Oliver Stone's New JFK Documentaries and the Vietnam War

[James DiEugenio]

Thanks so much,  as this confirms what I heard from a veteran.

[Michael Griffith]

In 1996, LCDR Nancy V. Kneipp wrote a superb project paper titled The Tet Offensive and the Principles of War for the Naval War College. Making good use of the North Vietnamese sources available at the time, Kneipp provided important insights about the events leading up to the Tet Offensive and the offensive itself. Let us consider some of those insights.

Kneipp noted that Hanoi’s leaders decided to launch the Tet Offensive because they perceived that the tide of the war was turning against them, that time was no longer on their side, and that their protracted guerilla-war strategy had to be abandoned because it had proved to be “unsuccessful”:

Until 1967, the North Vietnamese believed that victory in the South could be won using military dau tranh. The main debate was the type of armed struggle to be used. Most early activities used classic Maoist-style guerrilla warfare, concentrating on rural areas.

Things changed in 1967 for several reasons. Hanoi was surprised by the scope and pace of the U.S. buildup between 1965 and 1967. Allied search-and-destroy missions were disrupting logistics support to the People's Army of North Vietnam (PAVN) and National Liberation Front (NLF) forces, causing a significant decline in combat capability. Further, U.S. pacification efforts and South Vietnamese popular acceptance of the Americans contributed to a decline in NLF morale. By mid-1967, North Vietnamese leaders formally acknowledged that time was no longer on their side. The only hope for liberating the South was the withdrawal of U.S. forces, which, they agreed, would occur only when the cost of the war exceeded its benefits. Since the previous way of war had been unsuccessful, it was time for a change.

General Vo Nguyen Giap proposed a new direction, Tong Cong Kick, Tong Khoi Ngia (TCK-TKN)--General Offensive, General Uprising. (pp. 3-4)

Kneipp observed that the Hanoi regime launched the Tet Offensive based their belief that most South Vietnamese would rise up and aid Communist forces and that South Vietnam’s army (ARVN) would collapse when attacked, and based on their acceptance of erroneous status reports coming from the National Liberation Front (NLF) in South Vietnam:

It was widely believed in Hanoi that the South Vietnamese masses were ready to support the communists-they were so unhappy and disliked the Americans so much that they would overthrow the Thieu regime if given a little encouragement. They also believed that the GVN was on the verge of collapse; the ARVN was so inefficient it would disintegrate as a coherent military organization rather than fight; and attacks on Allied C3 systems would halt the American partnership in the war.

Additionally, the NLF claimed to have secret underground organizations in all communities in South Vietnam as well as control of four-fifths of the area; guerrilla units consistently submitted reports of the "vigorous movement in the South”; and urban cadres, wishing to keep their soft jobs and avoid the harsh guerrilla jungle life, consistently submitted enthusiastic progress reports-all were false. In other words, force planning for the Offensive was based on faulty assumptions and misinformation. Further, when Southern commanders, to their horror, were directed to prepare for TCK-TKN, they could not "lose face" by protesting or admitting the truth-they had to support the decision as best they could.

Similarly, for the plan to work, it was necessary for regular forces and local forces to coordinate closely. When effective coordination did not occur and local forces faced situations they could not handle alone, they were hesitant to report it to higher headquarters. As a result, the plan could not be effectively supported with available forces and readiness levels. From an economy of force perspective, the Offensive had little chance of success. (pp. 11-12)

Kneipp explained that Hanoi’s leaders made false assumptions about what Westmoreland would do as the date for the offensive neared. North Vietnamese army (NVA/PAVN) officers failed to communicate key information to some subordinate units, resulting in debacles such as the abortive attack on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon:

Even though intelligence collection and peripheral attacks provided insight into enemy intentions and although they were master manipulators and deceivers, the Communists fell into a "mirror imaging" trap. Although they accurately predicted the U.S. government and GVN [South Vietnam’s government] response to their extended truce proposal, they did not correctly assess the U.S. Army response. They expected that General Westmoreland and the U.S. Army to be controlled from Washington, to follow orders with virtually no deviation or independent thought. This was not the case; General Westmoreland was against the extended truce. In fact, he suggested the cease-fire be canceled altogether. Although the South Vietnamese refused to cancel it entirely, they did agree to shorten the period and to maintain ARVN units at half strength. As discussed above, this forced the Communists to change their plan, significantly reducing the effectiveness of their attacks. . . .

