John Newman and Greg Burnham Interview

[Ron Bulman]

8 hours ago, Matt Cloud said:

This, albeit from Wikipedia, is actually pretty good.

 

The message [Cable 243] was drafted by W. Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman, and Michael Forrestal^[4] who were the only senior State Department officials on duty on August 24, 1963, a Saturday afternoon, with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and CIA director John McCone on vacation.

President John F. Kennedy was on vacation at Hyannis Port, his family retreat, when Forrestal telephoned seeking to expedite the process with the commander-in-chief's verbal approval.^[5] Kennedy asked them to "wait until Monday" when all the key figures would be in Washington, but Forrestal said that Harriman and Hilsman wanted to get the cable "out right away."^[5] Kennedy thus told Forrestal to get another high-ranking official to "get it cleared."^[5]

Harriman and Hilsman then drove from their offices to a Maryland golf course where Under Secretary of State George Ball was playing with Alexis Johnson.^[5] Ball told the trio to meet him at his home after he and Johnson finished their round of golf. Having returned home, Ball read the message but, knowing that the telegram could raise the morale of the generals and prompt a coup, refused to authorize it until his three visitors had gained Secretary of State Dean Rusk's endorsement.^[5] Those present at Ball's home then phoned and read the important passages of the message to Rusk. They asked Rusk what he thought of the message if Kennedy was comfortable too. Rusk replied, "Well, go ahead. If the President understood the implications, [I] would give a green light."^[5]

Ball then discussed the matter with the President, who asked over the phone, "What do you think?" Ball said that Harriman and Hilsman were in strong support and that his "watered down" version "would certainly be taken as encouragement by the generals to a coup."^[5] Ball said that his group regarded Diem as an embarrassment to Washington because of his "most unconscionable and cruel, uncivilized" actions.^[5] He further cited Nhu's violence against the Buddhists and Madame Nhu's verbal attacks as reasons for breaking with Diem.^[6] According to Ball, Kennedy appeared to be broadly supportive of the cable but was apprehensive as to whether a new leader would do a better job.^[6] As McNamara was away, Kennedy told Ball that the message was acceptable if Rusk and Roswell Gilpatric endorsed it.^[6]

Rusk then approved the message. In the 1980s, Rusk said, "If Ball, Harriman, and President Kennedy were going to send it out, I wasn't going to raise any questions."^[6] Forrestal then phoned Gilpatric's farm in the evening and told him that both Kennedy and Rusk had already approved. Gilpatric later recalled, "If Rusk went along with it and the President went along with it, I wasn't going to oppose it."^[6] He washed his hands of the matter since it was between Kennedy and the State Department: "In McNamara's absence I felt I should not hold it up, so I went along with it just like you countersign a voucher."^[6] Marine General Victor Krulak also signed off without showing his superior, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor. Richard Helms of the CIA also endorsed the message without notifying Director John McCone and later said that he believed that Forrestal was only advising of a resolution that had already been made.^[6] Forrestal then told Kennedy that he had gained the support of Kennedy's inner circle, so the president told him to send the message. Cable 243 was thus sent to Lodge at 21:36.^[6]

^{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cable_243}

I've either read this myself on wikipedia or seen it or something close to it.  The latter I think.  Because, in the comments or discussion about it that Harriman in particular chose this weekend to do it knowing that McNamara and McCone and JFK were out of town/on vacation.  That Mc Namara I believe, would never have approved it.  They did do some tap dancing/jumping through hoops to get it authorized without opposition.  E.G. Ball wouldn't sign off initially because he knew it "would certainly be taken as encouragement by the generals to a coup."  Which to them meant not just removing Diem but eliminating him.

[Matt Cloud]

6 minutes ago, Ron Bulman said:

I've either read this myself on wikipedia or seen it or something close to it.  The latter I think.  Because, in the comments or discussion about it that Harriman in particular chose this weekend to do it knowing that McNamara and McCone and JFK were out of town/on vacation.  That Mc Namara I believe, would never have approved it.  They did do some tap dancing/jumping through hoops to get it authorized without opposition.  E.G. Ball wouldn't sign off initially because he knew it "would certainly be taken as encouragement by the generals to a coup."  Which to them meant not just removing Diem but eliminating him.

