Oliver Stone's New JFK Documentaries and the Vietnam War

[Michael Griffith]

3 hours ago, Cliff Varnell said:

 

Regime change is the far greater intervention, no?

Compared to sending hundreds of thousands of American ground troops to South Vietnam for years? No, I would say that the regime change was not the greater intervention. In any case, the point is that Jim was talking about the issue of whether or not to send regular combat troops.

Did MacArthur approve of what Kennedy green-lit in 'Nam?

Admittedly, Kennedy showed poor judgment and weakness in this affair. His first serious mistake was appointing Henry Cabot Lodge as ambassador to South Vietnam, a truly baffling and disastrous choice. JFK's second serious mistake was listening to his ignorant and self-righteous liberal advisors who were determined to get rid of Diem. 

JFK began having serious second thoughts about removing Diem, but he failed to take decisive action to call off the coup. He was afraid to challenge Lodge.

To be fair, JFK had no idea that Diem and his brother would be murdered. He assumed they would merely be exiled. Their murder should have alerted him to the fact that the generals whom Lodge and the CIA recruited to overthrow Diem were more repressive and undemocratic than Diem was (and not nearly as competent). This disaster never would have happened if JFK had appointed Edward Lansdale as our ambassador to South Vietnam, as JFK was initially considering doing.

Edited October 10, 2022 by Michael Griffith

[Cliff Varnell]

1 hour ago, Michael Griffith said:

Regime change is the far greater intervention, no?

Compared to sending hundreds of thousands of American ground troops to South Vietnam for years?

What makes you think such a commitment would have been possible with Diem in power?

1 hour ago, Michael Griffith said:

No, I would say that the regime change was not the greater intervention.

There were reports Nhu was negotiating with the North.  Regime change prevented the best chance for peace.

And was thus more significant.

1 hour ago, Michael Griffith said:

In any case, the point is that Jim was talking about the issue of whether or not to send regular combat troops.

And that decision was entirely up to Americans?

1 hour ago, Michael Griffith said:

Did MacArthur approve of what Kennedy green-lit in 'Nam?

Admittedly, Kennedy showed poor judgment and weakness in this affair. His first serious mistake was appointing Henry Cabot Lodge as ambassador to South Vietnam, a truly baffling and disastrous choice. JFK's second serious mistake was listening to his ignorant and self-righteous liberal advisors who were determined to get rid of Diem. 

I suspect Averell Harriman headed a cabal determined to take control of the world's heroin market.  He negotiated the partition of Laos and the overthrow of Diem -- and the murder of JFK, I suspect.

1 hour ago, Michael Griffith said:

JFK began having serious second thoughts about removing Diem, but he failed to take decisive action to call off the coup. He was afraid to challenge Lodge.

He needed to restore aid that had been cut off in September, sending a message to the generals to stand down.

1 hour ago, Michael Griffith said:

To be fair, JFK had no idea that Diem and his brother would be murdered. He assumed they would merely be exiled. Their murder should have alerted him to the fact that the generals whom Lodge and the CIA recruited to overthrow Diem were more repressive and undemocratic than Diem was (and not nearly as competent). This disaster never would have happened if JFK had appointed Edward Lansdale as our ambassador to South Vietnam, as JFK was initially considering doing.

Averell Harriman out-played him.  Getting rid of Diem was *the* key event in the evolution of the Vietnam War.

Edited October 10, 2022 by Cliff Varnell

[Michael Griffith]

1 hour ago, Cliff Varnell said:

 

What makes you think such a commitment would have been possible with Diem in power?

I would rephrase that question to read, "Would such a commitment have been necessary with Diem in power?" 

There were reports Nhu was negotiating with the North. Regime change prevented the best chance for peace. And was thus more significant.

Those reports were baseless and absurd on their face. Anyone who knew anything about Nhu should have known they were fiction. 

And that decision was entirely up to Americans?

A rather moot point.

I suspect Averell Harriman headed a cabal determined to take control of the world's heroin market.  He negotiated the partition of Laos and the overthrow of Diem -- and the murder of JFK, I suspect.

Averell Harriman??? I think that's bizarre. Even LBJ eventually realized that Harriman was an overly gullible, peace-at-any-price dove. Harriman was the last person who would have wanted JFK dead. I lost interest in the rest of your reply after reading the above comments. 

