David Talbot: Allen Dulles, CIA and Rise of America's Secret Government

[James DiEugenio]

As I said above, about Operation Forty, there were two last points i wanted to make.

The last one is pretty simple.

What is amazing about the Bay of Pigs debacle is that so many people involved in it come back as suspects in 1963.

You have for example, Ferrie and Banister in New Orleans, along with Sergio Arcacha Smith who is with Rose Cheramie on the way to Dallas.

Then you have the utterly compelling Bernardo De Torres, who was supposed to have been in Dealey Plaza and reputedly had pictures of the assassination.

Then there is Morales who Fonzi made a suspect in The Last Investigation.

And, of course, Hunt and Phillips.

Finally going to near the top, Dulles.

I should add, I once found a letter from a CIA agent who worked closely with Dulles and tangentially on the Bay of Pigs, who once said that in his view the Bay of Pigs was the motivating factor behind the murder of JFK. I mean even Bugliosi admits this is a tangible motive for the Cubans to get involved.

In my view the Cubans were used at the bottom and whipped into a frenzy by the likes of Hunt and Phillips into going along with it (like Hunt did with the burglars for Watergate). But the people at the apex had a lot more riding on the assassination than just Cuba or revenge for the BOP.

Between 1961 and 1963, JFK showed he was going to be a problem all over the globe.

Edited August 27, 2015 by James DiEugenio

[Chris Newton]

In my view the Cubans were used at the bottom and whipped into a frenzy by the likes of Hunt and Phillips into going along with it (like Hunt did with the burglars for Watergate).

Jim,

There is no doubt that the CIA propaganda machine was hard at work here. I believe this story of JFK culpability came from higher levels at CIA and was quickly pushed down to the likes of Hunt, Philips and others. At the operational level at CIA you see and hear the same bitterness and oft repeated myths that you hear from the Cuban exile community. Even today when I was listening to what appears to be High School students from the Miami Latin community asking the veterans of BoP about their experience I hear questions like "How did you feel when you found out Kennedy cancelled the airstrikes?". This theme is clearly being repeated to new generations. Has this become so ingrained that its become a political tool of the right wing to attempt to keep the Cuban community in the Republican Party? When I listen to otherwise intelligent people, CFO's, CEO's, people with PHD's and MBA's all repeat the same thing, "Kennedy and by osmosis the Democrats" failed us, I wonder?

Initially, even the exiles admit, that the goal of the Brigade was not a full scale invasion but a plan to infiltrate teams to instigate change from within the island. I've heard several of the early recruits to Brigade 2506 describe this shift and how it changed the training they were receiving. If this shift coincided with the election then it could be presumed that Kennedy was certainly being "set up" by CIA or powers at a higher level.

The CIA has a long history of "pumping up the opposition" as it did secretly leading up to the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 with promises that the US would intervene militarily - even though it was clear that there was no intention to do so in the Executive Branch. (It's clear that Allen Dulles was also responsible for this "propaganda".)

[Larry Hancock]

Chris, as I recently told Jim, having reviewed some new source material from Naval officers associated with the project its pretty clear that the planning assumption was that Ike had at least given a head nod to rules of engagement which would have allowed Naval support of the Brigade ships all the way into birthing at the docks at the original landing. There is virtually no doubt that would have led to attacks on American planes or ships and Ike would have allowed American combat to proceed from that point. There is little doubt you would have seen full engagement - which is why the fighter bombers were deployed on the command carrier in the first place (which sailed with ordinance for the aircraft). Once JFK demanded that such plans actually be written down and reviewed all that would have gone out the window and he continually demanded more restrictive rules of engagement. You will find posts on my blog which go into this information and sources in some detail. You also have to remember that the operation was supposed to have gone in before Ike left office. And to make matters worse, based on statements from the American brigade leaders - which they passed on to the exiles - Bissell kept giving them assurances of a level of air support over the landing that was simply never going to happen with JFK's directives. Perhaps somebody did expect JFK to cave but if so they did a terrible job of laying out the issues for him in real time even once they knew the initial strike had failed to produce the degree of Cuban air force losses everyone had agreed was necessary for the landing.

