Michael Collins Piper: Final Judgement

[Len Colby]

Mike: "Nothing that I have posted has been uncivil."

me: Oh yeah, you are the epitome of civility.

You are sloppy, careless, and lazy.

Michael's comments were quite tame when compared with some of the things you have called Jack White. Don't lecture anyone about civility.

Who is lecturing? Unlike Hogan I never claimed that, "Nothing that I have posted has been uncivil." I was replying to that inaccurate claim.

Funny both of you ignored his put down of Jack (see below) and have the audacity to accuse me of selective quoting. You left out the ruder of the two comments and then essentially said he was never really was rude after all.

His comments "were quite tame when compared with some of the things" Jack has said about me and others. Like saying I was "stupid" and accusing me of being an accessory after the fact to JFK assassination and called Evan a xxxx for correctly quoting him.

I never thought I'd be saying this, but more and more Jack reminds me of the kid in the playground that sticks his chin out and says "hit me," and when the bully obliges him, goes running to the principal.

When the principal doesn't do anything, the kid goes back the next day and sticks his chin out again.

"Talk about selective quoting. These are not the only things John Simkin and Ron Ecker have said about you, are they?"

No, I've had my differences with both of them. IIRC my differences with John have only been about how the forum is run have been applied except for the one occasion he though I was trying to get Andy to ban Sid. I don't remember him ever challenging the validity of any claims I have made or the quality of my research. He also said something along the lines that I was 'one of the better' debunkers here which I took as at least a left handed compliment. He invited me a couple of time by personal e-mail to participate on specific threads which I doubt he would have done if his opinion of my contribution he was as low as yours. Similarly my debate with Ron has been civil for the most part he challenged many of my claims but never that I can remember the quality of my research.

"I think your contributions are of marginal value at best."

-Other members have told me they disagree.

-The feeling is mutual.

"You are a kneejerk reflex D-bunk-er"

"I agree with Peter Lemkin."

You are entitled to your opinion.

Len

Edited October 30, 2006 by Len Colby

[Len Colby]

You can put whatever spin on it you wish; I quoted Marchetti in response to Greg's comment that the Israeli dedicated a memorial to Angleton.

In the context of the discussion you were attempting to downplay Angleton's importance to Israel.

I'll reply to you as long as your comments are directly related to the thread. Greg was trying to 'play up' his importance to Israel by mentioning the plaque.

"You wanted to give the impression that Angleton's plaque was made of cardboard and was next to a garbage dump. Your ultimate source was an unnamed British televison (sic) journalist that (sic) told (sic) * Victor Marchetti."

Let's be accurate now - that was obviously the impression Marchetti wanted to give and seemly believed as well. Apparently he put more faith in word of the journalist (whose nationality he never mentioned – you're getting sloppy) who he described as a friend than that of the people who told him the plaque was made of bronze. The journalist's cameraman backed his story as well. That is the impression I wanted to give because that's what I believed to be true.

´*[LOL and you get on my case about spelling and grammer]

"See the quote by Senior CIA Official William Hood that (sic) said:

…As it happened, I attended the memorial service for Angleton in Israel. Two monuments were dedicated, huge stones with engraved bronze plaques. One is on a hillside, a few miles from Jerusalem and the scene of a major ballet in the early days. The other is in a park near the Kind David Hotel in Jerusalem. The various ceremonies were attended by the surviving chiefs of Israeli intelligence, and various public figures. A future prime minister dedicated one monument.

Streets have been named for wartime spies and resistance fighters, others have been honored on postage stamps, but I know of no country that has given such public recognition to a foreign intelligence officer."

Either Hood or Marchetti or the journalist and his cameraman had "stretched the truth". Do you have any evidence it wasn't the former? According to someone who positively reviewed one of his books on Amazon "William Hood" is a "non de plume" [ http://www.amazon.com/Mole-William-Hood/dp/0345304918 ]. Hood is the only person I've heard say there are TWO monuments for Angleton.

I have corroboration of the account of Marchetti's friends:

If you take the road past there out of town, you down the hill and you wind through a pretty village and eventually come to what's called the Jerusalem Forest, which is full of memorial groves, if you like, to people who get honored in this way -- war heros or simply people who have been killed in war or people recognized by the state of Israel.

We were driving through this one day, and the reason we were doing this was we were looking for the memorial grove, memorial forest, to James Jesus Angleton. Angleton was a CIA man, a senior CIA official, very famous for a number of reasons but he was of interest to us because he was the link for many years between the CIA and the Mossad. The Israelis had all said to us, his old intelligence friends had said, "Oh, yes, we love Jim and Jim was a good friend to Israel and we liked Jim a lot. In fact, after he died" -- which was in 1987 -- "we created a memorial forest for him. It's out there. I suppose it's a bit hard to find. You might not want to look for it, but I can tell you that it's there." So, we thought we would go and take a look. We drove out, and there were all these nice groves with nice plaques carved in stone to various people, and we can't find the Angleton memorial.

Eventually we decided to give up, thinking we had taken the wrong direction or something. We were looking for a place to turn and there is an open space, or it looks like an open space, and we drive up, but it isn't. It's basically a garbage dump with a few stunted, dying little trees poking up and a plaque actually on plastic screwed to the stone to James Jesus Angleton. So this was the memorial forest. It's kind of hard to explain, but in a way it was an Israeli joke. It was, "Look, we're supposed to like you a lot. We're supposed to owe you a lot, but we don't owe anyone anything, so here's what we really think of you," and it's a garbage dump.

So said that famous apologist for Israel - Andrew Cockburn. If one has the patience to read the entire transcript they will see that Cockburn who was being interviewed about a book he had written about covert ties between US and Israeli intelligence believed that the relationship between the CIA including Angleton and the Mossad was very much a two way street.

http://www.booknotes.org/Transcript/?Progr.../?ProgramID=106

I looked into this about a year ago and Cockburn's and Marchetti's were the only accounts I could find of people who actually claimed to have seen the memorial, I didn't find Hood's, back then. I never found a photo of the memorial. You'd think that if it were some so special there would be a photo of it somewhere on the Net.

A href="http://images.google.com/images?hl=en&lr=&rls=GGLG%2CGGLG%3A2005-32%2CGGLG%3Aen&q=%22James+angleton%22+OR+%22James+jesus+angleton%22+OR+%22James+j.+angleton%22+%2Bmemorial+OR++monument+OR+plaque+OR+stone+%2Bisrael+OR+jerusalem+OR+%22tel+aviv+%2Bstone+OR+Bronze+OR+plastic&btnG=Search"%5b/size">http://images.google.com/images?hl=en&lr=&rls=GGLG%2CGGLG%3A2005-32%2CGGLG%3Aen&q=%22James+angleton%22+OR+%22James+jesus+angleton%22+OR+%22James+j.+angleton%22+%2Bmemorial+OR++monument+OR+plaque+OR+stone+%2Bisrael+OR+jerusalem+OR+%22tel+aviv+%2Bstone+OR+Bronze+OR+plastic&btnG=Searchhttp://images.google.com/images?hl=en&lr=&rls=GGLG%2CGGLG%3A2005-32%2CGGLG%3Aen&q=%22James+angleton%22+OR+%22James+jesus+angleton%22+OR+%22James+j.+angleton%22+%2Bmemorial+OR++monument+OR+plaque+OR+stone+%2Bisrael+OR+jerusalem+OR+%22tel+aviv+%2Bstone+OR+Bronze+OR+plastic&btnG=Search

Since you made a big deal about my supposed selective quoting to not be hypocritical you should have included the sentence that immediately preceded your Hood quote, "The author of one recent book devoted very few words to Angleton's relationship with Israel, dismissing it as extraneous." I quoted a single sentence and you criticized me for not quoting an entire two paragraph passage most of which was extraneous to the immediate question at hand. You on the other hand quoted two entire paragraph passage and edited out that single sentence, that is what I call "selective quoting". While you were at it you could have quoted the other passage concerning Angleton and Israel on the page (which was AKAIK the only other one on the site).

A new myth is in the making. A new book is being published calling Angleton an "Israeli Mossad Man." I have to thank Elizabeth Bancroft's latest issue of Surveillant for bringing to my attention this book by Terry Ellsworth, a Yale graduate of the class of 1965, that says that Israeli intelligence has manipulated the CIA since the 1940s as a result of Angleton's having the Israeli desk. In my opinion, Angleton's handling of the Israeli desk was exemplary, but as with may good things it lasted too long. Despite his being responsible for the liaison aspects of Israeli intelligence, suffice it to say that he also produced some excellent unilateral information about Israel. Angleton was not a Mossad man.

The myth also exists that Angleton single-handedly provided funds for Israel to carry on activities in Africa. This is false. Angleton never had such funds. Any such program would have been fully approved by the National Security Council approval mechanism at the time. Such a program would have let the Israelis carry out effective activities helping African areas with the American hand concealed, as a true American operation should.

