Bill Simpich

Let me share why I believe all references to Oswald and Cuba were stripped from the file...(from State Secret, Chapter 5) ...a molehunt had been done with the Oswald file in the past, using Ann Egerter at Angleton’s “office that spied on spies” at CI/SIG. Molehunts were standard operating procedure for CI/SIG – its bread and butter. As Paul Garbler, the CIA’s first station chief in Moscow, told a researcher: “You know what CI-SIG was? Find the mole. That’s all they had to do.” Bringing Ann Egerter into a molehunt that relied on Oswald’s biographical file meant that those trying to figure out who did the impersonation of Oswald and Duran on September 28 would use the Oswald legend in a paper trail that stretched into several US agencies and would be impossible to destroy later. It’s hard to think of any reason to bring Ann Egerter back into the Oswald story in late 1963, other than to design a molehunt to find out if someone was trying to penetrate the CIA. That’s how Egerter earned her salary as a CI/SIG analyst. That was the role of CI/SIG itself. Whoever imitated Oswald on the telephone in Mexico City on September 28 (and again on October 1) knew that such a paper trail would be a powerful way to blackmail the involved CIA and FBI officers after November 22 into deep-sixing any serious investigation of the assassination – even an internal inquiry that could be hushed up on the grounds of “national security”... Agreement to strip Oswald’s biographical file of any pro-Cuban references before beginning the molehunt The number one concern (after the impersonations of Oswald and Duran on 9/28 and 10/1) was that the LIENVOY operation had been discovered by Soviet or Cuban intelligence, blowing a highly valuable and sensitive asset of the United States. The impersonation could have been an effort by the Soviets or Cubans to rattle the Americans’ cage by letting them know that their tap operation had been found out, and then taking careful note of the American reaction. However, the Mexico City station could not assume that the calls were an operation conducted by Soviet or Cuban intelligence. It was a live possibility that these calls were an inside job. Any analyst could easily deduce that American intelligence knew a lot more about Lee Oswald then the Soviets or the Cubans. Due to the nature of the security problem, the logical prime suspects would be the CIA officers working in Cuban operations and the FBI’s double agents working with Bakulin. Also worthy of consideration were the Mexico City station and the domestic agencies responsible for handling Oswald – FBI, State, Navy. The immigration service also had a subsidiary role, as they were responsible for tracking Oswald’s wife Marina. A decision was made for the Mexico City station to make no reference to Oswald’s visits to the Cuban consulate. All of Mexico City’s references to the Oswald case would use the LCIMPROVE indicator of an operation designed to counter the Soviets, rather than the TYPIC indicator that would refer to Cuban operations. Oswald’s biographical file (known as his “201 file”) would be stripped of any reference to his pro-Cuban activities, as well as any reference to any attempt to obtain a visa. These documents were removed from the 201 file and placed inside Oswald’s FPCC 100-300-011 file tightly held by CI-SIG.[ 24 ] Many documents still bear this original FPCC file number today, crossed out and replaced by the 201 number. This was done to create a plausible reason to prevent FitzGerald’s Cuban desk at HQ and Shackley’s Miami station from receiving any cables or dispatches about this molehunt. The Cuba operations officers had access to the August 1963 FBI report about Oswald based on his real name Lee Harvey Oswald, his actual slender build of “5 foot 9, 140 pounds”, and his current status as a US resident; as you will see, they would have known that the molehunt descriptions of Oswald were inaccurate. The Miami station had been included in all of the memos about the related Azcue operation. The two joint agency anti-FPCC operations of that year (discussed in Chapter 3) included several officers with the Cuban division, including Tilton himself. It was reasonable to assume that the suspects for the Duran and Oswald impersonation would include people from Miami with intelligence connections. The heart of the plan was for Mexico City to add some marked cards based on phony information into their memo to HQ. Then HQ would do the same. Then see where those cards ended up. Both of these feints are part of the time-honored molehunt technique that Jim Angleton specialized in. The phony information simply created a brighter trail to follow... The stripping of Oswald’s 201 file Oswald’s 201 file at CIA HQ was stripped of all references to his FPCC background, and placed inside the Agency’s FPCC file, or in a casual, working file in Egerter’s possession commonly known as a soft file. The purpose was to conceal this information from anyone who had access to Oswald’s 201 file. The procedure was that there was no way anyone was going to see the contents of a 201 file without the express consent of the CI-SIG officer in charge. Ann Egerter, the senior analyst and custodian of Oswald’s 201 file, was a learned lady. Starting on September 23, Hosty’s report on Oswald went into the FPCC file, with the FPCC number 100-300-011 written on it.[ 27 ] Other pre-assassination FBI reports about Oswald, Cuba and the FPCC were directed to this file as well. It stayed in there until March 1964, after the assassination. This insulated anyone else from learning about Oswald’s history as a pro-Castro activist. CI-SIG held the FPCC 100-300-011 file tightly in its possession, and the routing sheet shows that the first document went straight to Will Potocki, and then other members of Angleton’s CI division.[ 28 ] Why was the Hosty memo inserted in the FPCC file on September 23, even before Oswald left for Mexico? I think it was to mislead other CIA officers about who Oswald was. I do not know why, but my hunch is that John Tilton and Lambert Anderson wanted to conceal their use of Oswald and his pro-Cuban background. The only people that saw the Hosty memo before the assassination were CIA counterintelligence officers. If my hunch is right, this strategy drove the decisions that were made afterwards. After Oswald was impersonated, an internal investigation began within the CIA. That investigation decided to maintain Tilton's original approach - do not reveal Oswald's full history to other members of the Agency. The best way to do that was to eliminate any reference of his visits to the Cuban consulate. By early October, the 201 biographical file was stripped of almost all of its documents. The purpose of this stripping was to make sure that the file “lied” to Bustos, who read it outside of CI-SIG and used it to prepare the twin October 10 memos. The stripping ensured compartmentalization, so that Bustos and others with no need-to-know did not know about Egerter’s molehunt. Although the CIA’s pioneering computer system would inform an inquirer that documents were missing from the file, there was no way of knowing their contents until the documents were in one’s hands. Charlotte Bustos at the Mexico desk at Headquarters had access to the 201 file. A note from the CIA’s document file expert Paul Hartman reveals that at the time of the assassination there were only five documents physically located in the 201 file.[ 29 ] Two were State Department documents, one was a Navy document, and the other two were FBI documents, all of them dating back to Oswald’s time in the Soviet Union.[ 30 ] The other documents were missing from the file when it was reviewed in February 1964. A March 1964 memo to the Warren Commission from chief Richard Helms restored the missing documents to the 201 file. Thirty-seven of the forty-two documents that made up Oswald’s 201 file in October 1963 had been removed and placed into a separate file supposedly held by Bustos before the assassination. Bustos claimed that she wasn’t even sure what file she was given, despite her reputation of having an excellent memory. CIA’s Paul Hartman, formidable in his knowledge on how to bird-dog documents, claimed that these 37 documents were removed because they dealt with “sensitive matters such as wiretaps and surveillance”.[ 31 ] You can bet that Bustos had the 201 file with five documents left in it. Most of these documents had nothing to do with wiretaps and surveillance – the only thing sensitive about them was that they would reveal Oswald’s biography, which was the actual state secret. Virtually none of the 37 documents dealt with wiretaps and surveillance. Take a look at this chart, which illustrates that most of the documents were restored to the file after the assassination. Paul Hartman, a well-respected document analyst for the Agency, put great emphasis on a red herring. Hartman insisted that the computer list of the documents in Oswald’s 201 file was always available during this time period. Hartman ignored that most of the documents in the 201 file were unavailable for reviewers such as Bustos, who had to rely on information given to her by Egerter when composing her letters. Jeff Morley recounts a footrace between Egerter and Bustos to retrieve the 201 file after CIA HQ learned that JFK had been shot.[ 32 ] Egerter won the footrace, because she had the full file. Bustos did not. The 201 file was stripped to hide not just Oswald’s pro-Cuban background, but almost everything about Oswald’s biography. In other words, Oswald would come across to Bustos as pretty much of a “nobody”, a schlep of so little consequence that no one knew or cared if he had even returned to the United States after the last date in the file, May 1962.[ 33 ]