[Chris Newton]

Larry,

My comment about the strategic planning and it's operational impact to the trainees is backed by the CIA IG Report.

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB341/IGrpt1.pdf page 3 lays out the initial plan given a nod by Ike.

The date given is Mar 17th, 1960 of the 'formal" adoption of the plan. Brigade 2506 recruitment stated in April 1960.

Additionally at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB355/ you find the following:

In perhaps the most important revelation of the entire official history, the CIA task force in charge of the paramilitary assault did not believe it could succeed without becoming an open invasion supported by the U.S. military. On page 149 of Volume III, Pfeiffer quotes still-secret minutes of the Task Force meeting held on November 15, 1960, to prepare a briefing for the new President-elect, John F. Kennedy: “Our original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted,” the document states. “Our second concept (1,500-3000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action.”

One specific example of the training I cited is the training received by those designated to be "radio operators". The first months of thier training concerned portable man-pack communications gear that was not "voice" but morse - suitable for small infiltration teams. Later, when the shift to a large landing occurred they were re-trained on larger heavier transmission gear that was a "voice" based. As it turned out, the more sophisticated communications gear was lost when the boats were damaged and destroyed and it wasn't until D-DAY+1 when smaller morse based man packs were parachuted in that they could communicate from the beach to "base".

[Larry Hancock]

No doubt about that Chris, and honestly its hard to conclude that Ike felt deniablity was all that important a concern. He had agreed to proceed with Brigade style military effort, with all the support elements normally found in such operations. Even David Phillips was shocked to find out that the CIA had been assigned to conduct a "covert" operation which included tanks and tank landing craft. In one of the December meetings, Ike even expressed a desire to be more aggressive with the plan and asked if something could not be done to provoke an immediate military incident which would justify committing the force. In his post election meeting with JFK Ike urged doing whatever was necessary and no doubt JFK was surprised to find out that there was virtually noting in writing for his review - which of course was not that unusual for Eisenhower. You can trace things over first months of 1962, as more gets put in writing and reviewed, JFK continually applied more restraints and some of the dialog looks very much like he was offering the CIA the chance to back off and say they it would not work under those constraints. Even the Joint Chiefs study group advised CIA in its report that a single operational Cuban aircraft over the beach could well take out sufficient key ships to doom the effort; absolute total control of the air space was mandatory.

[Chris Newton]

Larry, I concur.

It's interesting that Jacob Esterline, chief of ops for the invasion was asked, "Your superior, Richard Bissell, made some critical decisions that affected the invasion. What were your opinions about him?" Esterline's answer, "I am forced to a very unhappy conclusion, that is that he was lying down and lying up for reasons I don't yet totally understand...".

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB341/interview.pdf

[James DiEugenio]

Some really good stuff by Larry and Chris..

Chris has actually linked to the Kirkpatrick Report in post 79. So if anyone has not read this, here is an opportunity to do so free of charge.

Chris' crucial comment here: I believe this story of JFK culpability came from higher levels at CIA and was quickly pushed down to the likes of Hunt, Philips and others.

This is almost dead on, but needs amending. The cover story about the mythological cancelled D Day air strikes was prepared by Dulles to be written up by Hunt himself. It was then handed to Charles Murphy of the Lucepress' business mouthpiece, Fortune. As I commented on it above, the actual article goes beyond just Cuba and paints JFK as a naive ingenue who listens to the wrong people and who has now endangered the USA as to the communist threat. IT was pure black propaganda since Dulles and Hunt knew the truth.

But there is little doubt that from here Hunt and Phillips used this tall tale to inflame the Cubans--and this involved those in the operation--that somehow this was JFK's failure. I mean just look at Morales's famous outburst.

And Chris that now famous memo which admitted the operation could not succeed unless it was supported by the DOD, you combine that with Larry's new info about the naval operation, and three things become even more apparent:

1.) The concept seemed to change as time went on, but then JFK put many more strictures on it than Eisenhower did.

2.) This information complements the call JFK made to Ike after. That call is very revealing of the two different philosophies in play. See, Kennedy was not going to assert direct American power in the Third World, or if he did it was minimal and not crucial. Eisenhower was willing to do it, as was Nixon.

