Oliver Stone's New JFK Documentaries and the Vietnam War

[James DiEugenio]

Michael:

1. Please, you have 19 people saying that Kennedy was getting out the last of the advisors, since that was all there was.  He even said the helicopter pilots.  He said he did not even want generals visiting Saigon for God's sakes.  At McNamara's Sec/Def meeting, he demanded schedules from Pentagon, CIA and State.

So who was going to be left to fight?

2. Dean Rusk?  Everyone knows that Rusk supported the war all the way through Johnson. What do you expect him to say?  He was involved with Rolling Thunder.  He was one of the very few Kennedy guys who stayed in.  Salinger, O'Donnell, Powers, Bundy, Ball , Hilsman, McNamara all got out.

3. I consider saying Hanoi invaded the south as an oxymoron. Mansfield said above that we had created a civil war. BTW, that is exactly what Podhoretz used and Draper called him on it, its s civil war in one country. We fabricated South Vietnam. And about five months after we left, it fell.

4. The USA orally agreed to the Accords.  It then broke them by deliberately cancelling the unification elections and creating a new country which had not existed and installing a new leader, DIem.  We did this by not letting Bao Dai run and having Lansdale rig Diem's election. Lansdale had more people voting in certain districts than  who lived there. This is building democracy?

5.  When you say the statements were made later, are you trying to say all these people are lying? That is some conspiracy you got going there isn't it?  19 people cooperated on a plot?  Mike please.  What is so compelling about the statements is they jibe with what JFK was doing. The documentary record: from Galbraith's journey to Saigon, his visit to McNamara, McNamara's orders to Harkins,  the  May 1963 Sec/Def schedules which are all in writing and convinced the NY TImes Kennedy was getting out, NSAM 263 and Kennedy's insistence the withdrawal plan be kept in the McNamara Taylor Report, the announcement by McNamara to the press., and the McNamara. Taylor report which says the withdrawal will be complete by 1965. And I could add, the evacuation order requested by Kennedy in November of 1963.  The written record matches the statements.

6. Bobby later said that JFK would have never sent combat troops into Vietnam, "He was determined not to send troops.  If the South Vietnamese could not do it, the Unites States could not win it for them." (Mathews, pp. 304-05)  And this coincides with what he said in 1961 in the November debates as recorded by David Kaiser: that there would be no combat troops in VIetnam.  At the University of Kansas, in 1968 RFK more or less demanded the USA get out of Vietnam (Mathews, p. 322)

7. The invasions of Laos and Cambodia ripped America apart even further.  I mean please Mike, you do remember Kent State and Jackson State don't you?  You remember the cover of Life and the six kids who died on the campuses due to their protests of the further expansion of the war.  And I certainly hope you read Shawcross' Sideshow.  How on earth was that invasion and bombing campaign somehow worth what happened in Cambodia, since it directly caused the transfer from Sihanouk to Lon Nol to Pol Pot. And Laos ended up looking like the surface of the moon.

8. Finally, you bring up the old MSM shibboleth about JFK's public statements vs the internal record and what he said privately.  That was. a trick that Alec Cockburn took out against Newman and Scott. Mike, when you start sounding like Cockburn on this issue, don't you think its time to reassess?  Did you really expect Kennedy to go to Dallas, a big defense city,  and say, "I am getting out of Vietnam, completely.  So a lot of the jobs you people have will be endangered, and some plants may be shut down.  But I have decided that we cannot win and my advisors have lied to me, so its for the best."  Now I am sure you know what happened to George Romney when he said things like that.  The MSM destroyed him.  Kennedy was too smart to serve himself up on a roast duck platter. And you know that.

As per Selverstone, send me his book. Will probably review it.

Edited September 16, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[Michael Griffith]

2 hours ago, James DiEugenio said:

 

1. Please, you have 19 people saying that Kennedy was getting out the last of the advisors, since that was all there was.  He even said the helicopter pilots.  He said he did not even want generals visiting Saigon for God's sakes. At McNamara's Sec/Def meeting, he demanded schedules from Pentagon, CIA and State. So who was going to be left to fight?

You are simply ignoring the bulk of the record and are partly relying on McNamara’s belated hearsay claims. See my previous replies about NSAM 263. The conditional goal was to have all advisors withdrawn by the end of 1965, but, again, it was a conditional goal—it depended on the situation on the ground.

2. Dean Rusk?  Everyone knows that Rusk supported the war all the way through Johnson. What do you expect him to say?  He was involved with Rolling Thunder.  He was one of the very few Kennedy guys who stayed in.  Salinger, O'Donnell, Powers, Bundy, Ball , Hilsman, McNamara all got out.

So you’ll believe a lying snake like McNamara but refuse to believe Rusk???

3. I consider saying Hanoi invaded the south as an oxymoron.

I’m sorry, but this is downright bizarre. Good grief, if you can’t admit that North Vietnam invaded South Vietnam, you have no credible basis for discussing the subject.

Mansfield said above that we had created a civil war. BTW, that is exactly what Podhoretz used and Draper called him on it, its s civil war in one country. We fabricated South Vietnam. And about five months after we left, it fell.

More bizarre material. If we “fabricated” South Vietnam, then Russia and China fabricated North Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh would have remained a minor figure without Soviet and Chinese training and support. Even Ho Chi Minh was willing to have Vietnam partitioned—he just wanted the partition line to be at the 13th parallel instead of the 17th parallel. Both sections had functioning governments. The northern section invaded the southern section. The northern section is commonly known as North Vietnam, and the southern section is commonly known as South Vietnam. The fact that the northern government invaded the region controlled by the southern government is a matter of indisputable historical fact.

But you can’t even admit this historical fact because, when push came to shove, your party sided with the communists and betrayed the anti-communists. Your party demonized the Saigon government but whitewashed the far more brutal Hanoi government. After 1968, your party got upset when we did anything that gave us a better chance of forcing North Vietnam to stop attacking South Vietnam. After the Paris Peace Accords, your party ignored North Vietnam’s increasingly egregious violations, slashed our aid to South Vietnam by over 60%, and refused to honor our promise to provide air support if North Vietnam invaded again.

4. The USA orally agreed to the Accords.  It then broke them by deliberately cancelling the unification elections and creating a new country which had not existed and installing a new leader, DIem.

You can repeat this far-left spin a thousand times, but that won’t make it come true. “Orally agreed”? We made it clear that we objected to provisions of the accords, which is why we refused to sign. We agreed to help implement the Geneva Accords but made it clear that we would not do anything to endanger South Vietnam. That was the extent of our oral agreement.

Also, we were not the ones who cancelled the election. Diem, for very good reasons, was the one who cancelled the election by refusing to have the South take part in it. I notice you ignored what JFK said about the election. To repeat, JFK opposed holding the election, given the circumstances at the time.

I also notice you said nothing about Hanoi’s refusal to hold a nationwide election in 1973, even though Thieu called for such an election three times that year.

We did this by not letting Bao Dai run and having Lansdale rig Diem's election. Lansdale had more people voting in certain districts than who lived there. This is building democracy?