SAMUEL HALPERN - Former Senior CIA Official

Was Angleton a "Mossad man" in the sense that he subjected the CIA's interests to theirs? I have no idea. Halpern said no, the book author mentioned by Hood didn't seem to think so, Cockburn didn't say anything along those lines, Hood never said so but your selective editing almost made it sound like he was saying so, Marchetti insinuated he was but and offered no evidence and only a vague example.

People grow weary of clicking links, searching for one or two sentences on a page,

. You don't seem to know how to use the "Find (on this page)" function that all major browsers have, I assume other forum members have figured it out.

Oh yeah, you are the epitome of civility.

You are sloppy, careless, and lazy.

"That's the best you can do? Taken in the context it was written, my comment was accurate."

Talk about selective quoting, what about what you said to Jack? I also remember you getting rather uncivil with David Healy and a few other members of this forum. As I said to Mark unlike you I never claimed that I was never uncivil.

"Contrast that to what you wrote about Jeff Dahlstrom:

"Though the author made a couple of legitimate points it was on the whole it was a vile bigoted pile of xxxx and anyone who would see fit to post it approvingly on a forum is one as well. You are bigot (sic) by any objective definition."

I think my comment was quite justified, that was the most offensive post I've seen on this forum worse even IMO than Sid's Holocaust denial. I insulted a single person he insulted an entire ethnic group, I was not the only person offended by that post.

Len

(edited from type size 3 to make readable!)

Edited October 31, 2006 by Len Colby

[Michael Hogan]

I'll reply to you as long as your comments are directly related to the thread.

Is that why you bring up David Healy, Jack White, and Sid Walker and other threads in your response to me?

*[LOL and you get on my case about spelling and grammer (sic)]

No, I get on your case about spelling and grammar. By the way, you want to show me my typo again?

Was Angleton a "Mossad man" in the sense that be subject the CIA's interests to theirs? I have no idea.

What are you trying to say? I have no idea.

LOL and you have criticized me for not adequately sourcing my claims. Perhaps you failed to do so in this case because you got it from an obscure website run by anonymous people

and

This from the guy who didn't bother to (or perhaps intentionally didn't) provide a link to the Hood quote.

Why do you insist on behaving like a fool? In your feeble attempts to answer criticism, you again make a claim that is not true. See my post #402, where a link was provided. For your convenience I have posted the pertinent excerpt below:

From William Hood, former Senior CIA Official:

.....As it happened, I attended the memorial service for Angleton in Israel. Two monuments were dedicated, huge stones with engraved bronze plaques. One is on a hillside, a few miles from Jerusalem and the scene of a major ballet in the early days. The other is in a park near the Kind David Hotel in Jerusalem. The various ceremonies were attended by the surviving chiefs of Israeli intelligence, and various public figures. A future prime minister dedicated one monument.

Streets have been named for wartime spies and resistance fighters, others have been honored on postage stamps, but I know of no country that has given such public recognition to a foreign intelligence officer.

http://www.thefinalphase.com/Angleton%20My...ANGLETONS_WORLD

If you had bothered to look, you would have seen that Hood's remarks were copyrighted and came from the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. Go to their website and tell me how obscure they are (especially compared the the websites you routinely cite). http://www.intelligenceconsortium.org/purpose.htm

Consortium for the Study of Intelligence

FOUNDING MEMBERS, 1979:

Richard Betts, Columbia University

Richard Bissell, Foreign Policy Research Institute

Adda Bozeman, Sarah Lawrence

Ray Cline, Georgetown University

Stephen Gibert, Georgetown University

Roy Godson, Georgetown University

Samuel Huntington, Harvard University

John Norton Moore, University of Virginia

Myres McDougal, Yale University

Robert Nisbet, American Enterprise Institute

Robert Pfaltzgraff, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Richard Pipes, Harvard University

Antonin Scalia, University of Chicago

Paul Seabury, University of California, Berkeley

Richard Starr, Hoover Institution

Frank Trager, New York University

Allen Weinstein, Smith College

James Q. Wilson, Harvard University

Though the author made a couple of legitimate points it was on the whole it was a vile bigoted pile of xxxx and anyone who would see fit to post it approvingly on a forum is one as well. You (Jeff Dahlstrom) are bigot (sic) by any objective definition.

I think my comment was quite justified......

You refer to a Forum member as "a vile bigoted pile of xxxx" and and your justification is that you were not the only one to find his post offensive?

I said this before about a specific thread but now I'll apply it to the whole forum, I'll refrain from responding to you idiotic nitpicking in the future. Doing so is a waste of my time and tends to take the involved threads of on tangents.

Just couldn't keep your word, could you?

This post has been edited by Andy Walker: Today, 03:47 PM

Despite Andy Walker's efforts, your post is still quite laborious to read. And I'm being kind.

[Guest]

Despite Andy Walker's efforts, your post is still quite laborious to read. And I'm being kind.

As you well know Hogan my "editing" merely involved reducing the font size of Len's recent post.

You really are the most unpleasant and disingenuous little man .

[Michael Hogan]

Despite Andy Walker's efforts, your post is still quite laborious to read. And I'm being kind.

As you well know Hogan my "editing" merely involved reducing the font size of Len's recent post.

You really are the most unpleasant and disingenuous little man .

Yes, I knew that. And despite your act of reducing his font, one still has to scroll horizontally to read his post.

That is what makes it laborious to read.

[Jack White]

Despite Andy Walker's efforts, your post is still quite laborious to read. And I'm being kind.

As you well know Hogan my "editing" merely involved reducing the font size of Len's recent post.

You really are the most unpleasant and disingenuous little man .

Yes, I knew that. And despite your act of reducing his font, one still has to scroll horizontally to read his post.

That is what makes it laborious to read.

Michael, Mr. Walker calls you "disingenuous" without knowing you are

just the OPPOSITE. The word means LACKING IN CANDOR, and you

are anything but that...one of the few here willing to speak the truth

and speak your mind. Keep up the CANDOR! Maybe Mr. Walker does

not have a dictionary, or thinks researchers are too dumb to note his

misuse of the word. As for "unpleasant", he knows all about that.

Jack

[Mark Stapleton]

That was the book Tim Gratz was spruiking earlier on this thread. He even started a separate thread on it. Members can evaluate its worth for themselves:

http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=6174

Thank you for providing this background. When I get a chance I'll read the thread.

Some of your responses to my responses seem to involve some misunderstandings.

"Odd how Piper and others have 'broken new ground' in revealing potential Mossad ties to JFK's murder when an American might say the ground's barely been tilled investigating Nativist/racist angles. But as I once remarked to someone, is it possible to investigate an entire society?"

No-one's trying to investigate an entire society. I'm looking at the geopolitical realities surrounding America's relationship with Israel which may have contributed to their participation in Kennedy's assassination.

Me too. The reference to investigating an entire society was to the American South of the era, as extremely conservative, segregationist, racist attitudes (and the influence of the Ku Klux Klan, for instance) were so prevalent that it was and still is hard to really explore many "angles" in investigating Presiden Kennedy's murder (and those of others). My remark was a comment on the irony of the difficulties involved in that area whereas a Mossad (or Israeli, Zionist, Jewish) angle is thought to be breaking new ground.

Daniel, you are right about the UAR. It was a short lived federation between Egypt and Syria (1958-1961). After the breakup of the federation, Egypt retained the name UAR and used it interchangably with 'Egypt'. I must be acronym challenged.

The event which spooked Ben-Gurion was on April 17, 1963, when Egypt, Syria and Iraq signed, in Cairo, an Arab Federation Proclamation calling for a military union to bring about the liberation of Palestine. (Cohen, p.119).

Cohen goes on to describe how BG reacted...."Foreign Minister Golda Meir and the ministry's senior staff did not share BG's alarm. BG, however, launched into what his biographer calls an 'unprecedented diplomatic campaign', alerting fifty world leaders to the gravity of the new situation in the ME."

On 25 April BG wrote a seven page letter to Kennedy...BG compared the liberation of Palestine to the Holocaust: "The liberation of Palestine is impossible without the total destruction of the people in Israel, but the people in Israel are not in the hapless situation of the six million defenceless Jews who were wiped out by Nazi Germany".

Cohen adds that BG's new campaign upset many of the senior staff at the Foreign Ministry. This is based on interviews conducted by Cohen with Shimshon Arad (then head of the US Department at the Foreign Ministry), and Gideon Rafael (then Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry), in summer 1994. The substance and tone seemed exaggerated, or in senior diplomat Gideon Rafael's words, 'hysterical'. Ambassador Harman and his deputy Mordechai Gazit in Washington, were even more critical of and frustrated with BG's actions.

