer and more recently senior official with Mobile Oil and known to be on close terms with Baker.

4. Several days ago in response to your query from Tom Braden we sent Braden a copy of the memo given Symington and 7 November and quoted in reference A., paragraph 4. On 13 December we received from Braden, without covering comment, a copy of the "Tom Braden Report", (apparently a newsletter, understand he is no longer associated with Los Angeles Times although they syndicate his material) of 11 December entitled "Can He Blame it on CIA?",  full text, which has not yet appeared in any publication we know of, as follows:

"Washington – the last turn in the defense of Richard Nixon will be to blame the Watergate on the Central intelligence Agency. Such is the view of former CIA director Richard Helms, and such is the direction in which senator Howard Baker (R. Tennessee) and his minority staff on the Ervin Comittee, are now proceeding. It is not a very salable theory, but it's about all that's left;  and if it could be made sellable, it might get Richard Nixon off the hook. Consider: if CIA accomplished the break-in, the subsequent White House cover up might be excused on the grounds that the president had to protect this secret intelligence agency. And if the cover-up could be excused on that ground, unrelated crimes such as illegal contributions, forgeries and alleged extortions might be pardoned as mistakes of judgment arising from excessive political zeal. Thus, "some sinister force" General Alexander Haig put it to Judge J Sirica the other day, might eventually be used to explain it all. Three recent magazine articles – two published in the National Review by a former CIA employee named miles Copeland, The other published in Harpers by Andrew Saint George – suggest the President' last stand. Senator Baker has called the attention of all three articles to his colleagues on the Ervin committee.  Copeland alleges that the Watergate operation was CIA's is retaliation against the White House for setting up the plumbers as a rival apparatus. "McCord took Liddy into the trap," he writes, "and after all, the CIA specialists in operations of the plumbers's kind had a lot to gain by putting the White House clowns out of business. "St. George makes a similar allegation and adds detail worthy of 007 and a Fleming novel: "Ha, well," he quotes Helms as telling the young watch officer he telephoned him to report the break-in, "they finally did it… A pity; they really blew it… If the White House tries to ring me,… Just tell them you reported McCord's arrest already. Said I was very surprised." Senator Baker has also asked his colleagues to view an 38 page memorandum prepared by one of his investigators name George Murphy. Murphy's findings, Baker hints, implicate the CIA. Does the theory that the CIA is at the bottom of the Watergate makes sense? Is it a reasonable Presidential deffence? Richard helms has testified as follows: "I am prepared to swear that no such conversation with the CIA watch officer ever took place... The quotations attributed to me… We're never said by me. Of this I am certain". From the time he first learned of the Watergate break-in, Helms has been afraid that it would be blamed on him. Put yourself for a moment in his shoes. You're a career servant. You join the Office of Strategic Services during the war and you stayed on to help a series of directors build the first US intelligence service.President Lyndon Johnson has made you it's director. You feel the responsibility keenly. Now consider what happens to you in the subsequent administration. First, an old friend of the president, Patrick Gray, is appointed to be chief of your major rival agency. One month later, you are told by H. R. Haldeman that the President has appointed another old friend, George Vernon Walters, to be your deputy. Another month later, and just after the break in, you and your new deputy are summoned to the White House. You listen while Haldeman tells your deputy that "it has been decided " that he should go to Gray and ask him not to investigate the money found on the burglars because it might expose your operations.  For the next few days, the White House calls to discuss the break-in and to suggest that you pay money to the families of those arrested. 11 days after the break-in and on the eve of your departure for a long scheduled trip, Gray calls to cancel an appointment you had made with him. With this sequence of events in mind, what would you suppose? That people at the White House might be trying to blame the Watergate on you? That's what Helms supposed and supposes still."

5. On 14 December Baker met with Robert Bennett, of Mullen company, his father Senator Wallace Bennet and George Murphy to review agency memos covering our relationships with Mullen Company.after meeting, which lasted two hours, bakery emerged and told Lila Miller for everything Ben it said was consistent with what we had told bigger and it was becoming clearer that agency not involved but Baker reserves option to pursue matter furthersince he doesn't want to go to his grave without having gotten to the bottom of it. Indicating he is still receiving information implicating agency, he asked Fred Thompson, minority Council of Ervin committee, if you should tell Miller "about the money".Thompson advised him not to, remarking he was not sure of his source. We have no idea what this refers to.