And how would you compare this to Ho Chi Minh’s bloody consolidation of power in the North? Why do you suppose that nearly 1 million people moved from the North to the South but that only about 100,000 moved from the South to the North? And what about the fact that the Vietminh forcefully prevented some 2 million people from moving from the North to the South?

And I again point out that during the 1968 Tet Offensive, when the people of South Vietnam had every opportunity to desert the Saigon government and support the communists, they overwhelmingly chose to stand by their government, much to the shock and embarrassment of Hanoi’s leaders.

5.  When you say the statements were made later, are you trying to say all these people are lying? That is some conspiracy you got going there isn't it?  19 people cooperated on a plot?  Mike please.  What is so compelling about the statements is they jibe with what JFK was doing. The documentary record: from Galbraith's journey to Saigon, his visit to McNamara, McNamara's orders to Harkins,  the  May 1963 Sec/Def schedules which are all in writing and convinced the NY TImes Kennedy was getting out, NSAM 263 and Kennedy's insistence the withdrawal plan be kept in the McNamara Taylor Report, the announcement by McNamara to the press., and the McNamara. Taylor report which says the withdrawal will be complete by 1965. And I could add, the evacuation order requested by Kennedy in November of 1963.  The written record matches the statements.

How can you seriously claim that your version of the written record matches JFK’s public statements? How? In his public statements, JFK made it clear that he had no intention of abandoning South Vietnam to communist tyranny.

So are you saying that RFK, Rusk, Bundy, Rostow, Schlesinger, and Sorenson were lying or covering-up? You are ignoring the clear evidence from NSAM 263 and the supporting documents, which makes it clear that the withdrawal was a conditional plan that could be altered based on the situation on the ground.

Your position amounts to saying “If JFK had lived, he would have handed over South Vietnam to communist tyranny in 1965, and this would have been a very noble and honorable deed. It’s just too bad that the communists weren’t able to impose their tyranny on South Vietnam in 1965.”

6. Bobby later said that JFK would have never sent combat troops into Vietnam, "He was determined not to send troops.  If the South Vietnamese could not do it, the Unites States could not win it for them." (Mathews, pp. 304-05) And this coincides with what he said in 1961 in the November debates as recorded by David Kaiser: that there would be no combat troops in VIetnam.  At the University of Kansas, in 1968 RFK more or less demanded the USA get out of Vietnam (Mathews, p. 322)

Here we go again. Once more, an intention not to send in regular combat troops is not the same thing as an intention to totally disengage. I think I’ve made it as clear as possible that, yes, certainly, JFK was determined not to send in regular combat troops, but this was not an unalterable, no-matter-what position, as Bobby himself made clear in his April 1964 interview. JFK did not want to send in regular ground troops. He was strongly opposed to doing so. But, he did not categorically rule it out, unless you want to accuse Bobby of making false statements.

7. The invasions of Laos and Cambodia ripped America apart even further.  I mean please Mike, you do remember Kent State and Jackson State don't you?  You remember the cover of Life and the six kids who died on the campuses due to their protests of the further expansion of the war.  And I certainly hope you read Shawcross' Sideshow.  How on earth was that invasion and bombing campaign somehow worth what happened in Cambodia, since it directly caused the transfer from Sihanouk to Lon Nol to Pol Pot. And Laos ended up looking like the surface of the moon.

Holy cow. This stuff is just about identical to the propaganda that North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and Red China were putting out at the time.

First off, our bombing in Laos and Cambodia was limited to the eastern edge of those nations, where the NVA camps and depots were located and where the Ho Chi Minh Trail passed through those nations. Laos did not “end up looking like the surface of the moon.” That is sheer fantasy.

Second, the fact that some college students got so upset over Nixon’s justified and badly needed incursions into Laos and Cambodia only proves that they were terribly misguided and duped into siding with North Vietnam. If they had had a grip on reality and a sound concept of right and wrong, they would have been cheering those incursions and grateful that the incursions did great damage to the NVA’s forces and weapons supplies.

Why didn’t those students protest when North Vietnam began violating the Paris Peace Accords, or when North Vietnam launched its full-scale invasion of South Vietnam in December 1974, or when North Vietnam imposed a reign of terror on the South Vietnamese after Saigon fell, a terror that included the execution of at least 60,000 people, the sending of at least 1 million people to brutal detention camps (where a bare minimum of 5,000 more people died), and the flight of at least another 1 million people from the country? Why didn’t those students feel any “moral outrage” over those evil actions and crimes?

8. Finally, you bring up the old MSM shibboleth about JFK's public statements vs the internal record and what he said privately. . . . [SNIP]

It’s not a shibboleth. Your argument is based on your acceptance of the debatable claim that JFK said one thing in private but something totally different in public on this issue. The point that I have made, and made with evidence, and the point that so many scholars have made, is that there really was no difference between what JFK said in private and what he said in public on this matter, that his own brother and several other members of his administration said that he indicated to them that he was not going to completely withdraw from South Vietnam and certainly had no intention of abandoning South Vietnam.

As per Selverstone, send me his book. Will probably review it.

Uh, you can buy his book and review it. You could start by viewing his 2016 video on JFK’s withdrawal plans.

 

Edited September 16, 2022 by Michael Griffith

[James DiEugenio]

I am relying largely on McNamara's belated claims?

You don't have to read the rest of Mike's boilerplate.  That is really representative of his argument.

I fail to see how being 1 of 19 witnesses qualifies as being the center of my argument. If you turn that into a percentage, its about 5 per cent.  But somehow, some way, Mike wants to make the other 95 per cent disappear.  Come hell or high water he will do it. Therefore, somehow, Newman, Pearson, O'Neill, Mansfield, Morse, O'Donnell and Powers, Shoup, etc etc, all these witnesses do not really exist.  Mike throws them up into the ether. Bye Bye.

But let us use McNamara to see how Mike handles evidence about this issue.  He says McNamara only came to this belatedly conclusion about withdrawal concerning Kennedy and Vietnam in his book In Retrospect  published in 1995.  Let us examine the contemporaneous record to see if Mike is informed and/or honest.

On November 27, 1961 there was a meeting at the White House. Some of the attendees were Taylor, Dulles, Lansdale, David Bell, Bundy, Rostow, Rusk, and McNamara.  Kennedy got there late, so the early discussion was about how poorly Diem was performing. When Kennedy got there he took over the meeting.  It was very clear now why it was called.  Kennedy was quite disappointed at the struggle he had to go through to block combat troops at the mid November meetings. And also at the resistance to that decision. He could hardly have made it more clear: "When policy is decided on, people on the spot must support it or get out." He then asked for whole hearted support of his decision and wanted to know who at Defense was going to carry out his Vietnam policy. McNamara said it would be him. (Memorandum of Southeast Asia meeting by Max Taylor, 11/27/61)

At this time, Kennedy had sent Galbraith to Vietnam, also as a result of those prior meetings and his disappointment in them. He knew Galbraith was anything but a hawk and would give him a different recommendation on what to do.  Which he did.  When Galbraith was in town again in April, Kennedy told him to deliver his report to McNamara, which he did. Galbraith then told Kennedy that he talked to the Defense Secretary and he understood.  A mini battle took place over this. Since the Pentagon looked at the memo as beginning a withdrawal. (Pentagon Papers, Book 12, pp. 464-65, David Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 133) But McNamara got the message, as his deputy Roz GIlpatric said that McNamara told him that JFK had given him instructions to start to unwind this thing. (James Blight, VIrtual JFK, p.371).