This is considerable evidence supporting the point I made: Ben Gurion had evidently become depressed and paranoid, was recognized as such by others in the Israeli government, etc. Ben Gurion was over-reacting to pan-Arab rhetoric "about something which never materialized and which had already failed once." The most significant of these was apparently the April 17, 1963 Proclamation. It's important to recognize that at the time there was a tremendous amount of idealization of and sympathy for the goal of a "larger union" of all Arabs, including how it would serve to unify the fight against Israel, but that it had failed when it was attempted. This was in part due to unwillingness of other states to be incorporated under the hegemony of Nasser's Egypt. If Ben Gurion's own "diplomatic campaign" was recognized by so many within his own government in the way described, this works against any larger argument about Jews/Israelis/Mossad as eliminating the obstacle of John F. Kennedy. Since Ben Gurion stepped aside (for mental health reasons?), the thesis can only be maintained by saying Ben Gurion continued to have power over the Mossad or that eliminating Kennedy was a larger programmatic goal on the part of (at least some in) the Israeli government.

That's right. Although BG resigned (no reason was given, btw, he simply stated to his colleagues, "I must resign". Opinions were divided as to the reason, with Bar-Zohar and Yitzakh Navon citing domestic politics, while Pinhas Sapir, Israel Galili and Yuval Ne'eman believed JFK's pressure on Dimona played a part--Cohen, p.135) I believe he still wielded considerable influence, especially on security matters.

Piper's thesis does indeed rest on the assumption that BG resigned in order to get the wheels turning on JFK's assassination. I believe this is a strong possibility.

(And yet these patients were to themselves enough that they were able to recognize when another patient <Ben Gurion> had become really paranoid.)

"....If it is accurate that Kennedy was interested in supplying Israel with mucho conventional arms, with the proviso that Israel should not build nuclear weapons, one explanation for Ben-Gurion's mental straits could be that he was caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place --- there may have been other forces outside his control who were insistent on a nuclear capability, that this was something that would be developed no matter what he (or JFK) wanted. Ben-Gurion would also seem to have had other problems (like the domestic political corruption issues) that help account for his depression. Kennedy followed a similar attempt at an even-handed policy as Eisenhower did where the Arab-Israeli conflict was concerned; but then it's convenient to neglect to mention that Johnson held back assisting the Israelis in 1967 because CIA analysts convinced Johnson et al that the Israelis would wipe the floor with the Arabs (about which CIA was right). The really strong, overt support of Israel on the part of the US began during the Nixon Administration; this seems to me more likely the result of necessities inherent in the 'Nixon Doctrine' than anything else."

Here you've made assumptions which aren't supported by the evidence.

JFK wasn't interested in supplying Israel with 'mucho weapons' in return for co-operation on Dimona. In 1962, he had sent Myer Feldman to Israel to craft a deal that would tie the US supply of air defence Hawk missiles to Israeli concessions on the Palestinian refugee problem--not Dimona. The Skyhawk jet deal was signed off on LBJ's watch. The quid pro quo for LBJ's arming of Israel was ostensibly concessions on Dimona via AEC inspections. Those sham inspections, as we now know, were not really concessions at all---but Israel's quota of offensive weapons was secured nonetheless. The fact that LBJ was also considering direct US help for Israel in its war with the Arab states only strengthens the case for LBJ being the father of Israel's arming for war. Under LBJ, Israel got the weapons and they kept Dimona.

Military aid to Israel increased dramatically during LBJ's administration. (I haven't got the numbers handy but I could dig them up unless someone else has them handy). It has never really stopped. One third of all US foreign aid goes to Israel.

Kennedy's diplomatic strategy of 'arm's length' relations with all ME nations was designed to maintain good relations with those ME nations. This makes sense if your main concern is US foreign policy. He wasn't about to arm anyone in the region with the firepower to start a war.

So it is not accurate "that Kennedy was interested in supplying Israel with mucho conventional arms"? But this is apparently what Bass argues was the case. I can't argue the point without having access to Bass's book, investigation of his sources, arguments, etc. The only comment I can make is that Kennedy's Defense Department did actively promote a plan to "Buy American" weaponry, for reasons mentioned, and that Kennedy's Defense Department was essentially also Johnson's Defense Department.

I will concede that LBJ himself was particularly concerned with helping Israel and that military aid to Israel (on the part of the US) "increased dramatically during LBJ's administration." You're aware that even today there are those who argue that Israel is surrounded by a sea of hostile enemies; pre-1967 there was much more truth to this than there has been post-1967. Do you think such a view was justified prior to 1967?

Israel has been surrounded by hostile states since its partitioning in 1948. It's as true now as it was then.

"'Kennedy was the only obstacle.' That's a bit of a stretch, wouldn't you agree? Assuming you wouldn't, how do you justify such an assertion?"

It's not a stretch, it's a fact. Construction of the all important nuclear reprocessing plant was continuing with French assisstance even after DeGaulle's public announcement of a new French nuclear policy vis-a-vis Israel. JFK knew this and was determined to see the Dimona project abandoned. BG's two pronged strategy of securing both nuclear and conventional weapons was being threatened on both counts by one man.

You really believe only one man stood in the way of Israel getting nuclear weapons?

You wrote: "In mid-63, the Dimona reactor had not gone critical. That wasn't till two years later. Ben-Gurion, David Bergman and Shimon Peres had put in six years of painstaking wheeling and dealing since construction began in '57. JFK told them to end it or face serious consequences --- 'it could seriously jeopardise the relationship'. It can be argued that Israel would not have been able to fake out the inspectors had JFK lived."

I wrote: "It can be argued, but President Kennedy obviously wasn't Superman (his brains were blown out), so it's doubtful that even He could have kept a sovereign nation from developing nuclear weapons if that was their intent. This is the main problem with the thesis: President Kennedy did all that he could against nuclear proliferation; the Israelis and the Chinese developed nuclear capability during President Johnson's administration... Therefore President Johnson was amenable to if did not in fact facilitate the Israeli's gaining nuclear capability? Does the same hold true for President Johnson vis-a-vis Communist China? How much evil can we ascribe to Lyndon Johnson? And was it not so much Johnson per se as the Jews who 'controlled' Johnson?"

You wrote: "You don't seem to understand that JFK's positon was to halt nuclear proliferation. This means admitting no more new members into the nuclear club. He was also concerned with China and India but he understood that Israel was where he could use the most leverage to show that he was serious. Israel and JFK knew that without US aid, they were alone in the region. JFK's pledge to intervene in the event any ME agression provided no comfort to BG--he wanted Israel to be able to counter force with force (and an option for a rainy day).

"JFK's mindset was influenced by the CMC, imo. The spectre of nuclear war had spooked him to such an extent that he became a hardliner on this issue (see my post on NSAM 231--#21 of this thread). Israel discovered that they could not cut any kind of deal or compromise with JFK on this, like they had done with De Gaulle. The events of '62 had changed JFK and hardened his anti-nuclear resolve. By '63, there was no bargaining on Dimona. Kennedy was telling Israel to get rid of it or the relationship was in jeopardy. Moreover, tying limited arms sales to progress on the Palestinian issue meant both elements of BG's security strategy might be stymied.

"Had JFK lived, Israel would have had to abandon Dimona. I believe BG ultimately decided he was an enemy of Israel."

I am aware that President Kennedy did a lot to try to diminish the dangers of nuclear weapons, in a variety of ways. I'm also aware that he was gravely influenced by the Cuban Missile Crisis, like many other people. But you seem to have an advantage that most people don't, since you know a good deal more than most about President Kennedy's concerns, positions, designs, determinations, etc, and what his mindset, interests, and influences were.

"JFK wasn't interested in"

"Kennedy's diplomatic strategy...was designed to"

"He wasn't about to arm anyone"

"JFK knew this and was determined to"

"You don't seem to understand that JFK's positon was to halt nuclear proliferation."

"He was also concerned with...but he understood that"

"Israel and JFK knew that"

"JFK's mindset was influenced by the CMC, imo. The spectre of nuclear war had spooked him"

"The events of '62 had changed JFK"

"Had JFK lived, Israel would have had to abandon Dimona."

"Kennedy was interested in only limited arms sales to Israel--with strings attached."

You don't seem to be challenging any assertions of mine but rather you are questioning my apparent mindreading ability vis-a-vis JFK and BG. Daniel, I understand why you make this comment and here is my reply:

Since I started looking into this angle of the assassination (ie. Dimona), I've realised that JFK's words and actions have been perfectly consistent all the way through. Ditto BG. Quoting again from Cohen:

"No American President was more concerned with nuclear proliferation than JFK. He was convinced the spread of nuclear weapons would make the world a more dangerous place and undermine US interests. He saw it as his role to place nuclear arms control and nonproliferation at the centre of American foreign policy. In the words of Glenn Seaborg. Kennedy's chairman of the AEC, nuclear proliferation was Kennedy's 'private nightmare'.