3.) There was no point in going through with the operation under these new strictures since, as the Pentagon understood, it could not succeed without naval intervention--which as Larry points out--Ike was willing to contribute from the start. And that is what Burke's convoy was doing out there, with planes that could reach Cuba in 18 minutes or so. The only reason to go through with the thing at this point was if Kennedy was going to reverse himself and commit American forces.

BTW, Dulles lied about this during the Taylor Commission hearings. When Bobby Kennedy asked him what the purpose of the invasion was with 1500 men against a much larger Castro army, Dulles replied it was to build a beachhead up. RFK was flabbergasted:

"How could you possibly do that --take 1,000 or 1,400 men in there and hold the beachhead against these thousands of militia!" Clearly, RFK had read Kirkpatrick's report and was well versed on this key issue. (DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, second edition,p. 42)

I agree with Greg, the Taylor Commission is not as well written, as well organized, or as pointed as Kirkpatrick, but its value is in the actual interviews it has. Because, in addition to the BS about a beachhead, Dulles actually tried to deny that they were really reliant on defections also. Yet, he was countered on this by both Rusk and McNamara who said that this was the way the invasion was presented to them. Rusk was perfectly blunt on this: "The uprising was utterly essential to success in tems of ousting Castro." (ibid, italics added) And both Shoup and Lemnitzer backed them on this point. When asked who gave them the intelligence that uprisings were imminent, they both said it was the CIA. So Dulles was caught in another lie. (ibid)

Dulles was then caught in a third lie. The CIA had told Kennedy that if the invasion failed, the option was to "go guerrilla". Bobby Kennedy made sure that he got several officials to testify that this was repeated to them also. Dean Rusk said that he recalled that the Cubans were to head for the hills if the invasion faltered. Lemnitzer said he has been told the same. He even said that from what he was told, the guerrilla option was a main component of the plan. (ibid, p. 43)

This was a blatant misrepresentation. And when Lemnitzer learned of it he said, "Then we were badly misinformed." As everyone knows the hills were 85 miles away through heavy swamp. But even worse, when the commission interviewed the Cubans, they said they had never been informed or trained on this option.

So what was the object then? If there were no real defections possible, no guerrilla training, and if Kennedy had placed harsh strictures on the use of the Navy and pilots, and had cut back on the preliminary bombing and said the D Day bombing could only come from a beachhead, I mean what sense or logic guided it all?

None. Except that Dulles monumentally misjudged JFK.

Edited August 28, 2015 by James DiEugenio

[Cliff Varnell]

Chris, as I recently told Jim, having reviewed some new source material from Naval officers associated with the project its pretty clear that the planning assumption was that Ike had at least given a head nod to rules of engagement which would have allowed Naval support of the Brigade ships all the way into birthing at the docks at the original landing. There is virtually no doubt that would have led to attacks on American planes or ships and Ike would have allowed American combat to proceed from that point. There is little doubt you would have seen full engagement - which is why the fighter bombers were deployed on the command carrier in the first place (which sailed with ordinance for the aircraft). Once JFK demanded that such plans actually be written down and reviewed all that would have gone out the window and he continually demanded more restrictive rules of engagement. You will find posts on my blog which go into this information and sources in some detail. You also have to remember that the operation was supposed to have gone in before Ike left office. And to make matters worse, based on statements from the American brigade leaders - which they passed on to the exiles - Bissell kept giving them assurances of a level of air support over the landing that was simply never going to happen with JFK's directives. Perhaps somebody did expect JFK to cave but if so they did a terrible job of laying out the issues for him in real time even once they knew the initial strike had failed to produce the degree of Cuban air force losses everyone had agreed was necessary for the landing.

A terrible job, indeed.

The central not-yet-answered question for me is why Dulles was in Puerto Rico if the plan all along was to pressure Kennedy.

The top salesman didn't want to be around to sell his product?

This makes no sense whatsoever.

Did Dulles sabotage the BOP in order for it to blow up in Kennedy's face, somehow forcing him to intervene?

Or did Lovett/Rusk sabotage the BOP in order to get rid of Allen Dulles?

Looks to me Rusk was far more pro-active changing the plan...