Although general operational objectives were stated, breakdowns often occurred at lower levels where troops were not privy to the "big picture." A typical example was the attack on the U.S. embassy. A small sapper unit penetrated the compound exterior wall and entered the compound, killing the duty MPs. Once inside, they stopped. Although there are no indications that this was to be a suicide raid, nothing had been said to them about replacements or an escape route. They carried enough explosives to blast their way into the Chancery building, but had no order to do so. Without specific orders or a clear mission, the sappers took up defensive positions and returned fire. Eventually all were killed or captured. (pp. 13-14)

Kneipp pointed out that many NVA soldiers were mere boys (some were as young as 14) and were less committed to Hanoi’s cause than other soldiers:

As in other wars of attrition, high Communist casualties had resulted in a force of young, inexperienced boys, many of whom were conscripted from rural areas. This created significant problems for the Communists. In addition to reduced readiness, these young soldiers were sometimes as fearful of the urban environment as they were of death. They were also much less committed to the Communist cause. The following account from a Saigon merchant is typical:

"I saw them right in my area.... About 10 to 15 of them ... were sitting together and eating and smoking. I saw they were very calm, and didn't show any signs of fear or fright at all, although ... there were some MPs and policemen surrounding the area.... They said that they had obeyed their superior's orders to come and take over Saigon and that they were not attacking anyone or doing any fighting at all. But if GVN [South Vietnamese government] forces hit them, they would fight back." (p. 15)

Kneipp noted that Hanoi severely underestimated how fiercely South Vietnamese soldiers would fight:

Hanoi seriously underestimated the resolve of the South to resist. Rather than the predicted passive response and quick surrender, South Vietnamese soldiers fought fiercely and effectively, beyond even the expectations of the U.S., eventually repelling the Communist advance. This situation was compounded by the last-minute change in execution date, making it difficult for NLF regulars and reserve forces to effectively respond to Allied counter-attacks. (p. 17)

Kneipp discussed the fact that Hanoi’s military leaders made a major blunder in their orders regarding when to begin the offensive, resulting in the loss of the element of surprise in many areas:

Although much effort had gone into detailed planning, there was a major execution problem in addition to those discussed above. In their haste to disseminate the new execution order, Communist leaders told their commands to attack on the first day of the Lunar New Year. However, Communist planners forgot that North and South Vietnam were using different calendars-this meant there were two execution dates. As a result, attacks did not begin simultaneously as planned. Those who started a day late faced troops who were already alerted. This significantly degraded the operation's overall effectiveness. (p. 18)

If you read liberal books on the Vietnam War, you will find they say little or nothing about this information. Liberal scholars are loathe to admit that the Tet Offensive was not only a military disaster but that it was an act of desperation because Hanoi realized time was no longer on their side. Liberal scholars also still insist on portraying South Vietnamese soldiers as being unwilling to fight and ineffective. And liberal scholars rarely admit that most South Vietnamese supported the Saigon regime, in spite of its many faults, because they knew that the Hanoi regime was much worse.

[Joseph McBride]

I would tell any lone-nutter to read Jim DiEugenio's

book containing the scripts and interview material

for the two documentaries he did with Oliver Stone and

to see those films, especially the long version. Those works enable

you to cut to the chase on most subjects rather than

tediously arguing about bits of "so-called evidence"

that were exposed as phony decades ago.

[Ron Bulman]

On 10/15/2022 at 12:07 AM, Ron Bulman said:

I graduated HS in 1974, started college that fall.  Still went to the theater and drive in to see new movies.  Read the newspaper about new ones coming out.  I don't remember seeing anything about it then or since.  Was it suppressed?  I can see why it would have been.  The most powerful thing I've ever seen on Vietnam.

Ever since I watched Hearts and Minds, I've had this song stuck in my head.  So, I went looking for it this evening and found this video.

 

[Michael Griffith]

On 10/14/2022 at 2:52 PM, James DiEugenio said:

 

I am about now to give you up as a lost cause.

You keep saying this and getting my hopes up, but then you keep responding!😀

The last bastion of the right wingers, like George Will, on Vietnam, was that  Cambodia and Laos were lost and that somehow proves the Domino Theory.

It "somehow" proves the Domino Theory because two more countries were taken over by Communists after we withdrew. 

Speaking of the Domino Theory Mike, when China went communist, what other countries went with it? (Sounds of crickets in the night.)

You can't be serious. As soon as China became Communist, Red China began actively seeking to spread communism in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Indonesia. Northern Vietnam went Communist thanks to enormous Chinese aid and intervention in 1954, and we know what happened after North Vietnam launched its final invasion of South Vietnam in late 1974.

How can anyone talk about what happened in Cambodia and Laos without mentioning what Nixon did in both countries?  I mean Mike, you do understand the cause and effect pattern of history, do you not?  

I am thoroughly familiar with what happened in Cambodia and Laos, but I suspect your only knowledge on the subject comes from wingnuts like Chomsky and Prouty, or at least so it seems.

Kennedy had very strict limits on any commando raids into those two countries.  These were widened under LBJ, but then it was bombs away under Nixon and Kissinger.  It was that day by day pounding, week after week, month after month, that caused Sihanouk to be forced from office by Lon Nol.  And then Lon Nol to be overthrown by the Khymer Rouge. 