Substantial evidence supports Cohen's assertion. JFK's issuing of NSAM 231, and the SNIE of 30 February 1963 entitled 'The advanced weapons programs of the UAR and Israel", his private conversations with colleagues and his statements to the press, his sponsorship of the nuclear test ban treaty and the partial test ban treaty as well as his endorsement of the atoms for peace program and his single minded (perhaps obsessive) determination to end Israel's nuclear efforts as evidenced by his strongly worded letters to BG and Eshkol. Similarly, BG's reluctance to give up Dimona and his dream of the ultimate deterrent is clear from his words and actions all the way through.

This is why I might appear to know more about Kennedy's concerns, designs, mindset etc, on this issue than I should. Kennedy's words and actions were transparent and fully consistent with his stated nonproliferation goals. It's all on the table (and on the record).

Contrast this with, say, LBJ, who I consider to be a deceitful rattlesnake. While earning praise throughout the world for his civil rights legislation, he reportedly still called African Americans 'niggers' when talking in private, indicating that deep down he was still a southern redneck. No consistency, hence no trust, IMO.

This may be unfair, since we all tend to express ourselves with similar assertions. But the problem may be the high volume involved, and both the speculative and the categorical nature of the statements. (And you seem to be similarly aware of what was going on with Ben Gurion.) In any event, you originally wrote, "In mid-63, the Dimona reactor had not gone critical. That wasn't till two years later." A different source says, "In 1962, the Dimona reactor went critical; the French resumed work on the underground plutonium reprocessing plant, and completed it in 1964 or 1965."

My source (Cohen, of course) states that the reactor went critical (capable of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction) on 26 December 1963 (p.179). This information comes from Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban (7 February 1966). So your source is wrong. Unfortunately, so was I. Haste and relying on memory are my feeble excuses. It should be remembered that only the Israelis really know the answer. And on the issue of Dimona, and many others, any similarity between what the Israeli Government says and the truth is purely coincidental.

BTW, who is your source? I'd like to read what he/she has to say and compare it with Cohen. It's not Bass, I hope. Maybe I've been sucked in by Cohen's book. However, it's not that kind of book, IMO. There's no agenda being pushed, just a meticulously researched history of a very complex and secretive subject. It's a pity I can't persuade more members to read it. I think it provides readers who have an interest in the assassination a frightening but plausible new perspective. A high stakes diplomatic chess game played with incredible duplicity on the Israeli side, and JFK's death was the turning point which got it over the line. IMO, of course.

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm

So was it in '62 or '65 that the Dimona reactor went critical? And does it affect your scenario if it was in 1962? Assuming it might, would that be because you believed John F. Kennedy was holding the Israelis back while it was Lyndon Johnson that let them go ahead?

[Guest]

Keep up the CANDOR! Maybe Mr. Walker does

not have a dictionary, or thinks researchers are too dumb to note his

misuse of the word. As for "unpleasant", he knows all about that.

Jack

You mean 'candour' I presume?

Now write it out 1000 times.

As for "dumb" .... well what can I say?

[Mark Wilson]

"...the thesis can only be maintained by saying Ben Gurion continued to have power over the Mossad or that eliminating Kennedy was a larger programmatic goal on the part of (at least some in) the Israeli government."

That's right. Although BG resigned (no reason was given, btw, he simply stated to his colleagues, "I must resign". Opinions were divided as to the reason, with Bar-Zohar and Yitzakh Navon citing domestic politics, while Pinhas Sapir, Israel Galili and Yuval Ne'eman believed JFK's pressure on Dimona played a part--Cohen, p.135) I believe he still wielded considerable influence, especially on security matters.

Piper's thesis does indeed rest on the assumption that BG resigned in order to get the wheels turning on JFK's assassination. I believe this is a strong possibility.

Ben Gurion resigned in June 1963. Does Piper see this as an element of "plausible deniability" (Ben Gurion was no longer PM, so couldn't easily be tied to what followed) or as "getting out of the way of" those who wanted JFK eliminated? It seems like it could be read that way as well, that Ben Gurion might have represented some obstacle to "a plan to eliminate JFK."

Hi Daniel,Piper theorized that the assassination of JFK was BG's last order to Mossad as PM,then he resigned.His theory, as motive was the dead end they had come to...JFK was not going to let Israel get the bomb and BG's position was getting the bomb as his most important task,the diplomacy was over,the way Piper sees it.....Also playing into Piper's theory was a deep disrespect the BG had for JFK,JFK's age was a factor,he being so young and lacking in wisdom..Piper cited at least one instance where BG referred to JFK as a parent would adress their child,i believe he called him son in a letter between the 2.....Also playing into BG's distaste for JFK was the apparent anti semitic positions Joe Kennedy had taken during WWII,also,JFK's postion on Algeria's independence was in direct conflict with BG and Israel's interests,as Piper sees it....

[Mark Stapleton]

"...the thesis can only be maintained by saying Ben Gurion continued to have power over the Mossad or that eliminating Kennedy was a larger programmatic goal on the part of (at least some in) the Israeli government."

That's right. Although BG resigned (no reason was given, btw, he simply stated to his colleagues, "I must resign". Opinions were divided as to the reason, with Bar-Zohar and Yitzakh Navon citing domestic politics, while Pinhas Sapir, Israel Galili and Yuval Ne'eman believed JFK's pressure on Dimona played a part--Cohen, p.135) I believe he still wielded considerable influence, especially on security matters.

Piper's thesis does indeed rest on the assumption that BG resigned in order to get the wheels turning on JFK's assassination. I believe this is a strong possibility.

Ben Gurion resigned in June 1963. Does Piper see this as an element of "plausible deniability" (Ben Gurion was no longer PM, so couldn't easily be tied to what followed) or as "getting out of the way of" those who wanted JFK eliminated? It seems like it could be read that way as well, that Ben Gurion might have represented some obstacle to "a plan to eliminate JFK."

----------------------------------------------------

Yes, I think Piper's thesis implies an element of plausible deniability in BG's sudden resignation, although I don't recall the book explicitly stating this.

What's interesting to me are the chronological links to laying the groundwork for planning the assassination. In other words, I find it curious that the Texas trip was announced on June 5, 1963 after a meeting between JFK, LBJ and Governor Connally at the Cortez Hotel in El Paso, Texas. Eleven days later, BG suddenly resigns. He doesn't even read JFK's reply to his May 27 letter, which reached the embassy on June 15. That letter was the toughest and most explicit of them all, spelling out JFK's 'five conditions'.

Assuming Piper's thesis is accurate, BG would have required time to make arrangements from his end--clandestine meetings would have to be arranged--probably requiring trips abroad. It became necessary to discard the burden of the Prime Ministership to do this, IMO.

So far I'm unaware of any other researchers linking the close proximity of the announcement of the Texas trip, and BG's resignation, but for me it's relevant.

From http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc...ben_gurion.html

In June 1963 Ben-Gurion resigned as Prime Minister, citing “personal reasons.” Levi Eshkol took over the posts of Prime Minister and Defense Minister. But Ben-Gurion remained active politically, with a rivalry developing between him and Eshkol. In June 1965, the Mapai Party split, with Ben-Gurion establishing Rafi (List of Israeli Workers), which won ten Knesset seats in the following election. In 1968, Rafi rejoined Mapai and Ahdut Ha'avoda, to form the Israel Labor Party, while Ben-Gurion formed a new party, Hareshima Hamamlachtit (The State List), which won four Knesset seats in the 1969 elections. In June 1970, Ben-Gurion retired from political life and returned to Sde Boker where he passed away in 1973.

This later history seems like more indications of psychological issues, as in possibly pronounced egomania and being accustomed to being "the man." (Facilitated by Israel's electoral system, where even the smallest party can gain a seat in the Knesset.)

Israel has been surrounded by hostile states since its partitioning in 1948. It's as true now as it was then.

I had a hard time understanding this answer. My first reaction was, "Well, I don't agree with that at all. Israel can hardly be said to be actually threatened in its existence for some time." I have to assume you're referring to general negative or hostile attitudes on the part of large numbers in the Arab or Muslim world? But that is different from being surrounded by nations with armies actively trying to do away with you. If you don't want to concede that Israel was threatened in this way (in its existence) from 1948 to 1967, that's a different matter, but some observers would say as I do that Israel's security situation has been very good since at least the late '70s. Prior to 1967, Israel's position was much more precarious. That was what my original question was about: do you believe that prior to 1967 Israel's position was precarious because it was surrounded by nations with armies that were actively trying to destroy Israel?

Sorry Daniel, I read your original question as being general in nature. Of course, Israel has been surrounded by hostile states since its birth but yes, things were much more precarious for Israel prior to '67, because it had yet to establish the clear cut military advantage it has subsequently held.

The period of JFK's administration in particular was very worrying for Israel. The rise of pan-Arab alliances, accompanied by harsh rhetoric, and the threat of Soviet sponsorship of missile technology for Syria and Egypt, as we have discussed, frightened BG into near panic.