My belief has always been that Oswald was told by whoever was handling him to ask for John Abt or the ACLU. The John Abt request led right to a man who was not only 1000 miles away, but general counsel to the Communist Party. Want a war with Cuba? Tie LHO to the CPUSA. The Paines were ACLU members. The ACLU was considered to be a group of commie sympathizers to many people...minor league Communist Party. Michael Paine looks like he convinced LHO to join the ACLU in the month before his death. The ACLU had a black eye after that came out. That organization - which did a lot of good work - was totally compromised. They did not come sprinting to LHO's aid on Nov. 23, after he issued his call for help on TV the night of the 22nd. LHO called Ruth Paine on the 23rd, asking her to expedite his attempts to reach John Abt. She did virtually nothing, maybe one phone call and nothing more. As I recall, she said she was resentful that LHO was asking for her help in finding an attorney. She could have found him an ACLU attorney if she had really cared. I'm sure she did not want to be calling up Communist Party members. I think it was more than bad luck that LHO did not find a real attorney before his death that he could trust with his story. If I was his handler, the Abt/ACLU story is what I would have told him if I wanted to burn up a couple of days. LHO was considering private counsel by the time he spoke to local bar association member Nichols the night of the 23rd. It is tragic that Nichols could not convince him to trust him - I don't think Nichols made a serious attempt. I don't know why. I believe the plan was for LHO to never get out of the TSBD, and in any case to never leave the theater alive - and the fallback plan was that he was told in advance to ask for Abt or the ACLU if "anything happened". That would dirty him up even more, make any search for an attorney even more difficult, and give the planners a chance to bump him off. The attorney-client privilege gets pretty wobbly after the client is dead, because the client is the one who is holding the privilege. Once the client is dead, the attorney often feels s/he is free to talk.