Recall, this is 1961-62.

Edited September 16, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[James DiEugenio]

Now, in addition to Gilpatric, we also know that McNamara got the message because he told Harkins at the 1962 Sec/Def meeting to begin a withdrawal plan. He issued this order twice. (See Douglass, pp. 120-21 for the first time, and FRUS, 1961-63, Vol. 2 p. 549 for the second time)

McNamara had to do this twice since, clearly, Harkins had been blindsided and was reluctant to cooperate.

But finally, at the May 1963 Sec Def meeting, everyone brought their withdrawal schedules in writing. McNamara looked at them, and from the notes of that meeting we know that he said they were too slow. The ARRB declassified these voluminous notes in 1997 and they created a mini uproar in the press. The NY Times, Philadelphia Inquirer and the AP filed stories about Kennedy's withdrawal plan and the Sec Def meeting. 

At the internal battle over this withdrawal plan,  at the White House in October 1963, it was McNamara who led the way.  He insisted on the passage of NSAM 263, and the rest of the McNamara Taylor Report for the 1965 total withdrawal.  We have this on audio tape now. When Bundy resists, McNamara says quite literally: 

"We need a way to get out of Vietnam. This is a way of doing it." (Meeting of October 2, 1963) 

And then Kennedy sent McNamara out to brief the press.

Please note, this is all in 1961-1963.  It is not, in Mike's word, "belated".   It is all contemporaneous and we know it happened because there is a record of it all. So to say that somehow McNamara came across Kennedy's withdrawal plan in 1995, no, that is simply wrong.  Thanks to the ARRB we have the proof from back then, when it was happening.

Edited September 16, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[James DiEugenio]

Now, what happened afterwards?

Johnson was fully aware of how the war was going, since he was getting the real reports from Burris. (Newman, 2017, p. 225). And he was aware of Kennedy's decision to get out.  As we all know, Johnson wasted little or no time in making sure there was a new sheriff in town.  In fact, this happened at the very first meeting on 11/24. (ibid, pp 458-61) Johnson then told the JCS in December of 1963, "Just get me elected, and then you can have your war." (Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, p. 326)

As Joe McBride has written here, McNamara should have resigned after this last meeting. The writing was on the wall. LBJ was reversing policy.  For whatever reason he stayed. Perhaps the worst decision of his life.

But the ARRB performed a miracle on this. Because now we know that, after Johnson made clear his intent, he went to work on McNamara since he knew he was JFK's point man on the withdrawal program.  On February 20, 1964 he tells McNamara:

"I always thought it was foolish for you to make any statements about withdrawing.  I thought it was bad psychologically.  But you and the president thought otherwise and I just sat silent....Then come the questions: how in the hell does McNamara think, when he's losing a war, he can pull men out of there?"

I was quite content that Oliver Stone included this in his film.  To me it tells a huge story about both men.  Then on March 2, 1964, Johnson actually tries to get McNamara to take back NSAM 263 in public. Which means Johnson has no intention of following that order or the 1965 overall termination date.  And he makes that clear and in fact he did not do it.

By early 1965, some of the Kennedy appointees have realized what LBJ  is doing with all this. He is working assiduously to camouflage what he has really done. That is to work on disguising his breakage with Kennedy and building a mirage of continuity. LBJ is aware that they know and he tells McNamara about it in a conversation of January 13, 1965. He says that they think he is putting the war on Kennedy's tomb.  Which, of course, he was.

But there are two giveaways from that 1960's period which show us that McNamara, although clearly suffering from PTSD-- he would actually wrap himself in his curtains and weep over what he was doing (Tom Wells, The War Within, p. 198)--but understood what had happened.  The first is his secret authorization of the Pentagon Papers, which he kept from Johnson. Those documents made the front pages of 21 newspapers.  The Gravel Edition of the papers has a section on Kennedy's phased withdrawal plan.

Secondly, there is his secret exit debrief by McNamara, done after LBJ shoved him out.  John Newman heard it and talks about in the long version of Oliver Stone's film.  In that debrief McNamara says that he and Kennedy  looked at the American mission in Indochina as a training and advising one. That was it.  We could not fight the war for them. When the training was done, everyone was leaving. As we have seen that meant the choppers also.

So where Mike gets this stuff about "belated" with McNamara, that is simply and utterly false.  This is all from the sixties. And it is an invaluable record of what Kennedy was going to do versus what happened after his assassination.  And it is all right there on tape or in documents. McNamara was JFK's point man from November 27, 1961 on his withdrawal. And as Jamie Galbraith says in Stone's film, he was doing a pretty good job on that until LBJ reversed policy. 

Any term such as "belated" applied to McNamara is simply hooey.

Edited September 17, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[Michael Griffith]

6 minutes ago, James DiEugenio said:

 

I am relying largely on McNamara's belated claims? You don't have to read the rest of Mike's boilerplate.  That is really representative of his argument.

First of all, I did not say you are "largely" relying on McNamara's belated claims. I said you are "partly" relying on McNamara's hearsay. Go back and read that part of my reply. Or, here, let me quote it:

You are simply ignoring the bulk of the record and are partly relying on McNamara’s belated hearsay claims. See my previous replies about NSAM 263. The conditional goal was to have all advisors withdrawn by the end of 1965, but, again, it was a conditional goal—it depended on the situation on the ground.

And I would note that you still have not answered my points about the clear wording of NSAM 263 and its supporting documents. You are still ignoring them. 

My "boilerplate"??! You have done little else but repeat your talking points over and over and over again and have ignored most of my counter arguments. 

I fail to see how being 1 of 19 witnesses qualifies as being the center of my argument. If you turn that into a percentage, its about 5 per cent.  But somehow, some way, Mike wants to make the other 95 per cent disappear. 

No, the problem is that you have misrepresented what I said, as I document above. I did not argue that McNamara is the "center" of your argument, nor did I say that you are "largely" relying on him. 

Come hell or high water he will do it. Therefore, somehow, Newman, Pearson, O'Neill, Mansfield, Morse, O'Donnell and Powers, Shoup, etc etc, all these witnesses do not really exist.  Mike throws them up into the ether. Bye Bye.

You could have spared yourself from typing all these erroneous arguments if you had not misread my statement. See above.

But let us use McNamara to see how Mike handles evidence about this issue.  He says McNamara only came to this belatedly about Kennedy and Vietnam his book In Retrospect from 1995.  Let us examine the contemporaneous record to see if Mike is informed and/or honest.