Well, that's the coterie of persons responsible for Diem, and much else.  The Harriman crew.  This is one of the things Nixon was after -- till he was interrupted by Watergate.  Which explains a lot.  Gilpatric, by then general counsel at TIME, Inc., -- the magazine's correspondents had been rather on the spot in Saigon in '63 (see TIME's double agent Pham Xuan An) -- was steering Nixon via Haldeman and Gray down the false lead of Felt as Deep Throat.  

[Denise Hazelwood]

40 minutes ago, Sandy Larsen said:

That is just one of the many things you don't know (but could know had you studied it) that makes you think your theory is great.

 

I suspect you're only speculating, as was done in the main video of this thread. I did watch this video (and looked at a whole lot of other stuff). It convinced me that there was an Oswald-CIA connection, but didn't convince me that there was anything deep. There's always the possibility that I missed something. If you have any hard evidence, point me to it. I'm willing to look at it, just like I looked at this video. 

[Ron Bulman]

Has anyone else here actually watched the videos David provided of Dr. Newman, Greg Burnham and Paul Bleau?  They are very interesting, worth the time.  I found the statistics revealed in Paul and Co.'s surveys in particular so.  Though many of the charts were too blurry to follow that way, if you listen they are explained.  I was surprised they found that many knowledgeable targeted potential participants, and, at the number of respondents.  As well as some of the results, way more than I would have thought in some cases.  An interesting aspect to the overall discussion.

I've noticed it in another interview a little but Dr. Newman does get animated at times being emphatic making a point.  I've never checked out Greg's site closely, but I think now I'll look closer.  His experience at six, walking by JFK's casket in the rotunda, seeing his mother and sister cry for the first time would leave an indelible memory (I was seven).  His parents being politically involved and Catholic upbringing reminded me of Joseph Mc Bride.

The discussion of NSAM 263 and 273 is about as deep as I've ever read/heard.

[Robert Morrow]

On 5/22/2024 at 3:51 PM, Pat Speer said:

The CIA Chief in Vietnam, Richardson, was also against the coup, and was forced out as a result by the likes of Lodge and Harriman. 

In an incredible irony, for that matter, both the Schlesinger pre-assassination article claiming the CIA was running their own foreign policy in Vietnam and the Truman post-assassination article in which he complained about the CIA were written as a response to the struggle between the State Dept., which wanted the coup, and the CIA, which thought Diem was better than the alternatives. 

The CIA wasn't always the bad guy. 

 

In a nutshell, in early October, 1963 U.S. Ambassador Henry Lodge was LEAKING TO THE MEDIA that the damn CIA won't follow instructions and help us get rid of Diem. Then Lodge anonymously made a remark that if we ever have a coup in America it will come from an insubordinate CIA.

It was not just half the CIA that supported keeping Diem: it was the military, Lyndon Johnson and Gen. Edward Lansdale who was bitterly and extremely opposed to a coup of his longtime good buddy Ngo Dinh Diem.

John F. Kennedy SUPPORTED THE COUP against Diem; he just hoped he would be safely on a plane to France and not executed.

In my almost never humble opinion, Gen. Lansdale participated in the JFK assassination to take revenge for Diem's death and his own demotion from the military. Lyndon Johnson, a Diem and Lansdale supporter, resurrected the career of Gen. Edward Lansdale and sent him to Vietnam in 1965.  This was payback for being one of the "xxxxing renegade intelligence bastards" involved in the JFK assassination that LBJ told Madeleine Brown about on 12/31/1963 at Austin's Driskill Hotel where LBJ is confirmed at being at on the night of 12/31/1963.

“Spooks” make life miserable for Ambassador Lodge

By Richard T. Starnes, The Washington Daily News

October 2, 1963, p.3

 

[Note: I think that Henry Cabot Lodge was the U.S. official making the off the record speculation in October, 1963, that a CIA coup might overtake the American government. - Robert Morrow]

 

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP65B00383R000200170023-9.pdf

 

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP65B00383R000200170023-9.pdf

 

or  https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/print/1105521

 

The Washington Daily News, Wednesday, October 2, 1963, p.3

'SPOOKS' MAKE LIFE MISERABLE FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

'Arrogant' CIA Disobeys Orders in Viet Nam

By Richard T. Starnes

SAIGON, Oct.2 - The story of the Central Intelligence Agency's role in South Viet Nam is a dismal chronicle of bureaucratic arrogance, obstinate disregard of orders, and unrestrained thirst for power.