This is a delusional version of events in Cambodia. Under Sihanouk, the North Vietnamese army (NVA) took over eastern Cambodia and operated with impunity. Many thousands of American and South Vietnamese soldiers were killed because Sihanouk could not prevent the NVA occupation and because Johnson-McNamara refused to allow our forces to destroy this key NVA safe haven. And Lon Nol fell because liberals in Congress betrayed the anti-communist cause in Cambodia and South Vietnam, forcing us to withdraw our forces and then slashing aid.

You have read SIdeshow have you not?  And this bombing campaign was all kept secret.  Nixon should have been impeached over this.

Impeached??? WHY? Nixon should have been awarded a medal for this. His attack on the Cambodian sanctuaries saved tens of thousands of American and South Vietnamese lives and shut down the NVA's main supply port in Cambodia. It almost sounds like you wish the Communists had ravaged South Vietnam a year or two earlier than 1975.

There is also a debate over whether or not Pol Pot was a communist, many think he really was not.  He was more like an anarcho/syndicalist. 

What???!!! Only among looney-tune Chomsky-Hayden wingnuts is there any doubt that Pol Pot was a Communist. Good grief, Jim, it's sad to see you repeating these sorts of nutty claims on a public board. It might make some people unfairly question your mostly solid and insightful JFK research. 

Now, FYI, Pol Pot was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Cambodia (Kampuchea) from the early '60s until 1981. As General Secretary, he banned all parties except the Cambodian Communist Party and carried out a massive genocide to consolidate his rule after Lon Nol was deposed. Even as a young man in his teens in France, Pol Pot joined the French Communist Party. At the age of 28, he joined the Khmer Vietminh and took part in their insurrection against Sihanouk's government.

Saying there's "debate" about whether or not Pol Pot was a Communist is just about as bad as Chomsky's obscene claim that South Vietnam's government was more violent and oppressive than North Vietnam's government. (Yes, he actually said that.)

In other words, no American intervention by Nixon, and Sihanouk would have likely stayed in power. Thus saving about 2 million lives.

This is just crazy talk. The Khmer Communists were trying to overthrow Sihanouk and take over Cambodia long before Nixon was elected. And, again, the NVA occupied eastern Cambodia years before Nixon was elected.

The NVA used eastern Cambodia to set up sanctuaries for troops retreating from South Vietnam and built large military bases and supply depots in those sanctuary areas, in clear violation of Cambodia's professed neutral status. By the long-accepted laws of war, if a country cannot enforce its own neutrality and is occupied by a hostile force that is attacking your forces, you have every right to attack that hostile force. Nixon had every legal and moral right to finally attack the NVA's bases and depots in Cambodia, and shame on LBJ and McNamara for not having done it years earlier.

 

Edited October 19, 2022 by Michael Griffith

[James DiEugenio]

22 hours ago, Joseph McBride said:

I would tell any lone-nutter to read Jim DiEugenio's

book containing the scripts and interview material

for the two documentaries he did with Oliver Stone and

to see those films, especially the long version. Those works enable

you to cut to the chase on most subjects rather than

tediously arguing about bits of "so-called evidence"

that were exposed as phony decades ago.

Thanks Joe,  very nice of you to say so about the book.

 

[James DiEugenio]

Ron, pretty clever video I have to say.

Len and I will be interviewing a guy who lives and works in Saigon tonight for BOR.. 

[Michael Griffith]

Okay, let’s get some facts straight about the long-overdue, badly needed, and completely justified 1970 operation to strike at North Vietnamese army (NVA/PAVN) bases in eastern Cambodia.

-- The NVA had 14 bases in eastern Cambodia. These bases not only served as huge storage depots but as safe rallying points for NVA soldiers retreating or returning from South Vietnam. Some of those bases were less than 50 miles from Saigon. The entire military chain of command of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior CIA analysts, urged the Johnson administration to allow them to shut down those bases, but Johnson and McNamara refused. It is no exaggeration to say that thousands of American and South Vietnamese soldiers needlessly died because of this shameful, inexcusable refusal.

-- The NVA forces in the northern half of South Vietnam (Military Regions I and II) got their supplies from the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but the NVA forces in the southern half of South Vietnam (Military Regions III and IV) got their supplies from eight of the 14 NVA bases in eastern Cambodia, and the supplies at those bases came from the port of Sihanoukville. Thus, those bases were the conduit for at least half of the weapons, ammo, and other supplies entering South Vietnam, where they would be used to kill American, South Vietnamese, South Korean, Australian, and New Zealand troops.

-- Cambodia’s leader, Sihanouk, was not thrilled about the NVA’s occupation of a 10-mile-wide and 450-mile-long strip of the eastern end of his country, but he had little choice, and he also agreed to allow North Vietnam to ship gigantic amounts of military supplies to the port of Sihanoukville, from which they were then sent to the NVA bases in eastern Cambodia. To make the pill easier to swallow, the Hanoi regime paid handsome bribes to Sihanouk, his wife, and other relatives (Nghia M. Vo, The ARVN and the Fight for South Vietnam, McFarland Publishing, 2021, pp. 208-209).