Let us use McNamara to see how you handle evidence about this issue. Not one word of what you say below addresses the fact that the policy in question, the policy that JFK wanted to be supported, was not the policy that you claim it was but was a conditional policy that could be altered based on the situation on the ground. 

On November 27, 1961 there was a meeting at the White House. Some of the attendees were Taylor, Dulles, Lansdale, David Bell, Bundy, Rostow, Rusk, McNamara.  Kennedy got there late, so the early discussion was about how poorly Diem was performing. When Kennedy got there he took over the meeting.  It was very clear now why it was called.  Kennedy was quite disappointed at the struggle he had to go through block combat troops at the mid November meeting. And also at the resistance to that decision. And he could hardly have made it more clear: "When policy is decided on, people on the spot must support it or get out." He then asked for whole hearted support of his decision and wanted to know who at Defense was going to carry out his Vietnam policy. McNamara said it would be him. (Memorandum of Southeast Asia meeting by Max Taylor, 11/27/61)

None of this helps your case because you continue to ignore the fact that NSAM 263 did not order an unconditional, unalterable withdrawal by the end of 1965. Numerous scholars have discussed this, and I have documented this fact in previous replies. The policy that Kennedy wanted to see supported was not the policy that you keep assuming it was. That's the main problem here. 

At this time, Kennedy had send Galbraith to Vietnam, also as a result of those prior meetings and his disappointment in them. He knew Galbraith was anything but a hawk and would give him a different recommendation on what to do.  Which he did.  When Galbraith was in town again in April, Kennedy told him to deliver his report to McNamara, which he did. Galbraith then told Kennedy that he talked to the Defense Secretary and he understood.  A mini battle took place over this. Since the Pentagon looked at the memo as beginning a withdrawal. (Pentagon Papers, Book 12, pp. 464-65, David Kaiser, American Tragedy, p. 133) But McNamara got the message, as his deputy Roz GIlpatric said that McNamara told him that JFK had given him instructions to start to unwind this thing. (James Blight, VIrtual JFK, p.371). Recall, this is 1961-62.

Here, too, you keep assuming that the policy in question was an unconditional, unalterable withdrawal by the end of 1965, but the text of NSAM 263 and its supporting documents clearly, undeniably refute that view, as I've documented in my two replies on the NSAM. 

Let's quote liberal historian Stanley Karnow:

Early in 1963, South Vietnam's rigid President Ngo Dinh Diem was cracking down on internal dissidents, throwing the country into chaos. Fearing that the turmoil would benefit the Communist insurgents, Kennedy conceived of bringing home one thousand of the sixteen thousand American military advisers as a way of prodding Diem into behaving more leniently. Kennedy's decision was codified in National Security Action Memorandum, or NSAM 263. Its aim was to "indicate our displeasure" with Diem and "create significant uncertainty" in him "as to the future intentions of the United States." Kennedy hoped the scheme, which also scheduled a reduction of the U.S. forces over the next two years, would give the South Vietnamese the chance to strengthen themselves. (Karnow, "JFK," in Mark C. Carnes, editor, Past Imperfect: History According to the Movies, 1995, p. 272)

When you get on a public forum and make such ludicrous claims as your claim that North Vietnam did not invade South Vietnam, you indicate that you are too emotionally and ideologically committed to your position to be objective. That argument originated with the North Vietnamese communists. No one except a small cadre of communist and far-left authors takes it seriously. Go on any of the major boards where the Vietnam War is discussed and see what happens when you make that argument. Even Karnow utterly rejects it. North Vietnam signed a formal agreement with the government of South Vietnam that promised that North Vietnamese attacks and incursions against South Vietnam would cease--that agreement is known as the Paris Peace Accords.

To even begin to make this argument, one must accept the communist version of history, a version that ignores Ho Chi Minh's brutal tactics to consolidate his control of the North, that ignores the long-standing and recognized differences between the northern and southern regions, that ignores Ho's use of violence and intimidation to keep some 2 million northern Vietnamese from moving to South Vietnam, and that ignores the fact that Ho's vicious regime would have collapsed early on without massive Soviet and Chinese aid. 

 

 

 

[James DiEugenio]

I won't even reply to any of the above.  Mike will not admit he was wrong about McNamara in the face of voluminous records and tapes. Hearsay? Baloney. Its direct evidence.

What does he rely on to avoid the impact of this new ARRB evidence?

Kennedy's withdrawal plan was not definite.  When, in fact, 19 witnesses say it was--and he wants to throw them away.  I don't know how it gets any more clear than Kennedy saying his number one priority after he is re elected it to get out of Vietnam. I mean Mike does understand English I hope?

Or saying, even though he would be branded a communist appeaser, he was getting out in 1965.  

Or McNamara saying in his debrief that they were getting out no matter if Saigon was winning or losing? 

There is no question about these statements.  They are unequivocal. And what  makes them more convincing is that JFK knew we were losing. As he told Forrestal, which is his last statement on Vietnam before he left for Dallas. Which is why he scheduled the withdrawal for 1965.  His withdrawal plan was arranged around the re-election while Johnson's escalation plan was scheduled around his election.

The rest of Mike's arguments are just silly.  Nixon and Kissinger, for example, knew that the so called Peace Accords were a chimera. And they knew what was going to happen in reality.  They talk about it on tape. The only thing they are concerned about is that Saigon will fall at a decent interval after America leaves, when it will be considered a "backwater".  Which is the word Kissinger uses on tape.

Mike tried to  say the decent interval did not exist, but unfortunately for him it does. Just like he tried to say Nixon never said Vietnam was hopeless. But he did say that. Twice. Jeff Kimball, who listened to the tapes after they were declassified, has recorded it all.   

I have a question: Is Mike calling me a communist?  Because I read Jeff KImball who listened to the tapes?  If that is so, then Draper was correct.  This whole Podhoretz/Lewy thing has become a way to perform a stab in the back concept, like the Nazis did after World War I: We didn't really lose and you must be a communist to buy that.

Whew.  Ted Draper was a really smart guy.  But of course, since he said Vietnam was one country, we cannot have him here.

Edited September 16, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[Paul Bacon]

Once again, great history lesson Jim Di.  Your posts have filled in a lot of blanks for me...

[Michael Griffith]

Okay, let’s review NSAM 263 and JFK’s last statements on the Vietnam War. Here is what JFK was going to say about Vietnam in his speech at the International Trade Mart on 11/22/1963, the speech he was going to give soon after driving through Dealey Plaza: 

About 70 percent of our military assistance goes to nine key countries located on or near the borders of the Communist bloc – nine countries confronted directly or indirectly with the threat of Communist aggression – Viet-Nam, Free China, Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Greece, Turkey, and Iran. No one of these countries possesses on its own the resources to maintain the forces which our own Chiefs of Staff think needed in the common interest. Reducing our efforts to train, equip, and assist their armies can only encourage Communist penetration and require in time the increased overseas deployment of American combat forces. And reducing the economic help needed to bolster these nations that undertake to help defend freedom can have the same disastrous result. 