 

 

[Michael Griffith]

Years after the war, Bui Diem, the former South Vietnamese ambassador to the U.S., penned an eloquent essay that, among other things, addressed the wartime Communist propaganda line that the Vietnam War was a civil war, called out the gullibility and culpability of the American anti-war movement, and defended the morality of America’s effort to keep South Vietnam Free. Diem noted that Hanoi’s leaders themselves quickly dispelled the civil-war myth after Saigon fell. Diem rightly wondered if anyone in the anti-war movement felt any shame for their gullibility and actions. And, Diem cogently noted that only idealogues could still compare South Vietnam with “the chilling police state that destroyed it.” Here is an excerpt from Bui Diem’s essay:

The more vocal critics of the war in the sixties and seventies characterized the intervention, not just as wrong, but also as immoral. Their charge was based primarily on the theory that the war in Vietnam was a civil war, and that consequently American intervention was an act of aggression against people who were fighting to free themselves from an oppressive regime and unify their country in accord with the aspirations of the great majority of decent-minded Vietnamese.

It is my own belief that this theory held the field for so long primarily because it was a powerful attraction to the many Americans who were angry at their own government and society and were looking for issues to hang their anger on. Certainly, the facts that refuted it were readily available. From early on, both Saigon and Washington knew beyond a doubt that the National Liberation Front—the Vietcong—was a creation of the Communist Party, and that without North Vietnamese organization, leadership, supplies, and, starting in 1964, without the North Vietnamese regular army, there would have been no revolution to speak of and no war. It was one of my greatest frustrations that our firm knowledge of this—both from widespread and incontrovertible evidence and also from personal experience among many of us of communist “front” techniques—made no impact on popular understanding in the West. Regardless of what was there to be seen, people saw only what they wished.

After the war, when propaganda no longer mattered, the party dropped its pretense. “Our Party,” said Le Duan in his 1975 victory speech, “is the unique and single leader that organized, controlled, and governed the entire struggle of the Vietnamese people from the first day of the revolution.”

During the war, the North Vietnamese never openly admitted they had troops in South Vietnam. (Le Duc Tho even kept up this pretense with Henry Kissinger….). But afterward the party treated this subterfuge simply as an excellent piece of public relations and its own role as a matter of intense pride. As the North Vietnamese general Vo Ban told French television interviewers in 1983, “In May 1959 I had the privilege of being designated by the Vietnamese Communist Party to unleash a military attack on the South in order to liberate the South and reunify the fatherland.”

During the heyday of the antiwar movement, I marveled at the innocence of its spokesmen in believing something different from this. I wonder even now if they ever feel shame for their gullibility and their contribution to the tragedy. But they are not heard from.

The issue of morality, then, comes down to whether it was moral for the United States to have supported an admittedly flawed South Vietnamese regime in its attempt to survive against a totalitarian antagonist. Here, too, the answer seems to me self-evident. However unpalatable leaders like Nguyen Van Thieu might have been, South Vietnam was full of pluralistic ferment and possibilities for change and development. It was a place where good people could hope for something better to evolve, where they could even publicly advocate for it, as so many strong-minded opposition politicians, intellectuals, and writers did. None but idealogues can compare such a place with the chilling police state that destroyed it. And none, I think, can fairly question the morality of the effort to prevent its destruction. (Bui Diem, “A Viable State,” in Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, edited by Robert McMahon, Third Edition, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003, pp. 379-380)

 

[Cliff Varnell]

2 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

What makes you think such a commitment would have been possible with Diem in power?

I would rephrase that question to read, "Would such a commitment have been necessary with Diem in power?" 

I'll re-phrase: "Why do you assume Diem would have invited such a commitment?"

2 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

There were reports Nhu was negotiating with the North. Regime change prevented the best chance for peace. And was thus more significant.

Those reports were baseless and absurd on their face.

 

"Today's World Report: Truce Moves Reported In Viet Nam," New York World-Telegram & Sun, (Friday), 25 October 1963, p.6:*

"LONDON - The government of South Vietnam and Communist North Viet Nam are apparently making exploratory contacts that could lead to a truce, diplomatic sources said. There was no official confirmation…Diplomatic sources said the current moves were believed to be aiming at some sort of truce arrangement with possible wider ramifications." <quote off>

Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November, pg 156:

<quote on, emphasis in the original>

When [Diem and Nhu] had first claimed that Americans were active behind the scenes in the agitation spreading in Saigon, they had sounded paranoid – a favorite word among Americans for Diem and Nhu that summer.  But who could disbelieve [David] Halberstam, with his excellent sources in the Central Intelligence Agency, when he reported that the CIA had been openly sending its agents into the pagodas and making daily contact with Buddhist priests and “other participants in this crisis”?  These agents were acting under orders – and they did not go to the pagodas to discuss the finer points of Buddhism.