[James DiEugenio]

CV: The top salesman didn't want to be around to sell his product?

Its incredible to me that you don't see the problem in this.

If Dulles had been there and pleaded with JFK to enter the fray, would it not have been even more obvious that either 1.) He didn't know what he was talking about in the first place, or 2.) He had deliberately misrepresented the plan's chance for success from the start.

As anyone who has studied Kennedy's reactions during the crisis understands, one of the things that had him so upset was the fact that no one had objected to the logistics of the plan when they voted on it. Even though it was capsized from day one. (In fact, this is why he installed the taping system after. So no one could then deny what they said in deliberations, as he felt they did about Operation Zapata.)

Then you have the guy who grandfathered it saying that if he does not commit, its sunk?

If that was the case, Kennedy may have not even have gone through the two inquiries. He may have fired him right there.

Another thing you don't seem to understand Cliff is this: JFK really meant it when he said there would be no American direct intervention in Cuba. In fact, as far as I can see, Kennedy did not do this anywhere for three years. He deliberately avoided it. Dulles did not understand this. Which is why he went crying to Nixon when he did get back, which is another interesting point you make little of.

Edited August 28, 2015 by James DiEugenio

[Chris Newton]

James I think your commentary is spot on.

I do think though that Kennedy WH has some culpability. If they were not happy with the Trinidad landing zone because it was in an area that was too populated, they should have cancelled the whole thing. There were too many factors involved to think it that a major changes could be eked out in three days time.

Operationally:

The Cubans fought really well, with air superiority the conflict could have lasted much longer. If crucial supplies along with the north eastern paratroop drop had been allowed to occur as planned - Castro's armor might have been stopped as it was on the west flank. As it was the transport aircraft was under air attack and dropped that crucial force without it's anti-tank weapons miles from the designated drop zone.

There is a youtube movie I watched that was produced by Cuban TV that had english subtitles. One of the Militiamen was interviewed and described how badly their ass was handed to them because the weapons the exiles (mercenaries they called them) used totally outclassed their own. Shear numbers is/was no guarantee of success.

I don't understand the logic of canceling the second wave of FAR air attacks on D-Day and then allowing them back at D+1 and D+2 to try to support the beachhead. If Castro had no air power his Armor and especially his Artillery might have been devestated by the few FAR B-26's that were left.

The BoP Veterans describe watching their aircraft from the transport ships returning from the first strike and wiggling their wings as they passed over. This was in the morning and they expected to see them on the return run and were quite surprised when they didn't. The next plane they describe seeing was a lone Cuban fighter that made strafing runs on their ship.

That incident and not seeing their aircraft again should have raised every red flag in the invasion fleet.

[Cliff Varnell]

CV: The top salesman didn't want to be around to sell his product?

Its incredible to me that you don't see the problem in this.

David Atlee Phillips didn't see a problem with it.

He seemed to have been pining for Dulles' presence.

If Dulles had been there and pleaded with JFK to enter the fray, would it not have been even more obvious that either 1.) He didn't know what he was talking about in the first place, or 2.) He had deliberately misrepresented the plan's chance for success from the start.

And so he was counting on Charles Cabell to avoid the same critique?

The Agency didn't know what it was talking about in the first place, or it had deliberately misrepresented the plan's chance for success from the start, that's what you're saying Kennedy would conclude from talking to Dulles?

How does having Dulles gone make that any less apparent to JFK?

As anyone who has studied Kennedy's reactions during the crisis understands, one of the things that had him so upset was the fact that no one had objected to the logistics of the plan when they voted on it. Even though it was capsized from day one.

Then you have the guy who grandfathered it saying that if he does not commit, its sunk?

Isn't that what Dulles wanted Cabell to tell Kennedy?

So Dulles didn't want to be on the receiving end of Kennedy's scathing critique so he thought Cabell would get a completely different response?

If that was the case, Kennedy may have not even have gone through the two inquiries. He may have fired him right there.

Another thing you don't seem to understand Cliff is this: JFK really meant it when he said there would be no American direct intervention in Cuba.

Jim, you don't seem to understand that this contradicts your claim that Dulles expected something else.