This is literally the last statement we have from JFK himself, and, clearly, there is no hint of any intention to totally disengage from South Vietnam, but rather a clear intent to “train, equip, and assist” South Vietnam’s armed forces.

And here is what JFK said about standing by South Vietnam and other allies earlier in the day on 11/22/1963 when he addressed the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce:

In the past 3 years we have increased the defense budget of the United States by over 20 percent; increased the program of acquisition for Polaris submarines from 24 to 41; increased our Minuteman missile purchase program by more than 75 percent; doubled the number of strategic bombers and missiles on alert; doubled the number of nuclear weapons available in the strategic alert forces; increased the tactical nuclear forces deployed in Western Europe by over 60 percent; added five combat ready divisions to the Army of the United States, and five tactical fighter wings to the Air Force of the United States; increased our strategic airlift capability by 75 percent; and increased our special counter-insurgency forces which are engaged now in South Viet-Nam by 600 percent. I hope those who want a stronger America and place it on some signs will also place those figures next to it.

This is not an easy effort. This requires sacrifice by the people of the United States. But this is a very dangerous and uncertain world. As I said earlier, on three occasions in the last three years the United States has had a direct confrontation. No one can say when it will come again. No one expects that our life will be easy, certainly not in this decade, and perhaps not in this century. But we should realize what a burden and responsibility the people of the United States have borne for so many years. . . .

Without the United States, South Viet-Nam would collapse overnight. Without the United States, the SEATO alliance would collapse overnight. Without the United States the CENTO alliance would collapse overnight. Without the United States there would be no NATO. And gradually Europe would drift into neutralism and indifference. Without the efforts of the United States in the Alliance for Progress, the Communist advance onto the mainland of South America would long ago have taken place.

So this country, which desires only to be free, which desires to be secure, which desired to live at peace for 18 years under three different administrations, has borne more than its share of the burden, has stood watch for more than its number of years. I don't think we are fatigued or tired. We would like to live as we once lived. But history will not permit it. The Communist balance of power is still strong. The balance of power is still on the side of freedom. We are still the keystone in the arch of freedom, and I think we will continue to do as we have done in our past, our duty, and the people of Texas will be in the lead.

I don’t see any hint of an intention to abandon South Vietnam, do you? Now let’s look at NSAM 263 again:

At a meeting on October 5, 1963, the President considered the recommendations contained in the report of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on their mission to South Vietnam.

The President approved the military recommendations contained in Section I B (1 -3) of the report, but directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.

After discussion of the remaining recommendations of the report, the President approved the instruction to Ambassador Lodge which is set forth in State Department telegram No. 534 to Saigon.

What were the recommendations in Section 1 B (1-3) of the McNamara-Taylor report? And what was contained in the instruction sent to Ambassador Lodge? Below is Section 1 B (1-3) from the McNamara-Taylor report. Notice the intention to increase the size of South Vietnam’s army and to increase the pace of military operations, and notice the terms “should,” “the bulk of U.S. personnel,” and “without impairment of the war effort”: 

1. General Harkins review with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965. This review would consider the need for such changes as:

a. A further shift of military emphasis and strength to the Delta (IV Corps).

b. An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas, so that all combat troops are in the field an average of 20 days out of 30 and static missions are ended.

c. Emphasis on “clear and hold operations” instead of terrain sweeps which have little permanent value.

d. The expansion of personnel in combat units to full authorized strength.

e. The training and arming of hamlet militia to an accelerated rate, especially in the Delta.

f. A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program, especially in the Delta, and action to insure that future strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and until civic action programs can be introduced.

2. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.

3. In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.

So, clearly, NSAM 263 was not an unalterable, no-matter-what order for a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, and it certainly did not even remotely suggest any intention to totally disengage from South Vietnam. Rather, if things went according to plan, it “should” be possible to withdraw “the bulk” of U.S. forces from Vietnam “without impairment of the war effort.”

This is why the movie JFK's interpretation of NSAM 263 came under such heavy fire from so many scholars: NSAM 263 obviously and undeniably did not call for an unconditional withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Vietnam. Only by ignoring the document's plain wording can one misinterpret it to say such a thing.

Now let’s look at the instruction sent to Lodge. I won’t quote the whole telegram because it’s several pages long. But, here are key parts of the instruction that clearly contradict the idea that JFK intended to abandon South Vietnam—and note the repeated emphasis on winning the war: 

The recommendations on negotiations are concerned with what US is after, i.e., GVN [South Vietnam’s government] action to increase effectiveness of its military effort; to ensure popular support to win war; and to eliminate strains on US Government and public confidence. The negotiating posture is designed not to lay down specific hard and fast demands or to set a deadline, but to produce movement in Vietnamese Government along these lines. In this way we can test and probe effectiveness of any actions the GVN actually takes and, at same time, maintain sufficient flexibility to permit US to resume full support of Diem regime at any time US Government deems it appropriate. . . . 

Test of adequacy of these actions should be whether, in combination, they improve effectiveness of GVN effort to point where we can carry on in confident expectation that war effort will progress satisfactorily. Since we cannot now foresee interlocking impact of possible actions both in GVN and here, we obviously do not expect that GVN will or even can perform on entire list and for this reason this is in no sense a package of demands. 

12. If, as we hope, Diem seeks clarification of US policies and actions, you should present an exposition of how our actions are related to our fundamental objective of victory. . . . 

Although we cannot at this time in complete confidence predict the exact point in this complex of actions at which we will be sure war effort will proceed to successful conclusion, it seems probable its achievement will require some restriction of role of Nhus. 

22. At President’s next press conference, he expects to repeat his basic statement that what furthers the war effort we support, and what interferes with the war effort we oppose.  

 

[Tom Gram]

2 hours ago, Michael Griffith said:

Okay, let’s review NSAM 263 and JFK’s last statements on the Vietnam War. Here is what JFK was going to say about Vietnam in his speech at the International Trade Mart on 11/22/1963, the speech he was going to give soon after driving through Dealey Plaza: 

About 70 percent of our military assistance goes to nine key countries located on or near the borders of the Communist bloc – nine countries confronted directly or indirectly with the threat of Communist aggression – Viet-Nam, Free China, Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Greece, Turkey, and Iran. No one of these countries possesses on its own the resources to maintain the forces which our own Chiefs of Staff think needed in the common interest. Reducing our efforts to train, equip, and assist their armies can only encourage Communist penetration and require in time the increased overseas deployment of American combat forces. And reducing the economic help needed to bolster these nations that undertake to help defend freedom can have the same disastrous result. 

This is literally the last statement we have from JFK himself, and, clearly, there is no hint of any intention to totally disengage from South Vietnam, but rather a clear intent to “train, equip, and assist” South Vietnam’s armed forces.