6. Many thanks to reference C, which has been discussed with Colby, who is commenting to you there on directly.

7. Warmest regards and seasons greetings

EEIMPDET

Date 17 Dec., 73

Orig. J. M Maury

https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=62363&relPageId=212

Bernard Barker..... AMCLATTER 1

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10164-10000.pdf

P49. Substantial background information. Former captain of USAF

crypto,s 

https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10164-10000.pdf

AMBLINK 1

AMBIDDY 1 (p.22)

AMRASP  (p.22)

AMHAWK  (p.22)

AMCIGAR  (p.22)

TWICKER  (p.22)

AMWAIL  (p.22)

KUBARK (p.37)

AMSERVE (p.37)

Who is "Identity A" on p.38?

What is E. Howard Hunt's Crypto, McCord's, Liddy's, Landsdale's?

Liggett s and Cornell U.

Malcolm Liggett earned a PHD from Cornell U. 1967.

------------------

A James Liggett also earned a PHD from Cornell.

https://archive.org/stream/JFKAssassinationFBI/62-109060 JFK Assassination Part 4_djvu.txt

TRANSLATION PROM ITALIAN 

✓ * ■'"&'** '* 

^ /I Sv*s: 9 *i* 1 ' 4 » t { l r 'i-tt* F- + 

^ w * T 4 

The envelope is addressed to the FBI, Washington, • 
(IWp.>)i V. S. A. It bears the postmark of Livorno (Leghorn}^ 
Italy, Stated November 25, 1963, 8:00 P. M. 


! 


The communication is on letterhead reading: 

August^Diax 

Attorney 

Via Serri8tori, 2 

Livorno (Leghorn), Italy. 

« ’ -■ ■■■ * 

Leghorn, November 25, 1963 


To thfe FBI . ^ . 

Gentlemen: . ■ 

The only way you will be able to lay hands on the • 
true and ferocious assassin of President Kennedy and him 
accomplices is by arresting all the policemen of Dallas, from 
the chief down to the last mao. 


time. 


Bovever, perhaps you have already wasted too much 
Best regards. 


81gned: (illegible) - 

Found on this website

https://www.albany.edu/~milne/06-15-2008.html

Malcolm Liggett obituary

http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/tcpalm/obituary.aspx?page=lifestory&pid=109226042

Malcolm Liggett Obituary - Stuart, FL | TC Palm

Malcolm H. Liggett, 78, died May 5, 2008 at his home. He was born in Idylwild, Md. He served in the Air Force during the Korean War. He was an instructor at Cornell University and moved on to be an associate professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and San Francisco State University. He was a labor economist at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for three years and from 1975 to1981, he served the Office for Wage and Price Stability in the Executive Office of the President. He was an associate professor of Labor Relations at Penn State Harrisburg and served for two years in the University Faculty Senate of Pennsylvania State University and was a committee chair on the Academic and Athletic Committee. In May of 1995, he was certified as a county mediator by the Florida Supreme Court and in 1999 was the founding editor of the 19th Judicial Circuit's quarterly newsletter for mediators. He was a member of the Vista Plantation Golf League. He graduated with honors from the University of Texas at Austin with a bachelor's degree in government and received his doctorate in economics from Cornell University. Survivors include his wife, Suzanne of Vero Beach; brother, Thomas Liggett of Bedford, Texas; and sister, Patricia Diaz of North Las Vegas, Nev. Memorial donations may be made to McKee Botanical Garden, 350 U.S. 1,Vero Beach, FL 32962. SERVICES: Arrangements are by Strunk Funeral Home and Crematory in Vero Beach.Published in the TC Palm on May 8, 2008

https://www.history-matters.com/archive/jfk/other/yeltsin/html/Yeltsin_0028a.htm

Info on Malcolm liggette

http://prabook.com/web/person-view.html?profileId=197700