Twice the CIA flatly refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, according to a high United States source here.

In one of these instances the CIA frustrated a plan of action Mr. Lodge brought with him from Washington because the agency disagreed with it.

This led to a dramatic confrontation between Mr. Lodge and John Richardson, chief of the huge CIA apparatus here. Mr. Lodge failed to move Mr. Richardson, and the dispute was bucked back to Washington. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and CIA Chief John A. McCone were unable to resolve the conflict, and the matter is now reported to be awaiting settlement by President Kennedy.

It is one of the developments expected to be covered in Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's report to Mr. Kennedy.

Others Critical, Too

Other American agencies here are incredibly bitter about the CIA.

"If the United States ever experiences a 'Seven Days in May' it will come from the CIA, and not from the Pentagon," one U.S. official commented caustically.

("Seven Days in May" is a fictional account of an attempted military coup to take over the U.S. Government.)

CIA "spooks" (a universal term for secret agents here) have penetrated every branch of the American community in Saigon, until non-spook Americans here almost seem to be suffering a CIA psychosis.

An American field officer with a distinguished combat career speaks angrily about "that man at headquarters in Saigon wearing a colonel's uniform." He means the man is a CIA agent, and he can't understand what he is doing at U.S. military headquarters here, unless it is spying on other Americans.

Another American officer, talking about the CIA, acidly commented: "You'd think they'd have learned something from Cuba but apparently they didn't."

Few Know CIA Strength

Few people other than Mr. Richardson and his close aides know the actual CIA strength here, but a widely used figure is 600. Many are clandestine agents known only to a few of their fellow spooks.

Even Mr. Richardson is a man about whom it is difficult to learn much in Saigon. He is said to be a former OSS officer, and to have served with distinction in the CIA in the Philippines.

A surprising number of the spooks are known to be involved in their ghostly trade and some make no secret of it.

"There are a number of spooks in the U.S. Information Service, in the U.S. Operations mission, in every aspect of American official and commercial life here, " one official - presumably a non-spook - said.

"They represent a tremendous power and total unaccountability to anyone," he added.

Coupled with the ubiquitous secret police of Ngo Dinh Nhu, a surfeit of spooks has given Saigon an oppressive police state atmosphere.

The Nhu-Richardson relationship is a subject of lively speculation. The CIA continues to pay the special forces which conducted brutal raids on Buddhist temples last Aug. 21, altho in fairness it should be pointed out that the CIA is paying these goons for the war against communist guerillas, not Buddhist bonzes (priests).

Hand Over Millions

Nevertheless, on the first of every month, the CIA dutifully hands over a quarter million American dollars to pay these special forces.

Whatever else it buys, it doesn't buy any solid information on what the special forces are up to. The Aug. 21 raids caught top U.S. officials here and in Washington flat-footed.

Nhu ordered the special forces to crush the Buddhist priests, but the CIA wasn't let in on the secret. (Some CIA button men now say they warned their superiors what was coming up, but in any event the warning of harsh repression was never passed to top officials here or in Washington.)

Consequently, Washington reacted unsurely to the crisis. Top officials here and at home were outraged at the news the CIA was paying the temple raiders, but the CIA continued the payments.

It may not be a direct subsidy for a religious war against the country's Buddhist majority, but it comes close to that.

And for every State Department aide here who will tell you, "Dammit, the CIA is supposed to gather information, not make policy, but policy-making is what they're doing here," there are military officers who scream over the way the spooks dabble in military operations.

A Typical Example

For example, highly trained trail watchers are an important part of the effort to end Viet Cong infiltration from across the Laos and Cambodia borders. But if the trailer watchers spot incoming Viet Congs, they report it to the CIA in Saigon, and in the fullness of time, the spooks may tell the military.

One very high American official here, a man who has spent much of his life in the service of democracy, likened the CIA's growth to a malignancy, and added he was not sure even the White House could control it any longer.

Unquestionably Mr. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell Taylor both got an earful from people who are beginning to fear the CIA is becoming a Third Force co-equal with President Diem's regime and the U.S. Government - and answerable to neither.