And here is what JFK said about standing by South Vietnam and other allies earlier in the day on 11/22/1963 when he addressed the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce:

In the past 3 years we have increased the defense budget of the United States by over 20 percent; increased the program of acquisition for Polaris submarines from 24 to 41; increased our Minuteman missile purchase program by more than 75 percent; doubled the number of strategic bombers and missiles on alert; doubled the number of nuclear weapons available in the strategic alert forces; increased the tactical nuclear forces deployed in Western Europe by over 60 percent; added five combat ready divisions to the Army of the United States, and five tactical fighter wings to the Air Force of the United States; increased our strategic airlift capability by 75 percent; and increased our special counter-insurgency forces which are engaged now in South Viet-Nam by 600 percent. I hope those who want a stronger America and place it on some signs will also place those figures next to it.

This is not an easy effort. This requires sacrifice by the people of the United States. But this is a very dangerous and uncertain world. As I said earlier, on three occasions in the last three years the United States has had a direct confrontation. No one can say when it will come again. No one expects that our life will be easy, certainly not in this decade, and perhaps not in this century. But we should realize what a burden and responsibility the people of the United States have borne for so many years. . . .

Without the United States, South Viet-Nam would collapse overnight. Without the United States, the SEATO alliance would collapse overnight. Without the United States the CENTO alliance would collapse overnight. Without the United States there would be no NATO. And gradually Europe would drift into neutralism and indifference. Without the efforts of the United States in the Alliance for Progress, the Communist advance onto the mainland of South America would long ago have taken place.

So this country, which desires only to be free, which desires to be secure, which desired to live at peace for 18 years under three different administrations, has borne more than its share of the burden, has stood watch for more than its number of years. I don't think we are fatigued or tired. We would like to live as we once lived. But history will not permit it. The Communist balance of power is still strong. The balance of power is still on the side of freedom. We are still the keystone in the arch of freedom, and I think we will continue to do as we have done in our past, our duty, and the people of Texas will be in the lead.

I don’t see any hint of an intention to abandon South Vietnam, do you? Now let’s look at NSAM 263 again:

At a meeting on October 5, 1963, the President considered the recommendations contained in the report of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor on their mission to South Vietnam.

The President approved the military recommendations contained in Section I B (1 -3) of the report, but directed that no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.

After discussion of the remaining recommendations of the report, the President approved the instruction to Ambassador Lodge which is set forth in State Department telegram No. 534 to Saigon.

What were the recommendations in Section 1 B (1-3) of the McNamara-Taylor report? And what was contained in the instruction sent to Ambassador Lodge? Below is Section 1 B (1-3) from the McNamara-Taylor report. Notice the intention to increase the size of South Vietnam’s army and to increase the pace of military operations, and notice the terms “should,” “the bulk of U.S. personnel,” and “without impairment of the war effort”: 

1. General Harkins review with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965. This review would consider the need for such changes as:

a. A further shift of military emphasis and strength to the Delta (IV Corps).

b. An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas, so that all combat troops are in the field an average of 20 days out of 30 and static missions are ended.

c. Emphasis on “clear and hold operations” instead of terrain sweeps which have little permanent value.

d. The expansion of personnel in combat units to full authorized strength.

e. The training and arming of hamlet militia to an accelerated rate, especially in the Delta.

f. A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program, especially in the Delta, and action to insure that future strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and until civic action programs can be introduced.

2. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.

3. In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.

So, clearly, NSAM 263 was not an unalterable, no-matter-what order for a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, and it certainly did not even remotely suggest any intention to totally disengage from South Vietnam. Rather, if things went according to plan, it “should” be possible to withdraw “the bulk” of U.S. forces from Vietnam “without impairment of the war effort.”

This is why the movie JFK's interpretation of NSAM 263 came under such heavy fire from so many scholars: NSAM 263 obviously and undeniably did not call for an unconditional withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Vietnam. Only by ignoring the document's plain wording can one misinterpret it to say such a thing.

Now let’s look at the instruction sent to Lodge. I won’t quote the whole telegram because it’s several pages long. But, here are key parts of the instruction that clearly contradict the idea that JFK intended to abandon South Vietnam—and note the repeated emphasis on winning the war: 

The recommendations on negotiations are concerned with what US is after, i.e., GVN [South Vietnam’s government] action to increase effectiveness of its military effort; to ensure popular support to win war; and to eliminate strains on US Government and public confidence. The negotiating posture is designed not to lay down specific hard and fast demands or to set a deadline, but to produce movement in Vietnamese Government along these lines. In this way we can test and probe effectiveness of any actions the GVN actually takes and, at same time, maintain sufficient flexibility to permit US to resume full support of Diem regime at any time US Government deems it appropriate. . . . 

Test of adequacy of these actions should be whether, in combination, they improve effectiveness of GVN effort to point where we can carry on in confident expectation that war effort will progress satisfactorily. Since we cannot now foresee interlocking impact of possible actions both in GVN and here, we obviously do not expect that GVN will or even can perform on entire list and for this reason this is in no sense a package of demands. 

12. If, as we hope, Diem seeks clarification of US policies and actions, you should present an exposition of how our actions are related to our fundamental objective of victory. . . . 

Although we cannot at this time in complete confidence predict the exact point in this complex of actions at which we will be sure war effort will proceed to successful conclusion, it seems probable its achievement will require some restriction of role of Nhus. 

22. At President’s next press conference, he expects to repeat his basic statement that what furthers the war effort we support, and what interferes with the war effort we oppose.  

 

I’ve been reading through this debate and your repeated emphasis on JFK’s use of conditional language is not very convincing, IMO. 

Hypothetically, if JFK was planning a total disengagement from Vietnam, how do you think he would have written that plan into policy before his re-election? Do you think it would have been wise politically to not include such statements as “without impairment of the war effort”, or wise strategically to set hard deadlines for withdrawal? 

The conditional language reads to me like a sales tactic that was included, by political necessity, to help sell the idea of American disengagement from Vietnam. As pointed out by Jim, there are 19 credible witnesses that support this exact interpretation. 

Basically, your position on this is based on the notion that if JFK was planning a full withdrawal, he would have revealed his plan publicly and unambiguously coded it into policy prior to his re-election, and thus your position is based on the notion that JFK was an idiot. It’s just not an effective argument. 

[Paul Brancato]

2 hours ago, Tom Gram said:

I’ve been reading through this debate and your repeated emphasis on JFK’s use of conditional language is not very convincing, IMO. 

Hypothetically, if JFK was planning a total disengagement from Vietnam, how do you think he would have written that plan into policy before his re-election? Do you think it would have been wise politically to not include such statements as “without impairment of the war effort”, or wise strategically to set hard deadlines for withdrawal? 

The conditional language reads to me like a sales tactic that was included, by political necessity, to help sell the idea of American disengagement from Vietnam. As pointed out by Jim, there are 19 credible witnesses that support this exact interpretation. 

Basically, your position on this is based on the notion that if JFK was planning a full withdrawal, he would have revealed his plan publicly and unambiguously coded it into policy prior to his re-election, and thus your position is based on the notion that JFK was an idiot. It’s just not an effective argument. 

Well put. And thank you Jim for making your points so convincingly. Michael either doesn’t understand basic critical thinking, or he does and uses logical fallacies knowingly. Basically it’s straw man - he misstates Jim’s points and argues against those rather than what Jim actually says. And his focus on McNamara to the exclusion of so many supporting statements would appear to be a glaring example of this. Perhaps there is another word for this besides straw man. 