<quote off>

The Ngo Brothers were well aware of the American hand in the generals' plots.  To think that the Ngos *wouldn't* seek a way out by negotiating with the North is absurd on it's face. 

"Politics make for strange bedfellows," no?

2 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

Anyone who knew anything about Nhu should have known they were fiction. 

In the late 80's and early 90's I dated the daughter of an officer in Nhu's secret police. Her family was Buddhist.

She adamantly denied there was strife between Catholics and Buddhists, and she insisted the C.I.A. agitated the whole crisis.

2 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

And that decision was entirely up to Americans?

A rather moot point.

Not if we're discussing whether or not Diem would have chosen to throw in entirely with an untrustworthy ally.

2 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

I suspect Averell Harriman headed a cabal determined to take control of the world's heroin market.  He negotiated the partition of Laos and the overthrow of Diem -- and the murder of JFK, I suspect.

Averell Harriman???

Are you familiar with the man's career?  Apparently not.

2 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

I think that's bizarre.

An uninformed opinion.

2 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

Even LBJ eventually realized that Harriman was an overly gullible, peace-at-any-price dove.

Who negotiated the Vietnamese peace deal in 1968, which Nixon torpedoed right before the Prez election?

2 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

Harriman was the last person who would have wanted JFK dead.

From Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman, by Rudy Abramson, pg 624:

<quote on, emphasis added>

Some of Averell's friends, including [Roger] Hilsman, who had heard Bob Kennedy muse about the possibility of Harriman as secretary of state, thought there was still a chance that Averell might yet get the Foggy Bottom job he long coveted.  But that had been before the notorious coup cable [243 authorizing Diem coup 8/24/63].

    Though the President had avoided criticism of Averell in the episode, Harriman knew Kennedy's confidence in him was shaken.  After working his way to the seventh floor, he was suddenly viewed as a problem.  Almost overnight, he looked ten years older.  Privately, the President and the attorney general talked of finding a way to rehabilitate him, to find a job that would get him out of the Vietnam business.  There was a need to put more emphasis on hemispheric matters, and the President thought that one way to solve two problems might be to create a new post of undersecretary for Latin American affairs for him.

As deeply as the administration had involved itself in the machinations against Diem, Kennedy still appeared stunned when the long-anticipatred coup ended with the assassination of Diem and Nhu on November 1.  The United States could technically claim that it had been a Vietnamese affair; but the administration had conditioned the atmosphere, beginning with the Harriman-Hilsman cable to Lodge.

<quote off>

Harriman sacrificed his long cherished Sec of State job to maintain a militarized So. Vietnam.  Think he wouldn't sacrifice Kennedy?

2 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

I lost interest in the rest of your reply after reading the above comments.

Just as well, since you lack the knowledge base to discuss the career of W. Averell Harriman.

Edited October 10, 2022 by Cliff Varnell

[Michael Davidson]

[James DiEugenio]

Great image capture.  

 

IMO, this is the best documentary ever made on the subject.  If you have not seen it, you should.

 

Edited October 10, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[James DiEugenio]

OMG Mike, Bui Diem?

The guy who cooperated with the Nixon forces to torpedo Johnson's peace attempts in 1968 and give the 1968 election to Nixon? Thus achieving two disastrous goals: first, elongating the war, and second bringing us Nixon?

Please.  

Talk about a man with an agenda.  If you do not know, this guy was the ambassador to the USA from Saigon under Thieu. He was the nephew of the PM under Emperor Bao Dai.  It was the attempted reinstallation of Bao Dai by France that infuriated Ho Chi Minh, because he knew this meant that France wanted to keep Vietnam a puppet state.  This is when he addressed Russia and China for aid.  In turn, this antagonized Acheson into verbally attacking Ho Chi Minh.  This was first, a real break with FDR, and secondly, it was America's start at  financing a large part of of the cost of the French colonial war from the US Treasury.