There is naturally the highest interest here as to whether Mr. McNamara will persuade Mr. Kennedy something ought to be done about it.

More here: http://educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?show topic=7534

AFTER THE STARNES ARTICLE, THE NEXT DAY ARTHUR KROCK, FORMERLY CLOSE TO THE KENNEDY FAMILY, WROTE ABOUT IT IN THE NEW YORK TIMES. In a nutshell Starnes was quoting Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and then a day later Arthur Krock was referencing the Starnes article.

The New York Times
October 3, 1963 p. 34
The Intra-Administration
War in Vietnam
By Arthur Krock

... One reporter in this category is Richard Starnes of the Scripps-Howard newspapers. Today, under a Saigon dateline, he related that, "according to a high United States source here, twice the C.I.A. flatly refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge . . . [and] in one instance frustrated a plan of action Mr. Lodge brought from Washington because the agency disagreed with it." Among the views attributed to United States officials on the scene, including one described as a "very high American official . . . who has spent much of his life in the service of democracy . . . are the following:
The C.I.A.'s growth was "likened to a malignancy" which the "very high official was not sure even the White House could control . . . any longer." "If the United States ever experiences [an attempt at a coup to overthrow the Government] it will come from the C.I.A. and not the Pentagon." The agency "represents a tremendous power and total unaccountability to anyone."
... The C.I.A. may be guilty as charged. Since it cannot, or at any rate will not, openly defend its record in Vietnam, or defend it by the same confidential press "briefings" employed by its critics, the public is not in a position to judge. Nor is this department, which sought and failed to get even the outlines of the agency's case in rebuttal. But Mr. Kennedy will have to make a judgment if the spectacle of war within the Executive branch is to be ended and the effective functioning of the C.I.A. preserved. And when he makes this judgment, hopefully he also will make it public, as well as the appraisal of fault on which it is based.

 

[Robert Morrow]

On 5/22/2024 at 4:47 PM, James DiEugenio said:

Lansdale was Diem's benefactor and advisor.

The two guys running the overthrow were Lodge and Conein.

Oh, let's not forget that JOHN KENNEDY supported the coup against Diem. Not that JFK wanted Diem dead. This did not sit well with Gen. Edward Lansdale, Lyndon Johnson, the military, while the CIA was split down the middle over whether to support the Diem coup.

My source for JFK's coup support is Luke Nicter's book on Henry Cabot Lodge.

https://www.amazon.com/Last-Brahmin-Henry-Cabot-Making/dp/0300217803

Author Larry Hancock on who LBJ blamed for

the JFK assassination:

            “The day after John Kennedy’s funeral, Johnson pointed at a picture of Diem and told Hubert Humphrey that, “We had a hand in killing him; now it’s happening here.” Johnson later told Pierre Salinger a story about “divine retribution” and implied that perhaps also applied to Kennedy’s death. A few days after Kennedy’s funeral, Kennedy aide Ralph Dungan was working late in his office in the West Wing when he heard a noise at the door. Dungan looked up and there was President Johnson, in nothing but a t-shirt and boxer shorts. He told Dungan he wanted to talk to him and motioned him to the Oval Office, where Johnson forced him to sit on the sofa and in a low voice said, “I want to tell you why Kennedy died.” A stunned Dungan sat while Johnson pointed his finger and said, “Divine retribution … he murdered Diem and then he got it himself.” (Mahoney 302-303, from Mahoney interview with Dungan).

 

Hubert Humphrey says Lyndon Johnson in fall 1963 had a portrait of Ngo Din Diem in his home at the Elms and that LBJ said the USA killed Diem and the JFK assassination may have been payback for that

QUOTE

      I called President Johnson again, dripping self-satisfaction. “Mr President, I want to report to you your first Congressional victory. We have defeated the Mundt bill by a vote of 57-35. I’m sorry I misinformed you earlier.”

      He asked what I was doing for dinner. I told him I had had a snack, but he said, “Well, come on over anyway and have something more to eat. I want to talk to you.”

UNQUOTE

ALSO IN A FOOTNOTE 

Footnote, p. 265 of The Education of a Public Man: My Life and Politics, by Hubert Humphrey

FOOTNOTE QUOTE, bottom p. 265:

      He was not yet in the White House, but in his private home, the Elms. He had a portrait of Diem in the hallway, and as we passed it he said, “We had a hand in killing him. Now it’s happening here.”