[Kirk Gallaway]

3 hours ago, Tom Gram said:

Basically, your position on this is based on the notion that if JFK was planning a full withdrawal, he would have revealed his plan publicly and unambiguously coded it into policy prior to his re-election, and thus your position is based on the notion that JFK was an idiot. It’s just not an effective argument. 

Tom, I would slightly change your critique.

Tom: , he would have revealed his plan publicly and unambiguously coded it into policy prior to his re-election, and thus your position is based on the notion that JFK was an  political idiot.

Tom: It's just not an effective political argument.

There's no doubt what JFK said in his speeches were hawkish.

But there are 2 things to keep in mind. 1) He was talking to Texas supporters, the most Defense conscious, Cold Warmongering state in the union. (eventually evidenced by LBJ)

I believe the very last sentence in his last speech in his life, he acknowledged all the work being done in waging the Cold  War and said to rally the audience "And Texas will lead the way!" 

2)the point you're making,  it's poor political strategy to mention definitive  future plans regarding Viet Nam. Just as Biden in the 2020 campaign never definitively mentioned his intention to pull out of Afghanistan.

Edited September 17, 2022 by Kirk Gallaway

[James DiEugenio]

Thanks for your contributions, both Pauls and Tom.  I think they are accurate and incisive.

The reason Kennedy did not opt for the timetable McNamara was encouraging is pretty simple.  As I proved above, McNamara was clearly Kennedy's point man on the withdrawal. There is so much declassified evidence of this today that its silly to argue he was not. McNamara wanted the advisory withdrawal to proceed on a monthly basis of 1,000 per. And in whole units.  Not bits and pieces.  

Kennedy is the one who did not want to do it that way.  And its quite simple as to why not.  Newman discussed this with us during the making of the documentary and its also in his revised edition. (p. 419)

Kennedy and McNamara were quite aware of how strong the internal and external pressures were on Saigon in late 1963. Which is why JFK ordered an evacuation plan in November of 1963. There was a possibility that Saigon would collapse and Hanoi would take over before November of 1964.  (LBJ was later aware of this also, and he was sensitive to it for disparate reasons.)

So Kennedy wanted to be able to adjust the exit flow so Saigon would not fall during his re-election campaign. As he said: how can I ask the public to vote for me after something like that occurs?  As also noted above, he was fully aware of what the other side would do with something like this.  So he had to be in a safe position--that is in office-- in order to get the whole mission out.

Once the election was over, fine. Which is what he said on more than one occasion. So the difference between him and McNamara was the fact Kennedy was a politician running for re-election.

 

Edited September 17, 2022 by James DiEugenio

[Michael Griffith]

A few follow-up points:

-- It is beyond me how anyone can cite McNamara’s claims, given his record of deception and manipulation, not to mention his disastrous incompetence. Even H. R. McMaster, in his highly acclaimed book Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam, scorches McNamara for his dishonesty and ineptitude, even though McMaster is also harshly critical of the Joint Chiefs.

-- When Ho Chi Minh declared the creation of the “Democratic Republic of Vietnam” (DRV), he did not even control all of the northern part of Vietnam, much less all of Vietnam. Furthermore, literally thousands of pages of scholarship document the fact that the Vietminh and then North Vietnam would have quickly ceased to exist had it not been for prolonged massive aid from the Soviet Union and Red China.

-- Regarding the Geneva Accords and the holding of elections in 1956, the New York Times editorial page noted at the time,

The plain fact is that neither the truce commission nor the signatories to the Geneva Agreement have as yet established in North Vietnam the essential conditions provided by the agreement for a “free expression of the national will”. . . . In these circumstances, Mr. Diem . . . is duty-bound to reject the proposed elections until the necessary conditions for freedom have been established in the North.” (April 6, 1956)

Bingo. Remember that during the Geneva Accords-mandated “free flow” period in 1954-1955, the Vietminh forcefully prevented some 2 million North Vietnamese from going to South Vietnam, as I discussed in a previous reply. Liberals simply ignore this gross violation of the Geneva Accords and then attack Diem and the U.S. for believing that the Vietminh would not hold honest elections in the North.

-- Perhaps the best response to Nick Turse’s book Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam, is the 37-page critical review written by Vietnam War scholars Gary Kulik and Peter Zinoman. Here’s a brief excerpt from their review:

Turse’s slipshod approach to the existing scholarship highlights more general problems with his research methods. “Only by combining veterans’ testimonies, contemporaneous press coverage, Vietnamese eye-witness accounts, long classified official-studies, and the military’s own formal investigations into the many hundreds of atrocity cases that it knew about,” he writes, “can one begin to grasp what the Vietnam War really entailed” (258). But Turse’s sloppy and tendentious use of sources represents the book’s most serious problem. A perusal of the notes indicates that he relies on an indiscriminate mix of credible and unreliable sources and that his agenda-driven selection and presentation of evidence frequently misleads. Gary Kulik’s “War Stories” (2009) uses the same military documents to examine the first American atrocity discussed at length in Turse’s book: the so-called Trieu Ai massacre. Comparison with Kulik’s much longer and more detailed account reveals a working method on the part of Turse marked by the cherry picking of data and the partisan framing of evidence. Eyewitness accounts of the incident that Turse collected in Vietnam in 2006 and 2008 raise more questions than they answer and point to problems with his use of this complicated source. Americans killed civilians at Triệu Ái, but Turse jumps to false conclusions about the circumstances that led to the killings, and he offers unqualified speculation about this episode as emphatic truth. As historians, we argue that Turse’s opposition to war atrocities does not excuse these mistakes. (https://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/e-journal/articles/zinoman_kulik.pdf)

Vietnam veteran Tom Equels, who was personally slandered in Turse's book, had this to say about Turse’s work:

I was personally defamed by Turse's disregard for truth. It is ironic that he talks about overkill and then with careless disregard for the truth trashes the reputations of honorable soldiers, having zero factual basis. Journalistic overkill at its worst. He interviewed no one regarding the incident and obviously did not even read the record he so liberally cites. I had to gather the official documents, gather witness statements, and then prove I was not within a hundred miles of the alleged incident to get a retraction/correction! (https://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-12/zinoman-and-kulik)

To read more about Turse’s irresponsible handling of evidence regarding Tom Equels, see Agreement Reached to Retract Story that Decorated Vietnam War Hero Participated in Civilian Massacre -- Equels Law Firm | PRLog. Turse and his publisher were eventually forced to issue a formal retraction of his false claims about Equels.

-- I have presented some of the evidence regarding the “reign of terror” (quoting former VC official Tang’s words) that the North Vietnamese army (NVA) imposed on the South after Saigon fell, which terror included executing tens of thousands of South Vietnamese and sending 1-2 million others to brutal “reeducation” camps, where thousands more died from forced labor, starvation, neglect.