After the war he went to work for the American Enterprise Institute and at George Mason college, home of the Koch Brothers foundation.  

Mike please.  And I also addressed your point about Vietnam being one country prior, you are now recycling arguments I already undermined.

Edited October 10, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[Michael Griffith]

More on the powerful impact of Operation Linebacker II, the warped liberal version of the operation, and Congress’s role in helping North Vietnam in the peace negotiations.

Military historian Earl Tilford discusses the powerful impact of Operations Linebacker I and II in an article titled “Linebacker II: The Christmas Bombing” published in 2014 on the Vietnam Veterans of America website. Among other things, Tilford notes that after the devastating December 26 bombing raids, Hanoi cabled Washington and asked that peace talks resume on January 8. Nixon rejected Hanoi’s offer and insisted that peace talks begin on January 2. When Hanoi refused Nixon’s terms, Nixon continued the bombing. After two more days of ruinous bombing, Hanoi agreed to resume negotiations on Nixon’s terms. Tilford also discusses just some of the distorted news media coverage of the bombing and observes that Linebacker II did minimal damage to North Vietnam’s cities and caused fewer than 2,000 civilian deaths. Here’s an excerpt from Tilford’s article (note: ARVN refers to South Vietnam’s army):

During the six months of Linebacker I (May 10-October 23) 155,548 tons of bombs fell on North Vietnam. The NVA’s Soviet-style blitzkrieg consumed 1,000 tons a day in fuel for tanks and trucks, as well as munitions for tank and artillery tubes, food for troops, and medicine for the considerable casualties inflicted by a stubborn ARVN defense. American air power, with more latitude in target selection than in the past, sharply reduced the supply flow, effectively blunting the offensive.

By October, with North Vietnam’s ports mined and blockaded, the vital northeast and northwest rail and road lines leading to China cut, and its divisions in the South taking a hard pounding, Hanoi seemed ready to end the war on terms acceptable to Washington. That included a ceasefire, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam, continued U.S. military aid to Saigon, and the return of American POWs. . . .

While the diplomatic jousting at the Paris Peace Talks continued into November, Nixon handily defeated Sen. George McGovern, the peace candidate, in the presidential election. Muddling Nixon’s political victory, however, the Democrats extended control over Congress and threatened to cut off funding for the war in January. . . .

The bombing on the night of December 26 got the Politburo’s attention. Instead of sending in waves of bombers throughout the night, 120 B-52s hit ten targets within two 15-minute periods. Remaining SAMs claimed two more B-52s, but the 1.66 percent loss rate was acceptable given the results.

Hanoi cabled Washington asking if talks might resume on January 8, 1973. Nixon demanded that talks start on January 2 and told Hanoi the bombing would continue until they agreed. Accordingly, the following night, sixty B-52s struck airfields and warehouses around Hanoi and Vinh, along with the Lang Dang Rail Yard near the Chinese border. While SAMs claimed two more B-52s, returning crews reported that the missile firings seemed less coordinated and more sporadic.

Sixty more B-52 sorties struck over the next two nights with no losses and no reported SAM firings. On December 28 Hanoi agreed to reopen negotiations on Nixon’s terms. Linebacker II ended on December 29, after eleven days of bombing the enemy’s heartland, including roads and troop concentrations in North Vietnam’s southern panhandle. Aerial attacks on NVA units inside South Vietnam intensified to encourage serious negotiations on Hanoi’s part. . . .

Critics of the war, and of the air war in particular, lambasted what became known as the Christmas Bombing. In Europe it was unfairly and erroneously compared to the firebombing raids on Dresden and Hamburg near the end of World War II. A December 28, 1972, Washington Post editorial asked if the Christmas Bombing was not the “most senseless and savage act of war…ever visited by one sovereign people on another?” The historical ignorance displayed by that question is astounding.

Former Vietnam War correspondent Gloria Emerson’s lack of objectivity—not to mention disregard for documentation—was evident in her book, Winners and Losers: Battles, Retreats, Gains, Losses, and Ruins from the Vietnam War, in which she cited an unidentified source in Hanoi to support her claim that 100,000 tons of bombs fell on “Hanoi alone” during Linebacker II. This is a physical impossibility given the number of bombers involved, their carrying capacity, distances to the target, and recycling time for the 210 B-52s available. Given that it took six months to drop 155,000 tons of bombs during Linebacker I, that should have been self-evident.