Next, I’ll quote from Boston University historian Dr. Michael G. Kort’s book The Vietnam War Reexamined (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

On Cambodia’s ”neutrality” and on the justification for the invasion:

The time and place where Abrams’s efforts to cut the North Vietnamese ”logistics nose” melded neatly with Nixon’s willingness to exceed the limits established by President Johnson was the 1970 offensive into Cambodia. The target area was Cambodian territory just across the South Vietnamese border. . . . Kissinger notes that Cambodia’s official ”neutral” status was a sham. In fact, the offensive’s target territory” was no longer Cambodian in any practical sense ... Cambodian officials had been excluded from the soil of their own country; most, if not all, of the population had been expelled.” These were ”illegally occupied territories” under control of the North Vietnamese.

Dave Richard Palmer calls the situation as of 1968 a North Vietnamese ”military occupation on parts of Cambodia.” There were fourteen North Vietnamese military bases inside Cambodia, some no more than thirty-five miles from Saigon. About two-thirds of South Vietnam’s population was exposed to attack from these bases. . . . Andrade points out that Cambodian bases, immune from attack along with those in Laos and North Vietnam, were part of the ”unbeatable advantage” the United States had long given North Vietnam. This situation gave Nixon his first, and primary, reason to move against Hanoi’s forces in Cambodia. (pp. 168-169)

Kort explains the events that led to the invasion:

The sequence of events that led to the Cambodian invasion dates from 1965 . That was when Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia’s longtime ruler, first allowed the North Vietnamese the use of his country’s port of Sihanoukville as an entry point for shipments destined for Communist forces in the southern part of South Vietnam. . . .

In 1970 Sihanouk was overthrown in a [bloodless] coup led by his country’s prime minister, Lon Nol. The main reason for the coup was widespread resentment of the North Vietnamese occupation of Cambodian territory, which Sihanouk was blamed for tolerating and abetting. Lon Nol immediately closed the port of Sihanoukville to the North Vietnamese, a serious blow to their efforts to supply their troops in the southern part of South Vietnam. When the North Vietnamese responded to the coup by seizing more territory and threatening the existence of Lon Nol’s pro-Western government, Nixon had a second reason to attack their forces in Cambodia. (p. 169)

Kort observes that the incursion achieved significant results, both tactically and strategically:

Allied forces . . . killed or captured thousands of enemy troops, seized huge quantities of weapons and ammunition of all sorts, and confiscated fourteen million pounds of rice. The amount of small arms ammunition alone was equal to what Communist forces used in an entire year. Davidson cites estimates that North Vietnamese offensive plans were set back at least a year, possibly two. The operation thus was ”quite successful militarily.” It ”struck the Communists a stunning blow by destroying their stores and bases in Cambodia” and bought time both for Vietnamization and the US withdrawal from South Vietnam.

Army veteran and military historian John M. Shaw, author of a comprehensive and well-received volume on the subject, offers a similar assessment. Shaw considers the campaign ”fully justified and reasonably well executed.” While hardly perfect, it seriously weakened the North Vietnamese, bolstered South Vietnamese morale, strengthened Vietnamization, and bought the United States time to complete an orderly military withdrawal. (p. 170)

Here are the stats on the results of the operation in terms of enemy losses:

1. Casualties

Killed   11,369

Prisoners and Ralliers (defectors)   2,328

2. Material and Supplies

Individual Weapons 22,892

Crew-Served Weapons   2,509

Installation, shelters destroyed   11,688

Small-arms ammunition, mortar   16,762,167 rounds

Hand grenades   62,022

Explosives   83,000 lbs

Antiaircraft ammunition   199,552 rounds

Mortar ammunition   68,593 rounds

Rockets, 107- and 122-mm   2,123

Rockets, B-40 and B-41   43,160

Recoilless rifle ammunition   29,185

Vehicles, all types   435

Pharmaceutical products  110,800 lbs

Rice   14,046,000 lbs (Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho, The Cambodian Incursion, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979, p. 193, /tardir/mig/a324718.tiff (dtic.mil))

Those mindless, brainwashed anti-war students who screamed against the Cambodian operation had no objection when the NVA occupied eastern Cambodia in the first place, no objection when the NVA tried to overthrow the Cambodian government when that government demanded that the NVA leave the country, and no objection to all the thousands of American and Allied soldiers who needlessly died because of the weapons and supplies that came from the NVA bases in Cambodia. But, when we finally moved against those bases to save our lives and defend South Vietnam, they became outraged.

Of course, those same brainwashed dupes had little or nothing to say when the North Vietnamese Communists imposed a reign of terror on the South Vietnamese after Saigon fell and when Communist Vietnam was consistently ranked, year after year, as one of the most brutal and repressive regimes on the planet after the war.

Edited October 19, 2022 by Michael Griffith

[James DiEugenio]

All told, American warplanes dropped more than 2.7 million tons of bombs on more than 113,000 sites in Cambodia, exacting a heavy toll among combatants and civilians alike. More than two million people fled their homes to escape the bombing, ground fighting, and Communist rule. 