Richard, no, I don’t want to attack you, I want to appeal to your sense of humor and collegiality. i didn’t mean to spread “disinformation” about downloading. Can’t you copy and paste the content on the screen?

Richard - I wrote both of my books up there for researchers, and I put them up there for free. You get several free click throughs a day, and you can download everything you click on. Disinformation artists? Or challenging your beliefs? Annoying? Maybe, if your belief system is challenged. Sadistic? Maybe, if you read too much JFK material.

I would respectfully suggest not including de Mohrenschildt for the reasons stated and more. The facts are contested. I think if you limit it to six people or something like to start with - Koethe, Hunter, Kilgallen, Pritchett Smith, Giancana and Rosselli - you will obtain a very positive result.

Silvia Duran was impersonated as well as Oswald on 9/28/63. She has repearedly denied ever seeing Oswald after 9/27/63, despite the CIA transcript documenting that she and Duran were together at the Cuban consulate on 9/28 about noon time. Did the American agencies provide a reaction to this impersonation? Immediately after the Oswald-Duran impersonation, a strong thread of evidence emerges on 10/2/63 about the CIA's concern about the "danger that the FBI's field office in Mexico City had been penetrated". See the cryptonym LAROB, and this in particular: 10/3/63 cable from HQ to Mexico City, DIR 73144 PBRAMPART: "Urgent. Private meeting (illegible)." Next page: "On October 2, a memo went out from CIA headquarters discussing the danger that the FBI's field office in Mexico City had been penetrated. "Re coordination of FBI (oper?)ations in MEXI, -__ in liaison with ODENVY (note: FBI) is still delicate matter which ___ AMDEAD at HDQS 0-- directives foresee that certain types of operations may be coordinated at HDQS rather than in the field. on the whole our relations with FBI on world-wide and PBPRIME and CE (note: US and counter-espionage) matters are extremely productive and still improving and we do not wish at present time to raise new issues in Mexico...FBI has agreed and has instructed its MEXI rep to discuss with you pertinent details of such Russian CE ops as LAROB case." Here's my analysis of the LAROB evidence in Chapter 5: Keep in mind that right after the calls of Sept 28 and Oct 1, the station had immediately responded with a report to HQ admitting its fear that the local FBI field office had been penetrated. On October 1, Bill Bright’s defection target Valentin Bakulin – who was handling the double agents LAROB and LINEB-1 for the Soviets, as seen in Chapter 3 - was seen talking to Yatskov outside the Soviet Embassy.[ 18 ] Yatskov was the consul assumed to be in close communication with Oswald, as seen in a contact sheet for Oswald. This referenced list of contacts makes it clear that the CIA was convinced by October 1st that “Y talked to O” on September 28.[ 19 ] At this point, CIA complaints surface about the FBI’s operation. I believe the concern was that someone from the LAROB or the LINEB-1 operations might have obtained access to LIENVOY, and impersonated Oswald and Duran on the telephone (note: after the Oswald figure spoke in person with Yatskov earlier that day) Bakulin and LINEB-1 met on October 1. Bakulin told LINEB-1 he had no money for him that day. Things had heated up. After the meeting, Bakulin was put on continuous physical surveillance by the CIA’s Mexico City station unit known as LIEMBRACE.[ 20 ] The next day, October 2, a memo went out from CIA headquarters discussing the danger that the FBI's field office in Mexico City had been penetrated, and that any coordination with that FBI office was "a delicate matter" that should be dealt with at the headquarters level rather than in the field. The memo also said that the FBI leadership “instructed its Mexi rep to discuss with you pertinent details of such Russian CE ops (note: counter-espionage operations) as LAROB case”. LAROB was a double agent handled by both Soviet officer Valentin Bakulin and the FBI in Mexico City. Bill Bright had been tracking this story, as discussed in Chapter 3. Although there was a danger that the FBI's relationship with LAROB might have compromised its own security, HQ valued its relationship with the FBI and told the Mexico City station that "we do not wish at present time to raise new issues in Mexico."[ 21 ] On October 5, the Mexico City station reported that “HQs was deferring discussion of the high level of penetration, but would take it up after hearing results of closer liaison between (the Mexico City station and the FBI) in Mexico City."[ 22 ] On October 7, twenty sets of reports about double agent LAROB were sent from the FBI to the Mexico City station and Headquarters.[ 23 ] Why were they sent? Because both the Station and Headquarters were worried that LAROB was insecure. This double agent or his contacts could have impersonated Duran and Oswald on September 28 and October 1. LAROB and his contacts were logical suspects. If the local FBI field office had been subjected to a high level of penetration, then the Mexico City station could have been penetrated as well. The station itself had to be treated as a suspect in the molehunt.