"You don't seem to understand that JFK's positon was to halt nuclear proliferation. This means admitting no more new members into the nuclear club. He was also concerned with China and India but he understood that Israel was where he could use the most leverage to show that he was serious. Israel and JFK knew that without US aid, they were alone in the region. JFK's pledge to intervene in the event any ME agression provided no comfort to BG--he wanted Israel to be able to counter force with force (and an option for a rainy day).

"JFK's mindset was influenced by the CMC, imo. The spectre of nuclear war had spooked him to such an extent that he became a hardliner on this issue (see my post on NSAM 231--#21 of this thread). Israel discovered that they could not cut any kind of deal or compromise with JFK on this, like they had done with De Gaulle. The events of '62 had changed JFK and hardened his anti-nuclear resolve. By '63, there was no bargaining on Dimona. Kennedy was telling Israel to get rid of it or the relationship was in jeopardy. Moreover, tying limited arms sales to progress on the Palestinian issue meant both elements of BG's security strategy might be stymied.

"Had JFK lived, Israel would have had to abandon Dimona. I believe BG ultimately decided he was an enemy of Israel."

You don't seem to be challenging any assertions of mine but rather you are questioning my apparent mindreading ability vis-a-vis JFK and BG.

Exactly, Mark, that's the point. I started reading each sentence and found you were often expressing very categorically what JFK "thought" or "was determined to do," etc, and found still more "evidence" of this throughout. As I said, we all tend to do this, particularly when we know a subject well enough that we can be considered to have a good grasp of the circumstances. The problem is when we express our opinions so categorically, as if we were "right inside the head of" JFK or Ben Gurion, whatever we have to say is persuasive and convincing as such. I see no overwhelming reason to dispute your take on the situation in the quote above, aside from the "Saint JFK" aspects previously mentioned.

But the larger issue is important and, presumably, was part of Andy Walker's earlier criticism about the "anti-historical" character of so much of what goes on. If I present an argument about some circumstances, claiming that "JFK thought," "Ben Gurion wanted," etc, etc, I could well be right about the circumstances but I would still be assuming and presuming an awful lot about things I can't actually be privy to (people's thoughts, motivations, fears, likes, dislikes, etc). It's a different matter in regard to what people did; what goes on inside their heads can at best only be inferred from what they do or say or write. You seem to be on much stronger ground with the character of the correspondence between Kennedy and BenGurion/Eshkol, and the NSAM 231. But I think my overall criticism was apt: your assessment should be given considerable respect, since you've read a lot of source material, but the total volume of categorical statements which are based on your opinion or your take on the situation serves as persuasive and convincing rhetoric that can hardly be refuted. It's nearly impossible (and therefore fairly pointless) trying to assess, critique or refute what someone else believes about something. (The bad thing is that now I have to be more careful in expressing my own opinions categorically.)

Daniel, I understand why you make this comment and here is my reply:

Since I started looking into this angle of the assassination (ie. Dimona), I've realised that JFK's words and actions have been perfectly consistent all the way through. Ditto BG. Quoting again from Cohen: "No American President was more concerned with nuclear proliferation than JFK. He was convinced the spread of nuclear weapons would make the world a more dangerous place and undermine US interests. He saw it as his role to place nuclear arms control and nonproliferation at the centre of American foreign policy. In the words of Glenn Seaborg. Kennedy's chairman of the AEC, nuclear proliferation was Kennedy's 'private nightmare'."

Substantial evidence supports Cohen's assertion. JFK's issuing of NSAM 231, and the SNIE of 30 February 1963 entitled 'The advanced weapons programs of the UAR and Israel", his private conversations with colleagues and his statements to the press, his sponsorship of the nuclear test ban treaty and the partial test ban treaty as well as his endorsement of the atoms for peace program and his single minded (perhaps obsessive) determination to end Israel's nuclear efforts as evidenced by his strongly worded letters to BG and Eshkol. Similarly, BG's reluctance to give up Dimona and his dream of the ultimate deterrent is clear from his words and actions all the way through.

This is why I might appear to know more about Kennedy's concerns, designs, mindset etc, on this issue than I should. Kennedy's words and actions were transparent and fully consistent with his stated nonproliferation goals. It's all on the table (and on the record).

A good explanation for your position, with plenty of evidence to back it up. There's no doubt that President Kennedy and others in his administration, notably Robert Kennedy and Robert McNamara, worked very hard in many ways after the Cuban Missile Crisis to limit the dangers of nuclear weapons.

Contrast this with, say, LBJ, who I consider to be a deceitful rattlesnake. While earning praise throughout the world for his civil rights legislation, he reportedly still called African Americans 'niggers' when talking in private, indicating that deep down he was still a southern redneck. No consistency, hence no trust, IMO.

I would have to write a book to explain my views about Lyndon Johnson, but I'm not as inclined as most in the "assassination carnival" to demonize him. I've long felt he was a peculiarly tragic figure, and possibly bipolar, and I'm far more suspicious of J. Edgar Hoover than I am of Johnson in terms of "assassination guilt."

But here's some examples of a typical problem I keep seeing. According to some, JFK would have responsibly solved the Vietnam conflict had he lived; LBJ gave us the Vietnam war as we knew it. According to some, JFK would have found a way to prevent Israel from gaining nuclear weapons; Israel gained nuclear weapons on LBJ's watch. But when the question of LBJ's initiation and securing of civil rights --- and much other important progressive --- legislation (and progress in general) comes up, it was all apparently a sham, he wasn't sincere, etc. This not only goes against a blatantly obvious historical record, including LBJ's "using" JFK's martyrdom to "do the right thing" in these areas (doing the right thing would have been much more difficult otherwise); it also fails to note that Johnson became "a traitor to the South" by doing so. So I don't think LBJ can ever win in the historical record: he has the disadvantage of having lived through and "benefited" from Dallas, in an immediate and constant and continuing comparison with a dead man about whom so many are free to speculate and idealize.

(By 1968 I don't think Johnson felt he "benefited" from having become president. He basically resigned, retired to the ranch, let his hair grow long, and regaled people with his confusions about how "the youth" had so violently opposed him when he had been an "anti-Establishment rebel" in his own younger days --- much including his attitudes toward authority, the cops, and civil rights. Private racist attitudes and jargon can be lived with, as long as they don't become part of something active and inimical, and I believe Johnson was sincere about the broadest goals of civil rights [and poverty] issues. It's easy for us to misunderstand that "liberal elites" had the luxury of being rhetorically in favor of civil rights, having little or no contact with black folks, whereas a "redneck" like Johnson was much more fully aware of the realities of what all this entailed. The fact that he did do so much substantively in this area argues for his sincerity as well as his courage. But then it's also hard to judge when Johnson had J. Edgar constantly whispering in his ear about sex and Communist menaces.)

Interesting comments about LBJ. I don't want to get too far into this (I want to continue summarising the MCP book), but you're right that the civil rights legislation is a matter of record and this can't be taken from LBJ. However, there's too many other strikes against him for me to regard him as anything other than a corrupt and venal politician. The biggest black mark against his name is his near certain involvemnet in the assassination conspiracy, IMO.

My source (Cohen, of course) states that the reactor went critical (capable of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction) on 26 December 1963 (p.179). This information comes from Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban (7 February 1966). So your source is wrong. Unfortunately, so was I. Haste and relying on memory are my feeble excuses. It should be remembered that only the Israelis really know the answer. And on the issue of Dimona, and many others, any similarity between what the Israeli Government says and the truth is purely coincidental.

BTW, who is your source? I'd like to read what he/she has to say and compare it with Cohen. It's not Bass, I hope. Maybe I've been sucked in by Cohen's book. However, it's not that kind of book, IMO. There's no agenda being pushed, just a meticulously researched history of a very complex and secretive subject. It's a pity I can't persuade more members to read it. I think it provides readers who have an interest in the assassination a frightening but plausible new perspective. A high stakes diplomatic chess game played with incredible duplicity on the Israeli side, and JFK's death was the turning point which got it over the line. IMO, of course.

My source is the paper written in the link I posted directly under the quotation:

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm

I hope you will check it out, as it is a brief but very thorough rundown of the entire background of Israel's development of nuclear weapons. Although it is written under official auspices, I think it's as much as we can hope for in terms of disclosure, objectivity, etc. It doesn't refute your thesis, generally supports it, in fact, and it also cites Cohen's book. I suppose the 1962 date could have been an oversight or a typo, but he also doesn't provide a reference for that particular statement (or a specific date), so I have no idea where his info came from or whether he was doing something "on purpose." but overall it looks like a good read for anyone interested in the subjects.

I read it and I agree it's a brief but accurate overview. Cohen's book is much more comrehensive, IMO, and despite the complexity of the subject matter, it's not a difficult book to read. Since reading it, I can understand where both parties (JFK and Ben-Gurion) were coming from and, in fact, have some sympathy for BG and Eshkol's behavior, given the pressure they were enduring from JFK.