While Linebacker II severely damaged North Vietnamese military targets, the country’s cities were far from devastated. According to Hanoi’s own figures, 1,212 people perished in the capital, while 300 were killed in Haiphong.

In reality, U.S. airpower could have obliterated North Vietnam far more quickly than the two-week period proposed by Gen. LeMay by bombing the dikes during the rainy season. . . . But those options never were considered given Washington’s limited strategic objectives. Linebacker II operated well within the law of proportionality prescribed by what was known as the Just War Doctrine. (https://vvaveteran.org/34-1/34-1_tilford.html)

Military historian Phillip Michael agrees, noting that civilian losses were minimal and that Linebacker II left North Vietnam “virtually defenseless”:

Major target complexes struck by B-52s and tactical aircraft included railroad yards, storage facilities, radio communications facilities, airfields, SAMs, and bridges. In total, LINEBACKER II bombed 59 targets. Railroad yards and complexes accounted for 36 percent of the total sortie effort; next were storage facilities such as warehouse complexes (25 percent). More than 20,000 tons of ordnance was dropped. Bomb damage included 1600 military structures damaged or destroyed; 500 rail interdictions; 372 pieces of rolling stock damaged or destroyed; one-fourth of petroleum reserves destroyed; and 80 percent of electrical power production destroyed. Based on the amount of ordnance dropped, civilian losses were minimal. Hanoi’s mayor claimed 1,318 civilians killed and 1,216 injured, while Haiphong reported 305 dead.

The Air Force and the Navy went after airfields, SAM sites, and communication centers. Prior to each night’s B-52 raids, F-11s struck MIG fields. On the night of 26 December, 120 B-52s hit a variety of targets within a 15 minute span. Additionally, 100 aircraft, including F-111s, F-4s, and Navy A-6s struck SAM sites and radar sites before, during and after the B-52 raids. The last two aircraft losses of LINEBACKER II came on Day 8. LINEBACKER II ended on 29 December, leaving North Vietnam virtually defenseless, their SAM supply depleted. (The Strategic Significance of Linebacker II, U.S. Army War College, 2003, pp. 11-12, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA414163.pdf)

Tilford alludes a key point that is usually ignored in liberal sources: Liberals in Congress were loudly threatening to cut off funding for the war when Congress came back in session in January. This is why Nixon ordered Linebacker II and insisted that peace talks resume on January 2. Congress came back in session on January 3. Phillip Michael notes,

President Nixon enjoyed a solid reelection victory in 1972. Even so, he faced an imminent cutoff of funds for the Vietnam War, so he needed a decision strategy to end the war in a short period of time. (The Strategic Significance of Linebacker II, U.S. Army War College, 2003, p. iii, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA414163.pdf)

Vietnam War scholars Dana Drenkowski and Lester Grau:

North Vietnam’s negotiators had walked out of the Paris Peace talks and were refusing to return, figuring that U.S. politics would force Nixon to abandon South Vietnam and the POWs without any concessions on their part. Congress was recessed, but when they returned from the Christmas recess, they were expected to force Nixon into unilateral withdrawal by stopping all funds for the war. Nixon’s position looked untenable, but he decided to launch a massive bomber strike against Hanoi to force the North Vietnamese back to negotiations before Congress could reconvene. The bomber campaign was named Operation Linebacker II. (Patterns and Predictability: The Soviet Evaluation of Operation Linebacker II, p. 1, http://www.admiraltytrilogy.com/read/Soviet_view_of_Linebacker_II.pdf)

Nixon feared that if peace talks had not resumed by the time Congress returned from the Christmas break, the liberal anti-war majority might well cut off all funds for South Vietnam. If Nixon had not had Congress ready and even anxious to betray South Vietnam if a peace deal were not quickly reached, he surely would have insisted on better terms in the Paris Peace Accords.

However, Nixon and Kissinger did succeed in getting a crucial provision into the accords that would have enabled South Vietnam to survive IF Congress had not refused to honor it, i.e., the provision that the U.S. could resupply South Vietnam on a one-for-one basis and up to the level of their existing equipment and supplies, which level was substantial.