[James DiEugenio]

Chris:

I think Kennedy sent in the air support later in order to cover the navy's ability to get out survivors.

If you recall, the naval support by the second day was something like 50 miles out there.

And by this time, it was clear that no beach head was going to be established.

This is why I don't like to focus on the air aspect. Ultimately I do not think that would have made any difference. There was no surprise, there were no defections. Two ships sunk on the reef. The bridges were not blown.

The whole thing was doomed from the start. And that DOD report you cite is even more proof of it in addition to the confessions by Dulles and Bissell.

What one should take away from this is Kennedy's refusal to bail out the operation. This is paralleled by his refusal to commit combat troops into SVN and his refusal to bomb the missile silos. IMO, this was part of a political philosophy that had been formed awhile ago. And Dulles did not seem to be fully aware of that.

He was after.

Edited August 28, 2015 by James DiEugenio

[Cliff Varnell]

Chris:

I think Kennedy sent in the air support later in order to cover the navy's ability to get out survivors.

If you recall, the naval support by the second day was something like 50 miles out there.

And by this time, it was clear that no beach head was going to be established.

This is why I don't like to focus on the air aspect. Ultimately I do not think that would have made any difference. There was no surprise, there were no defections. Two ships sunk on the reef. The bridges were not blown.

The whole thing was doomed from the start.

Was it doomed prior to Kennedy's election?

And that DOD report you cite is even more proof of it in addition to the confessions by Dulles and Bissell.

Those "confessions" don't hold water.

Sounds like a cover story concocted after the fact.

If Dulles intended all along to pressure Kennedy he would have been around to pressure Kennedy.

Otherwise the whole strategy doesn't make sense.

What one should take away from this is Kennedy's refusal to bail out the operation. This is paralleled by his refusal to commit combat troops into SVN and his refusal to bomb the missile silos. IMO, this was part of a political philosophy that had been formed awhile ago. And Dulles did not seem to be fully aware of that.

He was after.

[Chris Newton]

James,

Tactically the air cover was everything. Even though we had this great experience of amphibious assaults in WW2, none of those assaults were attempted without securing the air over the landing zones. In fact many of those assaults were disastrous in their planning, Iwo Jima's sandy beaches, Peleliu's sea walls and coral reefs, there were so many failures at Normandy that it's a miracle that it succeeded at all.

Four B-26's returned to the beachhead on the morning of D+2 and turned one of the main roads into Playa Giron into a bloodbath, knocking out eight tanks and many troop carriers. Three of those planes were shot down and four american pilots were killed along with several cuban pilots. B-26's incidentally usually have a rear gunner - these were removed to allow them to hold additional fuel tanks so that they could reach airfields all over the Island. This probably contributed to the loss of many of these bombers - another disastrous decision.

The Cubans suffered over five thousand casualties to the exiles five hundred. Castro had very little success until the exiles ran out of ammo. Consider this, the exiles hit the beach and successfully landed four thousand rounds for their 4.2mm mortars. I think Castro captured twelve rounds. Food, medical supplies, communication gear and reserve ammo either went down with the damaged ships or disappeared with the two supply ships that fled - all because there was no air cover.

[Chris Newton]

Was it doomed prior to Kennedy's election?

Cliff - I think it had no chance of success the day after the election. The Brigade was half the size that it would become in the coming months leading up to the invasion.

Did it have a chance after Kennedy took office?

The force was still too small. They depended on a popular uprising but they made no serious attempt to arm or train a resistance such as the OSS had done in WW2. They only had one weeks worth of re-supply, I don't see any discussion in any plans of how they would continue after that. Bobby Kennedy's after-action question of what was the Brigade's strategic objective and the CIA's answer that it was just to establish a beachhead is telling. Bobby was correct to be appalled. I recently heard a Felix Rodriguez interview where he talks about the Castros very effective counter-insurgency strategy, brutal but effective.

Once Kennedy cancelled the plan to use Trinidad, the CIA should have stepped up to the plate and cancelled the whole thing. That they did not and instead blamed Kennedy's restrictions on the failure is an obfuscation of the basic facts.

Edited August 28, 2015 by Chris Newton