I think Cohen's book (Israel and the Bomb?) should be read more widely. And you should also be commended for your work in and knowledge about this area of research.

I only have a couple other comments. To go back to something Pat Speer alluded to, I think it's important to recognize a lot of the overlaps among a number of different intelligence agencies, just as it's important to recognize the larger (Cold War) context. Israeli intelligence aspects (and Israeli government policies) ought to be investigated, since in general there would presumably have been many different unknown connections and since in particular James Angleton kept "the Israeli desk" all to himself (for 30 years), just as he kept counter-intelligence all to himself. More and more I'm personally interested in what we can know about South African intelligence, which is at least important considering Israel's eventual association with the regime and South Africa's own development of nuclear weapons.

What worries me (and I assume some others) is that a valid investigation of "an Israeli connection" might serve to buttress an anti-Semitic agenda. The extreme right in the US in the '50s and '60s were real consistent about the belief that all the evil in the world was due to Communist and Jewish "plots" (and Communism was itself a "Jewish plot"). So it was not out of character for them to promote Jews being behind President Kennedy's murder, a la the Somersett/Milteer info that Mark Valenti posted. Also, this might help to throw people off the extreme right's own trail. But I think there's another important point to consider.

Did Israel really have so much to gain in the "elimination" of John Kennedy when those who most ardently opposed John Kennedy would have been most ardently opposed to Israel as well (a Jewish, "Leftist"-oriented nation)? If Israelis and Jewish Americans were aware of the rhetoric and attitudes of the extreme right in the US, and if they also drew the conclusion (as many have ever since) that getting rid of Kennedy was some kind of "victory" for right-wingers, wouldn't Israelis and Jewish Americans have had some reason to be more worried about their survival, etc once Kennedy was eliminated? Would it have represented the triumph of the very forces that they themselves had some reason to be afraid of?

I have trouble accepting this argument. Jewish Americans don't always support the left wing of America's political spectrum. The current US Administration is one of the most right-wing, redneck Governments of recent history, yet it is also staunchly pro-Israel.

Many southern rednecks wanted JFK dead. Many were also anti-Semitic. But Israel also wanted to see JFK gone and their strong supporter LBJ ascend to the Presidency. IMO, BG believed Israel's survival was in the balance, so I don't think he cared that a bunch of racists who hate almost everyone also wanted JFK gone. The important thing for Israel was to remove JFK, who appeared indifferent to their predicament, and the fact that so many others also shared this desire only made this ambitious task more achievable.

It would have been different had Israel believed that JFK's removal would result in the installation of an anti-Semitic administration in Washington, but Israel knew that JFK's removal would result in no such thing. JFK's death was the circuit-breaker which, courtesy of LBJ, guaranteed their long term viability.

(And so if Israelis/Jews became more fearful as a result of the assassination, and became more intense about developing nuclear weapons, this might suggest there was a link between the assassination and the nuclear development, but not necessarily as Piper is suggesting.)

If the main argument in favor of "an Israeli connection" is that JFK was preventing or somehow would have prevented Israel from developing nuclear weapons, then everything depends on what turns up in the way of concrete, "on-the-ground" evidence of connections. And in the meantime I think this long-arsed debate will inevitably continue to revolve around issues about Piper and his proponents and his associates. If people believe that Zionism as such is not legitimate, that Israel never had a right to exist, that therefore the Israelis didn't really have any legitimate reason to look to its own security by developing nuclear weapons, then they will tend to support Piper's thesis far more and far more easily than others will.

Edited November 2, 2006 by Mark Stapleton

[Mark Stapleton]

Chapter 5:

This chapter in Final Judgement is where Piper starts to build the case on which his premise is based--the impasse between Israel and America over Dimona (and other issues).

The thrust of Kennedy's Middle East policy was neutralist. He believed that maintenance of good relations with all states in the region was in America's long term interests. Kennedy's support for Algerian independence, which Israel opposed, is on the record and Piper argues that JFK was also interested in opening up relations with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Piper quotes from Seymour Hersh's The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and America's Foreign Policy (1991):

State Department Arabists were pleasantly surprised early in 1961 to get word from the White House, that just because 90% of the Jewish vote had gone for Kennedy, it didn't mean he was in their pocket

He also quotes US diplomat Richard H Curtiss writing in A Changing Image: American Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Dispute (1986):

It is surprising to realise, with the benefit of hindsight, that from the time Kennedy entered office as the narrowly elected candidate of a party heavily dependent upon Jewish support, he was planning to take a whole new look at US Mideast policy.

He obviously could not turn back the clock and undo the work of President Truman, his Democratic predecessor, in making the establishment of Israel possible. Nor, perhaps, would he have wanted to. Kennedy was determined, however, to develop good new personal relationships with individual Arab leaders, including those with whom the previous administration's relations had deteriorated.

As a result, various leaders of newly independant countries were surprised to find their pro forma messages of congratulations upon Kennedy's assumption of office answered with personalised letters from the young American President.

In a meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir in Palm Beach, in December 1962, Kennedy cited four areas causing a strain on US-Israeli relations: 1. Israel's diversion--frrom the Arab states--of the Jordan River waters, 2. Israel's retaliatory raids against Arab forces in border areas, 3. Israel's pivotal role in the Palestinian refugee problem, and 4. Israel's insistence that the US sell advanced Hawk missiles to Israel. Piper cites Stephen Green in Taking sides: America's Secret Relations With a Militant Israel (1984):

The United States, the President said, has a special relationship with Israel in the Middle East really comparable only to that which it has with Britain over a range of world affairs. But for us to play properly the role we are called upon to play, we cannot afford the luxury of identifying Israel or Pakistan, or certain other countries as our exclusive friends. If we pulled out of the Arab Middle East and maintained our ties only with Israel, this would not be in Israel's interest.

Thus it had become clear to all parties that Kennedy was placing US interests--not Israel's--at the centre of US Middle East policy.

Once America discovered Israel's nuclear ambitions in late 1960, it put Kennedy and Ben-Gurion on a collision course. Kennedy first met Ben-Gurion at a meeting brokered by New York financier Abe Feinberg at the Waldorf Astoria in May 1961. BG later told his biographer that Kennedy 'looked like a 25 year old boy'. Their relationship went steadily downhill from there. Ben-Gurion had disliked Kennedy's father, whom he considered an anti-semite and Hitler partisan. Piper states that Ben-Gurion's contempt for JFK was growing by leaps and bounds. He cites Hersh, "The Israeli Prime Minister, in subsequent private communications to the White House, began to refer to the President as 'young man'. Kennedy made it clear to associates that he found the letters to be offensive". In addition, he told his close friend Charles Bartlett that he was getting fed up with the fact that the Israeli "sons of bitches lie to me constantly about their nuclear capability".

Kennedy's efforts to encourage Israel to help find a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem were also being steadfastly resisted by BG. Piper cites former Undersecretary of State George Ball's book The Passionate Attachment (1992):

In the fall of 1962, Ben-Gurion conveyed his own views in a letter to the Israeli Ambassador in Washington, intended to be circulated among American Jewish leaders, in which he stated, 'Israel will regard this plan as a more serious danger to her existence than all the threats of the Arab dictators and Kings, than all the Arab armies, than all of Nasser's missiles and his Soviet MIGs....Israel will fight this implementation down to the last man

Piper's assertion is that it was now becoming clear that BG considered Kennedy's Middle East policies to be a threat to Israel's existence. Almost nothing about this was known to the American public at the time.

On November 20, 1963 Kennedy's delegation at the UN supported the implementation of the UN resolution calling for the right of displaced Palestinians to return home or be compensated.

The London Jewish Chronicle reported the reaction of the Israelis: "Prime Minister Levi Eshkol summoned the US Ambassador....and told him that Israel was 'shocked' by the pro-Arab attitude adopted by the US delegation". Golda Meir, the Chronicle reported, expressed Israel's 'astonishment and anger' at the attitude of the US.

In 1963, the relationship between JFK and BG rapidly deteriorated. Hersh writes, "Kennedy's relationship with Ben-Gurion remained at an impasse over Dimona, and the correspondence between the two became increasingly sour. None of these letters had been made public".

According to Ben-Gurion's writer, Yuval Neeman: "It was not a friendly exchange. Kennedy was writing like a bully. It was brutal".

Piper concludes this chapter by suggesting that Yitzhak Shamir, who headed a special Mossad hit squad at the time, would have been given the task of orchestrating the assassination, working in concert with Israel's allies in the CIA and organised crime. He quotes an article in Ha'aretz, dated July 3, 1992 which states that Shamir headed the unit from 1955 to 1964. The article states that, "In February 1963, Mr. Shamir dispatched squads on two unsuccessful attempts to assassinate Hans Kleinwachter, a German scientist suspected of helping Egypt develop missiles. Another German scientist working for the Egyptians, Heinz Krug, disappeared mysteriously in September 1962".