But, tragically and treasonously, the liberal anti-war majority in Congress began slashing aid to South Vietnam soon after the accords were signed, sending the worst possible signal to North Vietnam. Even when it became undeniable that North Vietnam was attacking South Vietnam in brazen violation of the peace accords, Congress kept cutting aid to South Vietnam and refused to approve emergency funding requests from the White House. Even with the help of this Congressional treachery, and even with ample Soviet and Chinese supplies flowing to North Vietnam, it took the North Vietnamese two years and heavy combat losses to finally conquer South Vietnam.

[Tom Gram]

On 10/10/2022 at 3:42 PM, James DiEugenio said:

Great image capture.  

 

IMO, this is the best documentary ever made on the subject.  If you have not seen it, you should.

 

I had only seen parts of this and watched the whole thing last night. That was indeed the best documentary I’ve ever seen on Vietnam - riveting from start to finish. Thanks for the recommendation. 

[W. Niederhut]

On 10/10/2022 at 2:42 PM, James DiEugenio said:

Great image capture.  

 

IMO, this is the best documentary ever made on the subject.  If you have not seen it, you should.

 

I saw Hearts and Minds at Denver's Flick theater in Larimer Square the year it came out back in the 70s.

I remember feeling overwhelmed by the film-- probably moreso than I had ever felt before, or since, after watching a movie.

I also remember thinking that I never, ever wanted to watch that film again.

I had a similar reaction to The Deer Hunter back in the day.  

Edited October 12, 2022 by W. Niederhut

[James DiEugenio]

Thanks Tom.

William, when I first saw Hearts and Minds  I understood why the distributor did not want the film anymore.

No film of my experience ever caught the Jungian collective unconscious that had gotten us into that war--e.g.the halftime speech of the football coach--and the terrible divisions that war created in American society--yes that was Martha Raye at the end heckling the protestors.  And the drive for everyone to wipe it out of their minds--the cheerleader saying, I would rather just think of my own life. And that officer describing the Phoenix Operation: throwing suspected Viet Cong out of the plane so the next one would talk.

And that unforgettable ending with the napalm raining down on those innocent villagers, with their skin being peeled off as they run.

The audience left the theater a little beat up. Did America really do this grisly, horrible stuff? To a backward, Third World country?

But the thing that never left me was the veteran at the end saying: No we have not learned anything from this experience.  We are trying NOT to learn from it.

Talk about prophetic.  The subsequent rise of the neocons then gives us Iraq and Libya.

Edited October 12, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[Ron Bulman]

On 10/10/2022 at 9:16 AM, Cliff Varnell said:

I'll re-phrase: "Why do you assume Diem would have invited such a commitment?"

 

"Today's World Report: Truce Moves Reported In Viet Nam," New York World-Telegram & Sun, (Friday), 25 October 1963, p.6:*

"LONDON - The government of South Vietnam and Communist North Viet Nam are apparently making exploratory contacts that could lead to a truce, diplomatic sources said. There was no official confirmation…Diplomatic sources said the current moves were believed to be aiming at some sort of truce arrangement with possible wider ramifications." <quote off>

Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November, pg 156:

<quote on, emphasis in the original>

When [Diem and Nhu] had first claimed that Americans were active behind the scenes in the agitation spreading in Saigon, they had sounded paranoid – a favorite word among Americans for Diem and Nhu that summer.  But who could disbelieve [David] Halberstam, with his excellent sources in the Central Intelligence Agency, when he reported that the CIA had been openly sending its agents into the pagodas and making daily contact with Buddhist priests and “other participants in this crisis”?  These agents were acting under orders – and they did not go to the pagodas to discuss the finer points of Buddhism.

<quote off>

The Ngo Brothers were well aware of the American hand in the generals' plots.  To think that the Ngos *wouldn't* seek a way out by negotiating with the North is absurd on it's face. 

"Politics make for strange bedfellows," no?

In the late 80's and early 90's I dated the daughter of an officer in Nhu's secret police. Her family was Buddhist.

She adamantly denied there was strife between Catholics and Buddhists, and she insisted the C.I.A. agitated the whole crisis.

Not if we're discussing whether or not Diem would have chosen to throw in entirely with an untrustworthy ally.

Are you familiar with the man's career?  Apparently not.

An uninformed opinion.

Who negotiated the Vietnamese peace deal in 1968, which Nixon torpedoed right before the Prez election?

From Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman, by Rudy Abramson, pg 624:

<quote on, emphasis added>

Some of Averell's friends, including [Roger] Hilsman, who had heard Bob Kennedy muse about the possibility of Harriman as secretary of state, thought there was still a chance that Averell might yet get the Foggy Bottom job he long coveted.  But that had been before the notorious coup cable [243 authorizing Diem coup 8/24/63].

    Though the President had avoided criticism of Averell in the episode, Harriman knew Kennedy's confidence in him was shaken.  After working his way to the seventh floor, he was suddenly viewed as a problem.  Almost overnight, he looked ten years older.  Privately, the President and the attorney general talked of finding a way to rehabilitate him, to find a job that would get him out of the Vietnam business.  There was a need to put more emphasis on hemispheric matters, and the President thought that one way to solve two problems might be to create a new post of undersecretary for Latin American affairs for him.

As deeply as the administration had involved itself in the machinations against Diem, Kennedy still appeared stunned when the long-anticipatred coup ended with the assassination of Diem and Nhu on November 1.  The United States could technically claim that it had been a Vietnamese affair; but the administration had conditioned the atmosphere, beginning with the Harriman-Hilsman cable to Lodge.

<quote off>

Harriman sacrificed his long cherished Sec of State job to maintain a militarized So. Vietnam.  Think he wouldn't sacrifice Kennedy?

Just as well, since you lack the knowledge base to discuss the career of W. Averell Harriman.

Nice to see you back Cliff.  Hope all is well.  Rock on.  Donate anything if you can/care.  Ron

[Michael Griffith]

A good book on North Vietnamese sources is Lien-Hang T. Nguyen’s 2012 book Hanoi’s War. Using previously unseen archival materials from Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from other archives around the world, Nguyen provides a look at the Vietnam War from the North Vietnamese perspective and also from the Soviet and Chinese perspective. As I’ve mentioned several times, liberal historians have found these sources to be highly embarrassing because they destroy the liberal version of the war.

One of the significant bits of information revealed in Hanoi’s War is that “Mao signaled to Washington that Beijing would only enter the war if Chinese territory were attacked.” Yet, McNamara repeatedly cited fears of Chinese intervention as his excuse for opposing the full use of American air power against North Vietnam’s infrastructure and main supply points, even though they were miles away from any Chinese territory.

Three other books that make extensive use of previously neglected North Vietnamese sources are Mark Moyar’s book Triumph Forsaken, Lewis Sorley’s book A Better War, and Nghia M. Vo’s book The ARVN and the Fight for South Vietnam. Vo, a Vietnamese-American scholar who's written several books about the Vietnam War and its aftermath, takes special aim at the American news media's warped reporting on the war.

I have to shake my head in disbelief when I see liberal historians matter-of-factly declare that the Domino Theory was proved false. Do these people not know that Cambodia fell to communism in April 1975 at the same time that the North Vietnamese army surrounded Saigon, that Laos fell to communism later that same year, and that Thailand felt compelled to abandon its staunch anti-communist stance and cozy up to Communist China after South Vietnam fell?

[James DiEugenio]

Oh my God Mike.

I am about now to give you up as a lost cause.

The last bastion of the right wingers, like George Will, on Vietnam, was that  Cambodia and Laos were lost and that somehow proves the Domino Theory.

Speaking of the Domino Theory Mike, when China went communist, what other countries went with it?

(Sounds of crickets in the night.)

How can anyone talk about what happened in Cambodia and Laos without mentioning what Nixon did in both countries?  I mean Mike, you do understand the cause and effect pattern of history, do you not?  

Kennedy had very strict limits on any commando raids into those two countries.  These were widened under LBJ, but then it was bombs away under Nixon and Kissinger.  It was that day by day pounding, week after week, month after month, that caused Sihanouk to be forced from office by Lon Nol.  And then Lon Nol to be overthrown by the Khymer Rouge. 

You have read SIdeshow have you not?  And this bombing campaign was all kept secret.  Nixon should have been impeached over this. And another point you miss:  it was Hanoi that finally intervened in Cambodia to overthrow Pol Pot.  There is also a debate over whether or not Pol Pot was a communist, many think he really was not.  He was more like an anarcho/syndicalist. 

In other words, no American intervention by Nixon, and Sihanouk would have likely stayed in power. Thus saving about 2 million lives.

Edited October 14, 2022 by James DiEugenio