David, my belief is that the 10/10/63 memos were a ploy to smoke out the Oswald imposters of 9/28 and 10/1. It's not impossible that these memos are part of an ongoing hunt for a Soviet bloc mole as well - but I would need evidence of that - which I haven't seen.

Paul and Jean, I do have an update on LITAMIL-3. New releases show that LITAMIL-3 is 201-290894, and that 201-290894 is Ricardo Vidal Dominguez. We have created a pseudonym page for him at MFF. He was an informant within the Cuban diplomatic corps. Jean, I am moving more towards the belief that Oswald was at least trying to get himself in the FBI's orbit in the last three months of his life. I can't get over the .way he sought out FBI agent John Quigley after his New Orleans arrest of 8/9/63 and put himself out there as a source of information. Oswald then seemed to pick up on Jim Hosty's 9/10/63 report about Oswald's long-distance mail relationship with the CPUSA and the FPCC, and then the Oswald figure shows up in the Cuban consulate later that month brandishing membership cards in both the CPUSA and the FPCC. I believe that Oswald himself wrote the Nov. 9 letter to the Soviet embassy complaining about the FBI (and knowing the FBI would intercept it!) and appeared at the Dallas FBI office in mid-November with a note complaining about Jim Hosty "bothering his wife". Matt, I agree that Fedora and Golitsyn are very important personages - Mary Ferrell created a decent index on Fedora and we created a good page on Golitsyn based on his cryptonyms DS-2137 and AELADLE - but I haven't seen any indication that Fedora or Golitsyn were involved in the Mexico City events of Sept-Oct. 1963.

Following up on my previous post...Here's my take on why Oswald was taken off the security watch list the day before the 10/10/63 memos went out. From Chapter 5 of State Secret: The day before the 10/10 twin memos were created, Gheesling took Oswald off the security watch list after talking with Lambert Anderson. Both Gheesling and Anderson had signed off on a watch list document placed in Oswald’s file on August 13 after Oswald was arrested in New Orleans for breach of the peace while leafleting for the FPCC. Gheesling wrote that once he learned that Oswald was arrested, he told Anderson that Oswald should be taken off the security watch list because he had inadvertently forgot to remove his name after Oswald’s return from the Soviet Union.[ 38 ] Anderson confirmed that someone had told him that the security flash had been removed because it was no longer necessary once Oswald had returned to the United States. One immediate problem with both of their stories is that their boss Bill Branigan wrote on 11/22/63 that the very reason Oswald was put on the watch list was to ensure that “any subsequent arrest in the U.S. was brought to our attention”. So why take him off the list after he was arrested? An even more intriguing problem, with Gheesling’s story in particular, is that he wrote that he removed Oswald’s name from the security watch list on October 9 right after he learned about Oswald’s arrest. Gheesling’s explanation flies in the face of the aforementioned watch list document showing that both Gheesling and Anderson knew about Oswald’s arrest around August 13. Gheesling’s name and initials “wmg” are also on other memos discussing Oswald and his arrest dated August 21 and August 23. The probable solution is that Anderson got wind of a tip. On October 8 Anderson received a Sept. 24 report of Oswald’s arrest, which revealed Oswald’s request to speak with an FBI agent and share quite a bit of information while in jail.[ 39 ] My conclusion is that on the 9th the two men came to some kind of mutual understanding that Oswald was helpful to the FBI, and saw no reason to keep him on the security watch list. “Anderson” of “Nat. Int.” is written on the watch list file, underneath the date of October 10. As a result, no alarms went off at the FBI when the 10/8/63 memo about Oswald being in Mexico City and trying to contact Kostikov arrived on the 10th. Any alarm that might have sounded about Oswald being a security risk appears to have been deliberately turned off by Gheesling and Anderson. The intriguing question is whether Gheesling and Anderson took Oswald off the security watch list based solely on the report about Oswald's cooperation with the FBI, or whether they had also been tipped off that a molehunt was about to begin with Oswald's file. It's not impossible that both factors may have been in play - but my current thinking is that FBI men Gheesling and Anderson didn't know about the CIA's molehunt.