Along this line, mention should be made of the fact that during the NVA’s final invasion of South Vietnam in March and April in 1975, the NVA killed thousands of civilians by shelling highways that were clogged with fleeing civilians.

The NVA did the same thing in 1972 when they shelled Highway 1 during their Easter Offensive. I quote from an article on the subject titled “Appeasing the Spirits Along the Highway of Horror,” published on a website maintained by Vietnamese refugees:

In contrast, the RVN government [South Vietnam’s government] (before it was defeated in 1975) claimed that the PAVN [another acronym for the North Vietnamese army] intentionally targeted civilians.[22] Bolstering the RVN’s assertion was the confession of PAVN Private Lê Xuân Thủy, who was serving as a radio operator for the 4th Battalion, 324th Division, when he defected on 31 July 1972.[23] At an RVN government-organized press conference on 8 September, Thủy revealed that his unit had been ordered to “maintain an ambush position along Route 1” for six days to allow other PAVN troops to capture Quảng Trị city.[24] Thủy’s commander had instructed his unit to shoot into the column of people fleeing Quảng Trị, even though it was clear that many civilians were present. The troops were told that the refugees were the enemy because they were opting to leave rather than stay. Troops were commanded to shoot at all vehicles, including civilian cars, buses, and bicycles. According to Thủy, this event shook his faith in the DRV [North Vietnam] and led to his defection.

The testimony of one defector in state custody does not make for credible evidence. His assertion that the PAVN fired on civilians, however, corresponds with other contemporary reports and eyewitness accounts. Many observers reported that civilian presence on the road was clearly discernable during the attack. . . .

The full extent of the attack was known only in July, after the ARVN [South Vietnam’s army] regained the southern parts of Quảng Trị province. As mentioned above, the two reporters who broke the story for Sóng Thần, Ngy Thanh and Đoàn Kế Tường, were among the first to return to the highway. Being members of the military force themselves, both reporters arrived with the troops on 1 July.[40] As the airborne headed toward Quảng Trị city on the western side of Highway One and the marines on the eastern side, the two reporters went on their own and found a way across the Bến Đá Bridge, which had been destroyed in late April. Because they arrived before the ARVN troops, Ngy Thanh and Tường were able to witness the scene before soldiers cleared the highway of vehicles and bodies to make it passable.

According to Ngy Thanh and Đoàn Kế Tường’s article, published on 3 July, the 10-km stretch of highway southeast of Quảng Trị city was a scene of mass destruction. The road was obstructed by damaged tanks, buses, cars, and Red Cross vehicles with stretchers still inside. Motorcycles were abandoned with keys in the ignition. Strewn around and in these wrecks were hundreds of bodies; some were soldiers but most were civilians, including women and children.[41] Many more bodies could be found in the sandy banks along both sides of the highway, the soft sand acting as their grave. The reporters noted that because the corpses had been there since the end of April, a significant number had already begun to decompose.

Other Vietnamese journalists reported equally horrifying sights along the highway when they returned in July.[44] War correspondents Vũ Thanh Thủy and Dương Phục recorded in their joint memoir the eerie and surreal sight that they encountered along this stretch of highway.[45] According to them, there were so many corpses that it was difficult for journalists to walk along the shoulders of the highway. They had to use walking sticks to help avoid stepping on corpses.[46] (Appeasing the Spirits Along the 'Highway of Horror' - DVAN)

The NVA also used South Vietnamese civilians as human shields during the Easter Offensive by surrounding some of their positions with captured South Vietnamese refugees.

-- Former Army Green Beret and veterans rights activist Ted Sampley discussed North Vietnamese war crimes in a 1997 article in U.S. Veteran Dispatch:

North Vietnamese Army Regulars, on orders from Vietnam's infamous "war hero" General Vo Nguyen Giap, rounded up and marched the civilians to a dry river bed and summarily executed them with bullets, bayonets and clubs. Some were buried alive with their hands tied behind their backs. Their only crime — they believed in democracy or they were Christians. . . .

The record is absolutely clear. Beginning in the 1950s and continuing until the fall of Saigon in 1975, communist leaders orchestrated as official policy the use of terror as a weapon targeted directly at the non-communist population of Vietnam. Communist terrorists blew up churches, schools and bridges, and murdered thousands of South Vietnamese civilian officials. In some cases, the communists murdered the wives, children, and even livestock and pets of the officials. . . .

After North Vietnam violated the Paris Peace Agreements and took over South Vietnam by bloody military force, they murdered thousands more civilians. Those that were not executed were taken from their homes and jailed for years in forced labor concentration camps. Some are still being held today.

There is no question about the intentional deprivation, beatings, torture and murder that U.S. and South Vietnamese prisoners of war were subjected to by the communist Vietnamese during the war. Many of the torturers are easily found today. They are still running the Vietnamese government. (Atrocities Committed by Vietcong (11thcavnam.com)

And what did the likes of John Kerry and Bella Abzug have to say about these atrocities? Nothing. How about all the misguided, duped college students who had staged numerous angry protests when we attacked NVA positions in Laos and Cambodia? Surely they protested these war crimes, right? Nope. They had nothing to say either, not one word, not one protest, not one poster, nothing.

These people were not really “anti-war.” Rather, they were "anti-" any U.S. military action against the NVA or the Vietcong. They said nothing when North Vietnam launched another full-scale invasion of South Vietnam in late 1974—not one peep of protest. Nor did they say anything about the Communists’ mass executions and their internment of 1-2 million people in brutal concentration camps after Saigon fell—not one word.

[Pat Speer]

There seems to be a disconnect in Michael's thinking. My household was one of many (probably a majority of) American households that were against the war, but had no illusions about the North Vietnamese military. Yes, they were commies. Yes, they were brutal. But many if not most Americans (certainly most by the end of the war) did not understand why we should send our young men to die in Vietnam, or bomb civilians so we could win. 

If the South Vietnamese army couldn't win the war without us, then so be it. That was the American attitude. Kennedy himself expressed this attitude. 

And no, we weren't the good guys. This is demonstrated by what happened at My Lai. Hundreds of civilians were lined up and murdered. And yet many Americans--including Nixon--were upset that the soldiers who'd orchestrated this mass slaughter of women and children were vilified. It was kinda like that Michael Douglas movie, where he suddenly realizes where his rampage is heading. He asks "I'm the bad guy?" That was America after My Lai. And a big chunk of America was like "No, don't blame our boys--the widespread slaughter of women and children was just a tactical mistake. Stuff happens. Oh well." (The same evil nonsense being spewed in Russia today, no doubt.) 

In any event, I would be curious to know what Michael thinks would have happened should we have stayed. I know he thinks the North Vietnamese government was gonna collapse. But what would this have looked like? Would the South Vietnamese Army have raced up north with little opposition and the North Vietnamese government have just surrendered? Would the CIA have then helped the victors with death lists of commies to be executed? Or would NV terrorists funded by China and Russia continue to fight the good fight from the jungles for decades to come?

Please provide a rough estimate of the amount of death and carnage should we have stayed in comparison to that which occurred after we left...