[Benjamin Cole]

5 hours ago, James DiEugenio said:

All told, American warplanes dropped more than 2.7 million tons of bombs on more than 113,000 sites in Cambodia, exacting a heavy toll among combatants and civilians alike. More than two million people fled their homes to escape the bombing, ground fighting, and Communist rule. 

Oh, not even:

Over 270 million cluster bombs were dropped on Laos during the American Secret War in Laos ; up to 80 million did not detonate. Over 5 decades on, 1% of these munitions have been destroyed. More than half of all confirmed cluster munitions casualties in the world have occurred in Laos.

---30--

The Laos cluster-bombs are just one toe on the horror-body known as the Vietnam War.

Take your pick: Agent Orange, the Phoenix Program, the turning of SE Asian women into brothel employees, 6 million dead in SE Asia, the forced relocation of entire Vietnamese villages into new zones...even My Lai. 

People think of the 55,000 US soldiers dead---that was just another toe on the ugly Vietnam War body. 

There was no way the Vietnam War was worth it, for SE Asians or for US citizens and taxpayers. 

The agonizing irony of it all is that Vietnam had long resented Sino hegemony, going back centuries. They even fought a border war. The China province that borders Vietnam is a semi-autonomous region, as they also resent Han hegemony.

I am not really a geopolitics fan, but Vietnam was an ally waiting to be made. 

The other ugly irony: US multinationals today do heavy, heavy  business in communist China. They could have started back in the 1960s with Vietnam except for the ideological insanity of the times. 

 

 

 

 

[Michael Griffith]

Here is further proof that the available evidence does not support the irresponsible claim that JFK planned on totally disengaging from South Vietnam regardless of the situation on the ground.

Francis Bator, LBJ's Deputy National Security Adviser, pointed out in 2007 that JFK's withdrawal plan was clearly conditional and did not include any intention to totally disengage from South Vietnam no matter what:

        Professor Galbraith is correct that “there was a plan to withdraw US forces from Vietnam, beginning with the first thousand by December 1963, and almost all of the rest by the end of 1965…. President Kennedy had approved that plan. It was the actual policy of the United States on the day Kennedy died.”

        But as the “Record of Action No. 2472 Taken” at the October 2 NSC meeting and the October 11 National Security Action Memorandum 263 make clear, that plan was explicitly conditioned on Secretary McNamara’s and General Taylor’s “judgment that the major part of the US military task can be completed by the end of 1965…,” that “the long term program to replace US personnel with trained Vietnamese [could go forward] without impairment of the war effort.”

        The point: the 1963 policy says nothing about what the US would do if the McNamara-Taylor judgment about progress by 1965 turned out to be wrong, if the choice in 1965 turned out to be between turning the war into an American war or letting Hanoi and the NLF win in South Vietnam. (Vietnam Withdrawal? | Francis M. Bator | The New York Review of Books (nybooks.com)

EXACTLY. EXACTLY. EXACTLY. No relevant document--not NSAM 263 nor any of it supporting documents--supports the reckless claim that JFK was prepared to cut off all aid and withdraw all U.S. personnel from South Vietnam after he was reelected. 

Even James K. Galbraith, of all people, admits that even under the withdrawal plan we were going to leave 1,500 troops for supply purposes and would continue to aid South Vietnam:

        Training would end. Support for South Vietnam would continue. They had an army of over 200,000. The end of the war was not in sight. After the end of 1965, even under the withdrawal plan, 1,500 US troops were slated to remain, for supply purposes. But the war would then be Vietnamese only, with no possibility of it becoming an American war on Kennedy's watch. (JFK’s Vietnam Withdrawal Plan Is a Fact, Not Speculation (thenation.com)

I think the end of training was conditional as well, but I agree that "support for South Vietnam would continue" and that we would leave a residual force in country for supply purposes. That is a galaxy away from the baseless, irresponsible claim that JFK intended to abandon South Vietnam no matter what. 

This is why the segment on Vietnam in JFK Revisited is wrong. This is why the segment on Vietnam in the movie JFK is wrong. This is why JFK conspiracy theorists need to stop claiming that JFK was prepared to let South Vietnam fall to the Communists after he was reelected. Those who claim this are misrepresenting his position and tarnishing his legacy.

[Michael Griffith]

An excellent source on the 1970 incursion against NVA bases in Cambodia is General Tran Dinh Tho's book The Cambodian Incursion (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979). General Tho was the Assistant Chief of Staff J3 of South Vietnam's Joint General Staff, and he helped plan the operation. His book is available online at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA324718.pdf.