Jean and Gerry, take a look at what happened when the security flash was still on in September, 1963... Hosty’s observations about Oswald in Dallas turned into membership cards in Mexico City "Keep in mind that (FBI agent Jim Hosty, in charge of Oswald's file) told (Lambert Anderson of the FBI's Nationalities Intelligence division) on September 13 that Oswald had a subscription to the newspaper of the Communist Party, USA, and that he had a background of leafleting on behalf of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. We see the follow-up three days later, on September 16, when John Tilton of the CIA’s Cuban operations at JMWAVE in Miami asked Anderson to put together a joint agency operation designed to “plant deceptive information which might embarrass the (FPCC) in areas where it does have some support”.[ 3 ] We will see that Oswald planted some deceptive information in Mexico City - he showed both his authentic FPCC membership card and his fake Communist Party card to Cuban consulate secretary Silvia Duran. On the 16th, FBI records indicate that Oswald’s security flash file with the FBI's Identification Division was reviewed, with Anderson’s name written alongside.[ 4 ] On the 16th, Anderson’s name is written on Oswald’s security flash – although no document entered the file, it appears to be related to Tilton’s request for help that same day. Tilton had been involved with the DRE just days earlier and may have heard from Anderson about Oswald’s arrest. On the 26th, Anderson confirmed that the anti-FPCC project was going forward, with plans to distribute “propaganda in the name of the committee”. This joint agency operation was launched right during the Cuba division’s project to recruit Cuban consul Azcue in Mexico City. As Azcue seemed sympathetic to Cuban exiles, he seemed like he might be ripe for recruitment. The problem was that Azcue was due to return to Cuba in a matter of days." What happened the next day, on Sept. 27, is that the "Oswald figure" appeared before Azcue and tried to get him to bend the rules to give him an "instant visa" to Cuba, similar to his successful attempt at getting an "instant visa" from consul Richard Snyder at the American embassy in Moscow back in 1959. I believe that the "Oswald figure" showed his FPCC credentials to Azcue in an effort to provoke Azcue to see how he would respond - keep in mind that LITAMIL-3, an American agent, had just tried days earlier to convince Azcue to defect to the Americans. I believe one objective was to get the Cubans to talk over their phone lines and in their offices that were bugged by the Americans. The bigger objective may have been to assist Tilton and Anderson in their "joint agency operation designed to “plant deceptive information which might embarrass the (FPCC) in areas where it does have some support”. Or maybe someone got wind of the anti-FPCC operation and piggy-backed a new operation on top of it that included the impersonation of Oswald. What "areas" did the FPCC have "some support"? Here, among the Cubans in Mexico. The Oswald figure's provocative behavior with Azcue, which got him thrown out of the office, had to give the FPCC a black eye in the eyes of the employees at the Cuban consulate. The Oswald figure was an attractive prospect – he represented a very rare re-defector, hoping to go to Cuba and then return once again to the Soviet Union. His activities and contacts were a counterintelligence bonanza. So Tilton and Anderson have got a deceptive anti-FPCC operation going, which appears to have been piggy-backed on top of the events that brought the Oswald figure down to Mexico. Doesn't it make sense that if Tilton and Anderson wanted to keep their deceptive anti-FPCC operation going, they may have wanted to dim the attention on Oswald? Gheesling was a major supervisor, one of a handful that answered directly to Hoover. Gheesling had the power to turn off the flash, which he OK'd with Anderson on October 9. Gheesling was suspended by Hoover after 11/22 for turning off the flash. But why did he do it? I will offer my thinking in the next post.