[Hubert Humphrey, The Education of a Public Man: My Life and Politics, p. 265]

Edited May 24 by Robert Morrow

[Denise Hazelwood]

26 minutes ago, Ron Bulman said:

Has anyone else here actually watched the videos David provided of Dr. Newman, Greg Burnham and Paul Bleau?  They are very interesting, worth the time.  I found the statistics revealed in Paul and Co.'s surveys in particular so.  Though many of the charts were too blurry to follow that way, if you listen they are explained.

I did watch it. Again, just because a lot of people believe in the “CIA did it” scenario doesn’t make it true.

[Robert Morrow]

22 hours ago, Ron Bulman said:

I thought this discussion featuring John Newman and Greg Burnham with Paul Bealu and the site hosts was very interesting and informative.  Thanks to David for posting it.

No discussion here about It.  Yet.  I'll mention a couple or three things about It in a day or two.

Since Robert decided to hijack the thread by attacking Greg over a subject not mentioned in That discussion and others responded to it, I will as well, for the moment.  This is what I think I remember reading about the Diem coup.

Harriman was giving orders without consulting JFK.  JFK reluctantly, possibly against his better judgment, did agree to what he thought would a bloodless coup.  That Diem would be persuaded or otherwise convinced to resign and immediately removed from Vietnam by a US plane to I believe it was France.

Lodge* acting on behalf of Harriman, ignored calls, instructions, attempts of communication from JFK.  He then through his military attaché, as Cliff notes (ha!), turned it over to the South Vietnam generals, knowing full well in advance what the result would be.

Jim, Cliff or Pat please correct me on this where I may be wrong or elaborate.  It would be great if Dr. Newman was a member and might comment, as well if Greg should choose to comment.  Though I understand full well why they might choose not to join this fray.

*Many here probably know well better than I the details.  But Henry Cabot Lodge, of the East coast establishment/aristocracy was a sitting, for the second time US Senator in 1952 when Congressman JFK upset him.  Then he was appointed ambassador to the United Nations by Eisenhower, and selected as Nixon's VP for the 1960 presidential election.

Donald Gibson questions why JFK made some of his Cabinet and other selections in Battling Wallstreet in the end notes.  C. Douglas Dillon for Treasury, Harriman Ambassador at large.  Lodge ?  I wonder myself.  Was JFK's appeasement to his US enemies his own downfall?

Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. - Wikipedia

1) Greg Burnham will tell anyone who asks him the Gen. Edward Lansdale was behind the Diem coup. This is a grotesque misreading of history.

2) John F. Kennedy wanted Diem over thrown. Just read Luke Nichter's biography on Henry Cabot Lodge. This does not mean JFK wanted Diem to be killed. https://www.amazon.com/Last-Brahmin-Henry-Cabot-Making/dp/0300217803 

[David Andrews]

Useful to consider who, or what, prompted the Starnes and Krock articles.

[Matt Cloud]

50 minutes ago, David Andrews said:

Useful to consider who, or what, prompted the Starnes and Krock articles.

26 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luncheon meeting with Mr. Reston of the New York Times - DCI residence - 26 September 1963

l. Discussed briefly our appraisal of Halberstam's objectivity, as outlined in the attached. Reston realizes there is reason for some prejudice on the part of Halberstam; stated that Halberstam and Sheehan were obviouslythe best-established permanent correspondents and therefore naturally the leaders in Saigon press corps. Furthermore, he did not think his reporting was as slanted as some claim.

2. Discussed in some detail the attacks on CIA as evidenced by the Ted Lewis article of September 19th and the Max Freedman I article of September 23rd, and others. Reston felt the attacks were ’ obviously planted; was of the opinion they came from State, probably a great deal of it from Harriman who is both emotional and talkative, .but did not feel there was much we could do about it; nor did he feel any particular damage was done, He made the point that the American public generally are against any kind of secrecy; that they look upon CLA as an organization of intrigue and that the Washington press corps feel the Kennedy administration operates on the basis of prejudices and special interests rather than principles, -and this lays them open to suspicion of intrigue, hence CIA is an obvious victim. Allin all ) Reston felt the situation not as bad’ as it has been in the past and I shouldn't worry too much about it. 