Sihanouk's professed posture of neutrality was phony, but his declaration of neutrality resulted in the protection of the North Vietnamese army (NVA/PAVN) bases along Cambodia's eastern border:

For several years Cambodia, under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, had condoned the use of part of its territory by the Vietnamese Communists for infiltration routes and logistic bases. These bases supported enemy activities in South Vietnam's Military Regions 3 and 4 and a significant part of Military Region 2 but were protected because of Cambodia's declared neutrality. (p. v)

By the early months of 1970, the situation in South Vietnam had improved considerably, and things had been improving since 1965:

The situation throughout South Vietnam in the early months of 1970 was one of continuing improvement, dating back to the introduction of United States combat troops into the war during 1965. This was in marked contrast to the dismally bleak prospects of the Republic of Vietnam in late 1964 and early 1965 when few believed that the new nation could escape Communist conquest.

To counter the RVN [South Vietnam] and U.S. battlefield successes, North Vietnam switched strategy in 1967, and conceived a bold strike at the cities in order to liberate the countryside. Executed during the 1968 Tet holidays, this offensive strike at the cities of South Vietnam had unexpected consequences for both sides. To our enemy, it was a tragic military defeat. Not only had his General Offensive-General Uprising [the Tet Offensive] failed but he also lost significant amounts of weapons and many human lives. In addition, his infrastructure suffered extensive damage.

On the RVN side, the population felt greatly stimulated by the enemy's defeat; morale and self-assurance grew. The GVN [South Vietnam's government] took advantage of this opportunity to call reservists to active duty and decreed partial mobilization. Popular response to military duty was enthusiastic.

The American people, however, reacted adversely to the Vietnam war, apparently under the influence of press, radio and TV reports. It was perhaps this animosity toward the war that influenced President Johnson to order the cessation of U.S. bombing above the 19th parallel on 3 March 1968. (p. 1)

Considerable progress was made in South Vietnam after the failure of the Tet Offensive:

Exploiting further the RVNAF [South Vietnam's armed forces] success during the 1968 general offensives, the GVN initiated a three-month accelerated pacification program for the last quarter of 1968 and a similar program for 1969. As a result, by the end of 1969, population control had risen to 92% as compared to 67.2% for the period prior to the 1968 Tet offensive. By contrast, confusion reigned among enemy ranks after their defeat. During 1969, a total of 47,000 enemy personnel rallied to the GVN, compared to 23,000 during 1968. Aided by improved security across the country, the GVN resettled or returned to their home villages in excess of 1.5 million people displaced by the war. Most significantly, the GVN-initiated People's Self-Defense program received wide acceptance. Approximately 2.5 million people volunteered to join the program, pushed by their eagerness to protect their own communities. (p. 3)

The nature of North Vietnam's war against South Vietnam:

The war in South Vietnam was waged by North Vietnam under the disguise of national liberation. Hanoi created the instrument for it in late 1960 by establishing the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. This disguise was aimed at justifying the war before world opinion. North Vietnam claimed that this was an uprising of South Vietnam's people against the RVN regime, not an aggression from the north. But it was North Vietnam that in fact directed the war effort and supplied the manpower, material and financial resources for this effort through its local executive office, the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). (p. 6)

NVA POWs and defectors (aka "ralliers") disclosed NVA intentions for 1970 before the incursion into Cambodia:

On top of these typical activities during the first quarter of 1970, enemy prisoners and ralliers disclosed that COSVN had been planning two offensive campaigns for 1970, in May and July respectively, with the objective of pressing the Paris peace talks toward an early settlement. However, the sudden change of government in Phnom Penh had forced our enemy to abandon these plans and turn his efforts toward Cambodia.

Beginning in April 1970, therefore, there was a flurry of enemy activity in Cambodia. This activity indicated that the enemy was hastily dispersing and concealing his supply storage points in the border base areas and displacing his most valuable materiel deeper inside Cambodia. At the same time, the enemy was endeavoring to control a corridor east of the Mekong River leading south in an apparent attempt to secure movements of supplies for his units in MR-3 and MR-4 [MR = Military Region]. Evidently, the closing of Sihanoukville by the new Khmer regime was beginning to have an adverse effect on the enemy supply system. Additionally, the enemy realized that the supplies already in Cambodia would be of even greater significance to his immediate combat plans. (p. 12)

The importance of the port of Sihanoukville to NVA supply operations:

The other major logistic route besides the Ho Chi Minh Trail was through the port of Sihanoukville. It originated in the port of Sihanoukville, and led across lower Cambodia toward enemy base areas on the Cambodia-South Vietnam border. As far as the enemy was concerned, this port route was the safest and most secure because it lay entirely on Cambodian soil. (p. 21)

More evidence that Sihanouk's claim of neutrality was bogus and that he was allowing his country to play the role of a hostile combatant:

North Vietnam and the Viet Cong had made overtures to Sihanouk as early as the rupture of relations between the RVN and Cambodia in l963 aimed at securing the use of Cambodian territory. In February 1968„high ranking Viet Cong and North Vietnam officials went to Phnom Penh to negotiate the establishment of bases in Cambodia and the movement of supplies and equipment through Cambodia to these bases. In March 1968, Sihanouk himself announced that he had approved these requests because, as he said, Cambodia and North Vietnam and the Viet Cong were facing the same enemy: the imperialist American aggressors. Then, during an inspection trip to Takeo the same year, he openly declared that Cambodian authorities would voluntarily overlook trade activities by the Cambodian population to supply the Viet Cong with food and he would even authorize the use of Cambodian hospitals by VC and NVA wounded until they were fully recovered.