Matt, I appreciate you engaging me on the topic, but I have to ask - have you read my book State Secret? Chapter 5 centers on what I call the Mexico City molehunt of 1963, chapters 3 and 4 set the context, and the last two chapters touch on the aftermath. I would ask you to at least read Chapters 3-5. I do want feedback! If you've read it, great, but I don't think there's anything "oblique" about what I wrote. Also, I'm very sensitive to not taking over other people's threads. Jean and Sandy's instincts are good about setting up a new thread on the setting up and removal of the FBI flash, which arguably is related to the molehunt but deserves its own analysis. McCord also deserves his own thread. John Newman has not finished his analysis of McCord, has written almost nothing on the subject, and I think it's best not to speculate on his views until he weighs in on the topic.

I should add that the molehunt was conducted after Oswald was impersonated on 9/28 and 10/1. Silvia Duran was also impersonated on 9/28 in the same taped phone conversation as "Oswald", which supposedly happened at the Cuban consulate, which was closed on Saturday, 9/28. Duran made it clear that she never saw Oswald after 9/27. There would naturally be a big reaction after the impersonation of Oswald and Duran. Note the absence of any notes about Oswald until October 8 and then the twin messages of 10/10, both filled with different descriptions of Oswald guaranteed to get people talking. What happened in the interim between 9/28 and 10/8? Once the station found out that the man who made the 9/28 call and the 10/1 calls identified himself as Lee Oswald, Phillips needed to know about it. The station would not want to leave a paper trail regarding this sensitive penetration matter that might be read by a CIA penetrator. On the night of October 1, a pouch was sent to Phillips at Headquarters. The CIA procedure at the time was that these pouched transmittals left no paper trail, other than to say that the items had been sent from point A to point B. The pouch probably contained a transcript of the October 1 calls from the man calling himself Oswald. You have to wonder if it also contained a copy of the tape. Many years later, Phillips told a very elaborate lie, claiming that he was in Mexico City working with the Soviet desk in preparing the draft of a response to the October 1 phone calls. He also claimed that the Soviet desk officer was lazy. That didn’t happen – even Goodpasture said Phillips’ story was not true. It is well-documented that Phillips was away from the Mexico City station at CIA HQ in Washington and then JMWAVE station in Miami between September 30 to October 9. On October 7, Phillips consulted with key people from the CIA's forward base on Cuba office like John Tilton, who triggered this whole situation as the architect of a joint agency anti-FPCC operation aimed at Mexico in September 1963. The molehunt was a direct result of the impersonation of Oswald and Duran. The CIA needed to see if it could smoke out how these fake phone calls were set up. When this documentation was brought to light, Phillips was forced to backtrack and fall back to a weak excuse that his memory was mistaken, and that he had not played any role in preparing this draft memo that was issued on October 8. The October 8 memo set the stage for the October 10 twin memos.

The whole point was to create a paper trail entangling CIA, FBI, ONI, and State Dept with a lot of knowledge about Oswald shortly before 11/22. Then, after the assassination, the employees of these agencies would go into a reflexive cover-up to protect their agencies, their careers, and the paycheck that takes care of their families. How much of the actual Mexico City documents made it to the Warren Commission? Very few of them. What they got were paraphrases. The actual documents were not made public until after the JFK Records Act forced them out in the 90s - and the JFK Records Act would never have passed without Oliver Stone's movie JFK!

Greg Doudna wrote: "In that interpretation that Givens was a real witness to a 6th floor shooter at the time of the shots, at 12:30 pm, how and when in that interpretation does Givens make his exit from the TSBD without anyone seeing him? At the point the building was sealed by officers minutes later Givens is not in the building." Greg, look at TSBD employee Edward Shields' testimony to the Warren Commission: "Did you see the motorcade?" "I sure did." "Where were you when you saw it?" "I was just standing right around there at Mullendorf's Cafe." "At what address?" "At Record and Main." "Who was with you?" "Givens". "Did you hear the shots?" "Yes, I heard the shots." Shields said that Givens had been there with him since about noon time that day. Givens' story matched with Shields.

Richard, Thayer Waldo is an extremely strong case about a journalist who was driven out of the USA - you ignored his case because you wanted to tout your case about Eddie Piper and the girl on the stairs, an important story that belongs on another thread. Even though you wrote that you agreed with me about Charles Givens, you used this thread to make your case about Eddie Piper. I was reluctant to join this thread because I wanted to avoid hijacking this thread. William is protective of his thread and I understand that. I suggest that we treat each other with respect and agree to disagree.