[Mark Stapleton]

Chapter 6:

In this chapter, Piper looks at LBJ, his reversal of US policy towards Israel and some of his connections to the pro-Israel lobby.

Piper cites Robert Lacey's book Little man: Meyer Lansky and the gangster life (1991) in claiming that when Lansky was living in Israel, Benjamin Sigelbaum paid him a visit. Sigelbaum had intimate dealings with LBJ's longtime aide Bobby Baker in the controversial Serve U Corporation. Ed Levinson, who operated the Fremont Casino in Vegas as a front man for longtime Lansky associate Joseph (Doc) Stacher, was also involved in Serve U.

Piper further cites Robert Morrow's book, The Senator Must Die (1988) and the claim made by Morrow that Baker was 'thick as thieves' with a mob courier named Mickey Weiner who regularly used Baker's office and facilities on Capitol Hill. Piper claims Weiner was one of Lansky's chief couriers between his Miami based operations and his European money laundering centre at the Banque de Credit International (BCI) in Geneva, Switzerland.

On LBJ's connections to the Israel lobby, Piper writes:

Israel, of course, had been keeping a close watch on Lyndon Johnson for a long time. About Johnson, Israeli intelligence man Ephraim Evron said as follows: "Johnson's feeling about Israel came out very early in the Suez crisis in 1957 when he was Senate majority leader. When at the time President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles wanted to force us to withdraw from the Sinai, they threatened us with economic sanctions. Johnson persuaded Senator William Knowland of California, who was then minority leader, to come with him to the White House and tell the President that it just wouldn't do."

The Arab states were also watching Johnson closely, particularly after he assumed the Presidency. Particularly concerned was Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser with whom JFK had hoped to build bridges. In fact, as we have seen, it was during his last White House press conference that JFK bemoaned the efforts by Israel and its partisans to sabotage his peace initiatives, especially in regard to relations with Nasser.

According to author Stephen Green (Taking sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel, 1988), as early as March 5, 1964, Nasser told Assistant US Secretary of State Phillips Talbot that 'the US had shifted its policy into more active support of Israel'. Nasser's assessment is supported by intelligence historian Richard Deacon in his book, The Israeli Secret Service (1978) . Deacon claims that Johnson's new policy was keeping in line not only with Israel's demands but those of Israel's friends in the CIA: 'President Johnson had already swung away from the tentative pro-Arab stance of the Kennedy Administration which had always been frowned upon by the CIA". Deacon further claimed that Walt Rostow, LBJ's national security advisor, believed that US policy towards Israel would serve as an effective check on Soviet support for Arab countries. Thus, according to Deacon, 'Rostow reflected almost totally the views of the CIA hierarchy'.

Did LBJ dramatically increase aid to Israel? Former Undersecretary of State George Ball commented that, 'The Isreali's were proved right in their assumption that Johnson would be more friendly than Kennedy'. For an analysis of the details concerning foreign aid, Piper again cites Stephen Green:

According to author Stephen Green, citing US Agency for International Development data: 'Over the next few years--the first three years of the Johnson administration--the level of foreign aid support to Israel would change both qualitatively and quantitatively. US Government assistance to Israel in FY 1964, the last budget year of the Kennedy administration, stood at $40 million. In FY 1965, this figure rose to $71 million and in FY 1966, to $130 million'.

'More significant, however, was the change in the composition of that assistance. In (JFK's) FY 1964, virtually none of the official US assistance was military assistance; it was split almost equally between development loans and food aid under the PL 480 program. In LBJ's FY 1965, however, 20% of US aid was military in nature, and in FY 1966, fully 71% of all official assistance to Israel came in the form of credits for purchase of military equipment.

'Moreover, the nature of the weapons system we provided had changed. In FY 1963, the Kennedy administration agreed to sell five batteries of Hawk missiles valued at $21.5 million. This however, was an air defence system. The Johnson administration, in FY 65/66, provided Israel with 250 modern (modified M-48) tanks, 48 A-1 Skyhawk attack aircraft, communications and electronic equipment, artillery and recoilless rifles.

'The $92 million in military assistance provided in FY 1966 was greater than the total of all official military aid provided to Israel cumulatively in all the years going back to the foundation of that state in 1948. America has given Israel $17 billion in military aid since 1946, virtually all of which--over 99%--has been provided since 1965'.

It should be remembered that Green's book was written in 1984, so much more military aid has been provided by US taxpayers since then.

LBJ's policy toward Israel was quite unprecedented and a major shift from that of his predecessors. Piper again cites Green: "In the years 1948-1963 Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy firmly guaranteed Israeli national security and territorial integrity but just as firmly guaranteed those of Jordan, Lebanon and other nations of the region. That was what the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 was all about. For successive Israeli Governments of this period, the boundary line between US and Israeli national security interests was drawn frequently and usually decisively. Truman's policies on arms exports to the Middle East. Eisenhower's stands on regional water development and territorial integrity during the Suez crisis and Kennedy's candor with Mrs. Meir--all of these were markers on this boundary line.

'Nevertheless, during this time US financial support for Israel far exceeded that given to any other nation in the world, on a per capita basis. But the limits to US support for Israel were generally understood by all of the countries in the region, and it was precisely these limits which preserved America's ability to mediate the various issues that composed the Arab-Israeli dispute.

'Then in the early years of the Johnson administration, 1964-67, US policy on Middle Eastern matters abruptly changed. It would perhaps be more accurate to say it disintegrated. America had a public policy on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, but suddenly had a covert policy of abetting Israel's nuclear weapons program. We had a public policy on arms balance in the region, but secretly agreed, by the end of 1967, to become Israel's major arms supplier.

'Officially, the US was firmly committed to supporting the political independence and territorial integrity of all the Middle East nations, while consciously, covertly, the Johnson 'Middle East team' set about enabling Israel to redraw to her advantage virtually every one of her borders with neighboring Arab states. It was, of course, a policy without principle, without integrity. But it was also ineffective, in the sense that Israel steadily continued to act in ways that ignored US national security interests.

Former Undersecretary of State George Ball summed up the result of LBJ's policy towards Israel in his book, The Passionate Attachment:

First, the administration put America in the position of being Israel's principal arms supplier and sole unqualified backer.

Second, by assuring the Israelis that the US would always provide them with a military edge over the Arabs, Johnson guaranteed the escalation of an arms race.

Third, by refusing to follow the advice of his aides that America make its delivery of nuclear capable F-4 Phantoms conditional on Israel's signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Johnson gave the Israelis the impression that America had no fundamental objection to Israel's nuclear program.

And fourth, by permitting a cover-up of Israel's attack on the USS Liberty in 1967, President Johnson told the Israelis in effect that nothing they did would induce American politicians to refuse their bidding. From that time forth, the Israelis began to act as if they had an inalienable right American aid and backing.

[Sid Walker]

Chapter 6:

In this chapter, Piper looks at LBJ, his reversal of US policy towards Israel and some of his connections to the pro-Israel lobby.

Piper cites Robert Lacey's book Little man: Meyer Lansky and the gangster life (1991) in claiming that when Lansky was living in Israel, Benjamin Sigelbaum paid him a visit. Sigelbaum had intimate dealings with LBJ's longtime aide Bobby Baker in the controversial Serve U Corporation. Ed Levinson, who operated the Fremont Casino in Vegas as a front man for longtime Lansky associate Joseph (Doc) Stacher, was also involved in Serve U.

Piper further cites Robert Morrow's book, The Senator Must Die (1988) and the claim made by Morrow that Baker was 'thick as thieves' with a mob courier named Mickey Weiner who regularly used Baker's office and facilities on Capitol Hill. Piper claims Weiner was one of Lansky's chief couriers between his Miami based operations and his European money laundering centre at the Banque de Credit International (BCI) in Geneva, Switzerland.

On LBJ's connections to the Israel lobby, Piper writes:

Israel, of course, had been keeping a close watch on Lyndon Johnson for a long time. About Johnson, Israeli intelligence man Ephraim Evron said as follows: "Johnson's feeling about Israel came out very early in the Suez crisis in 1957 when he was Senate majority leader. When at the time President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles wanted to force us to withdraw from the Sinai, they threatened us with economic sanctions. Johnson persuaded Senator William Knowland of California, who was then minority leader, to come with him to the White House and tell the President that it just wouldn't do."

The Arab states were also watching Johnson closely, particularly after he assumed the Presidency. Particularly concerned was Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser with whom JFK had hoped to build bridges. In fact, as we have seen, it was during his last White House press conference that JFK bemoaned the efforts by Israel and its partisans to sabotage his peace initiatives, especially in regard to relations with Nasser.