The port of Sihanoukville was a major point of entry for NVA supplies and materiel. It was estimated that the tonnages moving through Sihanoukville were sufficient to meet 100% of the requirements of enemy units in the RVN III and IV Corps areas, and perhaps two-thirds of the requirements for enemy units in the II Corps area of South Vietnam. . . .

Intelligence reports subsequently confirmed that some Cambodian military vehicles and troops even assisted the Viet Cong in transporting weapons, ammunition and foodstuff toward base areas along the border. Cambodian troops and officials at outposts and checkpoints along the border were bribed by smuggler groups into letting contraband merchandise, such as rice and medicine, pass into Viet Cong base areas. Business was brisk and lucrative because the Viet Cong usually paid higher prices. These smuggling activities were conducted mostly by Chinese entrepreneurs residing in Cambodia. (pp. 21-22)

Many Cambodians resented the NVA's presence and demonstrated against it:

On 8 March 1970, several demonstrations took place in the Cambodian provinces along the border. The demonstrators demanded that North Vietnamese Army arid auxiliary troops withdraw from Cambodia. Two days later, the same demonstrations resumed in earnest. In Phnom Penh, angry demonstrators marched to the North Vietnamese Embassy and smashed its windows with rocks. (p. 29)

Sihanouk's fall from power and the new government's demand that NVA forces leave Cambodia:

Chief of State Sihanouk, meanwhile, was undergoing medical treatment and vacationing in France. The direction of governmental affairs was assumed by General Lon Nol and Deputy Prime Minister Sirik Matak.

On 12 March 1970, General Lon Nol sent an official message to Hanoi asking for the withdrawal of NVA and auxiliary forces within 72 hours; the deadline was set for 15 March. On 16 March, other demonstrations took place with the same demand that NVA/VC forces immediately vacate Cambodian territory. On 18 March 1970, the Cambodian National Assembly passed a resolution stripping Prince Sihanouk of all governmental powers. General Lon Nol took over as prime minister and Prince Sirik Matak continued to serve as deputy prime minister. (pp. 29-30)

The NVA responded to the demand that they leave by launching an attack on Cambodia. (Be advised that the word "Khmer" by itself is simply another word for "Cambodian"):

Then, beginning in early April, NVA forces openly attacked Khmer outposts along the border and other towns east of the Mekong River. On 20 April, they overran Snoul, 16 km north of Binh Long Province. On 23 April, NVA troops attacked and seized Mimot after destroying an important bridge on Route 13 connecting Snoul with Kratie. On 24 April, they attacked the coastal city of Kep, north of Ha Tien, and on 26 April they opened fire on ships and boats sailing on the Mekong River. On the same day, they also took the town of Ang Tassom northwest of Takeo City and attacked Chhlong City northeast of Phnom Penh.

On 17 April 1970, the new Khmer regime officially announced to the world that North Vietnamese troops were invading Cambodia. By that time, three out of Cambodia's seventeen provinces had been occupied by NVA forces who were also exerting heavy pressure on five others. At the same time, Cambodia appealed to the United States and other nations of the Free World for help in resisting North Vietnam's aggression. (pp. 30, 32)

Lon Nol's appeal for help against the NVA provided a welcomed opportunity to finally deal with the unjust situation that Sihanouk's pro-Communist actions had created:

The Cambodian appeal for help in resisting NVN aggression came indeed as a most welcomed opportunity for South Vietnam to redress an unjust situation in which it had been victimized by Sihanouk's prejudice. For years Sihanouk had closed his eyes to North Vietnam's freedom of action on Cambodian territory, allowing our enemy to establish supply bases and sanctuaries in order to pursue his war of aggression against South Vietnam. Every Vietnamese serviceman wondered then why we did not have the right of pursuit into Cambodia. But all this had changed.

We were delighted when the new Khmer government asserted a hard line policy against our enemy, demanding that he withdraw his troops from Cambodia. We welcomed the new Khmer government's appeal for help to which we would certainly respond because RVN had found in the new Khmer regime not only a friendly neighbor but also a comrade-in-arms who shared our cause and fought against the same enemy. Surely, the United States could not ignore this plea. As the leader of the Free World, the U.S. could not let Cambodia or any other free country fall into Communist hands. (p. 32)

Some of the reasons that the U.S. and South Vietnam needed to defend Cambodia and to attack the NVA bases in the eastern part of the country:

What would happen if North Vietnam succeeded in overthrowing the Lon Nol regime and installed a pro-Communist government or reinstated Sihanouk in its place? If this were the case, I am sure that it would have brought very great difficulty for South Vietnam. Then the 600-mile infiltration corridor which ran the length of South Vietnam's western border from the Tri-Border area to the Gulf of Siam would allow North Vietnamese troops and weapons free access into South Vietnam and Cambodia would be an effective staging area for continued and unimpeded attacks against our country. During the previous few years, NVA units in South Vietnam were able to quickly replenish their materiel losses because they had control over border supply base areas and free access to the port of Sihanoukville. (p. 33)

The NVA bases should have been hit years earlier, but politics prevented this from being done:

The destruction of enemy logistic installations in Cambodia had in fact been considered by U.S. and RVN military strategists for a long time. It was a military action that should have been carried out before 1970. Political dictates, however, had prevented such an action, as long as Sihanouk was still in power. (p. 35)

NVA POWs and ralliers (defectors) provided information on some of the positive results of the Cambodian incursion:

According to depositions made by enemy prisoners and ralliers and in particular, judging by the large quantities of enemy supplies and materials captured, the following conclusions were quickly apparent:

1. The operation had effectively upset the enemy's plans to overthrow the Lon Nol regime and, as soon as he succeeded in Phnom Penh, his plan to launch an offensive in RVN MR-3. This was first disclosed by enemy Lt. Colonel Nguyen Thanh, Deputy Commander of Sub Military Region 2, who rallied [defected] to the GVN.

2. The morale of enemy troops had been seriously affected by the operation, particularly among troops under Sub Military Region 2. In a few instances, cadres and troops had refused to go into combat. Many had deserted to avoid fighting.

3. The area of Ba Thu and Angel's Wing, considered invincible, had been heavily damaged. Up to 90% of enemy supplies in this area had been destroyed or seized by the RVNAF. Heavy casualties had effectively reduced enemy troop strength by 25%, especially among Sub MR-2 units and Tay Ninh local force units. As a result, the enemy met with serious difficulties in replacing human and material losses. (p. 69)

 

[James DiEugenio]

Mike, please look at this, I used to use it for DVP:

 

[James DiEugenio]

You just got knocked out by Gary Dean, who lives in Saigon. And I can understand why you do not want to acknowledge what he said on Len's show.  There are now 80 story skyscrapers in Saigon.  They form  part of a second skyline to the city.  Kids at his business college do not want to work at the Sheraton, which is there on the square where Graham Green's explosions took place. Not enough money in that.  They want to go into banking and high finance.  There are all kinds of restaurants there.  And even fast food places.   He said when he first moved there he lived in Hanoi.  Where his landlord sublet a large villa into four apartments for rents. 

Hanoi practices protectionism to guard their own car industry which ow produces both gas powered and EV vehicles.  Those dirty commies.  

Gary Dean is an eye witness who disproves your thesis, with a vengeance.  He said that his college existed back in 1976. And he said that once Le Duan passed on, the leadership became much more practical.  Which proves my thesis, that the war by the Americans helped the ideologues secure more power.  But once they passed on, Vietnam became something like another southeast Asia economic tiger.  This would have never occurred with Kennedy. What happened after aided a catastrophe.

So this case is now closed.  Those books you have been quoting are now exposed as rightwing jibberish to distract from the present history of the area and how America did more harm than good.

It always helps to consult someone who is there.

Bye Bye.  

[Michael Griffith]

On 10/10/2022 at 4:42 PM, James DiEugenio said:

IMO, this is the best documentary ever made on the subject.  If you have not seen it, you should.

 

This documentary is trash. It could literally have been made by North Vietnam's propaganda arm. It is loaded with errors and distortions and ignores numerous facts that don't fit its anti-war narrative. I have already debunked many of the film's claims in previous replies. It would take many pages to discuss all the errors in the film, not to mention the distortions and glaring omissions. 

As just one example of the errors, the documentary shows Daniel Ellsberg making this inexcusably ignorant claim:

        A war in which one side is entirely equipped and financed by foreigners is not a civil war. The only foreigners in that country were the foreigners we financed in the first part of the war and the foreigners we were in the second half of the war. (1:22:50-1:22:57)

Ellsberg had to know better than this nonsense. By 1954, Communist China had tens of thousands of troops in northern Vietnam. Chinese generals essentially ran the Vietminh's military operations (including the assault on Dien Bien Phu). By 1965, China had over 100,000 support troops in North Vietnam. The Soviets stationed over 1,000 AAA technical advisers in North Vietnam to help operate the North Vietnamese SAM batteries and had special forces units there as well. The Soviets and the Chinese provided North Vietnam with massive amounts of weapons and supplies (including tanks, SAM batteries, artillery, trucks, mortars, grenades, land mines, etc.). The Soviets and the Chinese literally kept North Vietnam from economic collapse with hundreds of millions of dollars (yens, rubles) in financial aid. The North Vietnamese Communists would have been a small footnote in history had it not been for the massive support they received from the Soviets and the Chinese.

Edited October 22, 2022 by Michael Griffith