According to author Stephen Green (Taking sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel, 1988), as early as March 5, 1964, Nasser told Assistant US Secretary of State Phillips Talbot that 'the US had shifted its policy into more active support of Israel'. Nasser's assessment is supported by intelligence historian Richard Deacon in his book, The Israeli Secret Service (1978) . Deacon claims that Johnson's new policy was keeping in line not only with Israel's demands but those of Israel's friends in the CIA: 'President Johnson had already swung away from the tentative pro-Arab stance of the Kennedy Administration which had always been frowned upon by the CIA". Deacon further claimed that Walt Rostow, LBJ's national security advisor, believed that US policy towards Israel would serve as an effective check on Soviet support for Arab countries. Thus, according to Deacon, 'Rostow reflected almost totally the views of the CIA hierarchy'.

Did LBJ dramatically increase aid to Israel? Former Undersecretary of State George Ball commented that, 'The Isreali's were proved right in their assumption that Johnson would be more friendly than Kennedy'. For an analysis of the details concerning foreign aid, Piper again cites Stephen Green:

According to author Stephen Green, citing US Agency for International Development data: 'Over the next few years--the first three years of the Johnson administration--the level of foreign aid support to Israel would change both qualitatively and quantitatively. US Government assistance to Israel in FY 1964, the last budget year of the Kennedy administration, stood at $40 million. In FY 1965, this figure rose to $71 million and in FY 1966, to $130 million'.

'More significant, however, was the change in the composition of that assistance. In (JFK's) FY 1964, virtually none of the official US assistance was military assistance; it was split almost equally between development loans and food aid under the PL 480 program. In LBJ's FY 1965, however, 20% of US aid was military in nature, and in FY 1966, fully 71% of all official assistance to Israel came in the form of credits for purchase of military equipment.

'Moreover, the nature of the weapons system we provided had changed. In FY 1963, the Kennedy administration agreed to sell five batteries of Hawk missiles valued at $21.5 million. This however, was an air defence system. The Johnson administration, in FY 65/66, provided Israel with 250 modern (modified M-48) tanks, 48 A-1 Skyhawk attack aircraft, communications and electronic equipment, artillery and recoilless rifles.

'The $92 million in military assistance provided in FY 1966 was greater than the total of all official military aid provided to Israel cumulatively in all the years going back to the foundation of that state in 1948. America has given Israel $17 billion in military aid since 1946, virtually all of which--over 99%--has been provided since 1965'.

It should be remembered that Green's book was written in 1984, so much more military aid has been provided by US taxpayers since then.

LBJ's policy toward Israel was quite unprecedented and a major shift from that of his predecessors. Piper again cites Green: "In the years 1948-1963 Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy firmly guaranteed Israeli national security and territorial integrity but just as firmly guaranteed those of Jordan, Lebanon and other nations of the region. That was what the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 was all about. For successive Israeli Governments of this period, the boundary line between US and Israeli national security interests was drawn frequently and usually decisively. Truman's policies on arms exports to the Middle East. Eisenhower's stands on regional water development and territorial integrity during the Suez crisis and Kennedy's candor with Mrs. Meir--all of these were markers on this boundary line.

'Nevertheless, during this time US financial support for Israel far exceeded that given to any other nation in the world, on a per capita basis. But the limits to US support for Israel were generally understood by all of the countries in the region, and it was precisely these limits which preserved America's ability to mediate the various issues that composed the Arab-Israeli dispute.

'Then in the early years of the Johnson administration, 1964-67, US policy on Middle Eastern matters abruptly changed. It would perhaps be more accurate to say it disintegrated. America had a public policy on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, but suddenly had a covert policy of abetting Israel's nuclear weapons program. We had a public policy on arms balance in the region, but secretly agreed, by the end of 1967, to become Israel's major arms supplier.

'Officially, the US was firmly committed to supporting the political independence and territorial integrity of all the Middle East nations, while consciously, covertly, the Johnson 'Middle East team' set about enabling Israel to redraw to her advantage virtually every one of her borders with neighboring Arab states. It was, of course, a policy without principle, without integrity. But it was also ineffective, in the sense that Israel steadily continued to act in ways that ignored US national security interests.

Former Undersecretary of State George Ball summed up the result of LBJ's policy towards Israel in his book, The Passionate Attachment:

First, the administration put America in the position of being Israel's principal arms supplier and sole unqualified backer.

Second, by assuring the Israelis that the US would always provide them with a military edge over the Arabs, Johnson guaranteed the escalation of an arms race.

Third, by refusing to follow the advice of his aides that America make its delivery of nuclear capable F-4 Phantoms conditional on Israel's signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Johnson gave the Israelis the impression that America had no fundamental objection to Israel's nuclear program.

And fourth, by permitting a cover-up of Israel's attack on the USS Liberty in 1967, President Johnson told the Israelis in effect that nothing they did would induce American politicians to refuse their bidding. From that time forth, the Israelis began to act as if they had an inalienable right American aid and backing.

Well, Mark... it appears no-one on the forum wishes to dispute the massive shift in US policy towards Israel that occurred following the assassination of JFK, which your summary of Final Judgment Chapter 6 so ably describes.

A shift so stark that, with the benefit of hindsight, it has the characteristics of the policy aftermath of a silent coup d'etat. By 'silent', I mean clandestine, not explicit and not generally recognized as a coup at the time – as this massive policy shift was widely overlooked, obscured and crowded out by other events assigned prominence by the mass media.

Perhaps you could continue your exposition of Final Judgment, when time permits?

I wonder whether there is any substantive opposition to Piper's main theses in Final Judgment?

Does all ‘opposition’ really boil down to name-calling and other efforts to divert attention from the case he makes?

[J. Raymond Carroll]

it appears no-one on the forum wishes to dispute the massive shift in US policy towards Israel that occurred following the assassination of JFK, which your summary of Final Judgment Chapter 6 so ably describes.

A shift so stark that, with the benefit of hindsight, it has the characteristics of the policy aftermath of a silent coup d'etat.

I wonder whether there is any substantive opposition to Piper's main theses in Final Judgment?

Does all ‘opposition’ really boil down to name-calling and other efforts to divert attention from the case he makes?

Piper may well be on the money in regards to LBJ's policy switch on Israel, a move calculated to endear him to the pro-Israel lobby in his own party. A cunning move on LBJ's part, no doubt, but not evidence of Israeli involvement in the assassination.

Instead Piper offers us his hindsight bias along with the old familiar fallacy of POST HOC ERGO PROPTER HOC.

[Sid Walker]

it appears no-one on the forum wishes to dispute the massive shift in US policy towards Israel that occurred following the assassination of JFK, which your summary of Final Judgment Chapter 6 so ably describes.

A shift so stark that, with the benefit of hindsight, it has the characteristics of the policy aftermath of a silent coup d'etat.

I wonder whether there is any substantive opposition to Piper's main theses in Final Judgment?

Does all ‘opposition’ really boil down to name-calling and other efforts to divert attention from the case he makes?

Piper may well be on the money in regards to LBJ's policy switch on Israel, a move calculated to endear him to the pro-Israel lobby in his own party. A cunning move on LBJ's part, no doubt, but not evidence of Israeli involvement in the assassination.

Instead Piper offers us his hindsight bias along with the old familiar fallacy of POST HOC ERGO PROPTER HOC.

No, Raymond. Piper does not do that. What's more, if you know enough about philosophy and logic to splash around a little Latin, you probably know that too.

You would have a point, if the book Final Judgment consisted only of the specific chapter Mark has just reviewed for us. But of course, it does not. The book Final Judgement is not equivalent to Chapter Six of that book. That's a logical fallacy!

In Chapter Six Piper explores the issue of how US policy to Israel shifted after the assassination, from a reasonably even handed approach in Kennedy's day to fully within the Zionist camp under Johnson.

Had Piper found no indication of such a shift, the central thesis of his book would be a lot less plausible. As it is, he found copious evidence for it. Much of this came to light decades after the events in question. These days, it's better known. Heck, it appears that you yourself accept that the shift actually occured.

Speaking personally, I went through several decades not aware of it at all. True, during that time, I was no modern history scholar - but I followed news and current affairs avidly and liked to think I was reasonably well informed. In all the many discussions I recall about the JFK assassination during that time, I do not once remember hearing anything about the pro-Israel shift in US foreign policy following the demise of JFK.

I submit that had the pro-Israel tilt in US foreign policy under Johnson been more widely known earlier - and above all had the communications between Kennedy and Ben Gurion been known at the time - I and millions of others would have at least taken cognizance of the possibility that Israel and elements within organized Jewry were behind the assassination. As it was, the idea never occured to me until well into this new century.

My suspicion that Piper may indeed be 'on the money', not just in relation to Chapter 6 but in his overall thesis, is heightened by the rather dismal quality of 'rebuttal' served up by his critics, at least to date.

Any chance of you guys fielding your first eleven on this thread?

Edited December 17, 2006 by Sid Walker