3. He said that stories of the Freedman type had not been planted with the New York Times to his knowledge; however spokesmen for the State Department had definitely confirmed the Halberstam article that CIA supported Nhu's secret police that raided the pagodas and this was done by the Department prior to the publishing of the article.  Reston was very surprised at the true facts relating ' to this situation. There was a brief discussion of why the feeling has suddenly flared up. Reston recognized that certain elements in the government had moved precipitously in late August and wondered whether CIA had supported this move or been informed in advance. He recognized that our reserved position and warning to go slow might cause pain to some of those who wished to rush ahead.

...

U. S. press representatives resident here were bitterly anti—administration. Halberstam dominates resident U. S. press community. He made- up his mind quite some time ago that war could not be won with Diem, Diem had to go, and that any American who did not agree with Halberstam was either a fool or unwitting traitor to his country. Halberstam and Sheehan live together, have identity of views and emotions, and fully exchange their information and leads with each other. Irnpression is also that Halberstam and Sheehan attempt to indoctrinate and dominate incoming U. S. reporters. Situation is difficult enough to justify adverse reporting and am not ascribing such reporting solely to influence‘ of one or two men. They merely constitute at least one small part of problem. ’ . In some ways we seem to have reached point in official American community that, if you think we can win with present government, you are simply not running in right direction with the majority. There is continual leakage from official sources to press, especially to Halberstam and to Sheehan. Realize pres-l sures may be so strong in U. S. and abroad that time for decision making might be limited. However, if this is not compellingly the case, continue to suggest that we attempt obtain time for further development of situation here and for more deliberate process of analysis and formulation of action recommendations.

...

 

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/luncheon meeting with mr.[14877264].pdf

[Ron Bulman]

22 hours ago, Ron Bulman said:

I found the statistics revealed in Paul and Co.'s surveys in particular so.  Though many of the charts were too blurry to follow that way, if you listen they are explained. 

I thought Paul said the charts could be seen on the Chokehold's website but I didn't find them there.

I did stumble across this in the process of looking.  Pretty fair considering the source, though they do counter with Litwin.

A New Book on JFK Assassination Claims ‘Proof’ of ‘Conspiracy’ (texasmonthly.com)

[Robert Morrow]

6 hours ago, David Andrews said:

Useful to consider who, or what, prompted the Starnes and Krock articles.

HENRY CABOT LODGE - the ambassador to Vietnam who was encountering big time resistance from the CIA to overthrowing Diem. That led to the Starnes article where he was obvious a source. And the next day Arthur Krock followed up with an NYT article based on the Starnes article.

Eventually, the CIA cracked and went along with the overthrow of Diem. And that had massive implications for JFK because Gen. Edward Lansdale was a very unhappy person over the death of Diem and his own demotion.

[Robert Morrow]

5 hours ago, Matt Cloud said:

26 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luncheon meeting with Mr. Reston of the New York Times - DCI residence - 26 September 1963

l. Discussed briefly our appraisal of Halberstam's objectivity, as outlined in the attached. Reston realizes there is reason for some prejudice on the part of Halberstam; stated that Halberstam and Sheehan were obviouslythe best-established permanent correspondents and therefore naturally the leaders in Saigon press corps. Furthermore, he did not think his reporting was as slanted as some claim.

2. Discussed in some detail the attacks on CIA as evidenced by the Ted Lewis article of September 19th and the Max Freedman I article of September 23rd, and others. Reston felt the attacks were ’ obviously planted; was of the opinion they came from State, probably a great deal of it from Harriman who is both emotional and talkative, .but did not feel there was much we could do about it; nor did he feel any particular damage was done, He made the point that the American public generally are against any kind of secrecy; that they look upon CLA as an organization of intrigue and that the Washington press corps feel the Kennedy administration operates on the basis of prejudices and special interests rather than principles, -and this lays them open to suspicion of intrigue, hence CIA is an obvious victim. Allin all ) Reston felt the situation not as bad’ as it has been in the past and I shouldn't worry too much about it. 

3. He said that stories of the Freedman type had not been planted with the New York Times to his knowledge; however spokesmen for the State Department had definitely confirmed the Halberstam article that CIA supported Nhu's secret police that raided the pagodas and this was done by the Department prior to the publishing of the article.  Reston was very surprised at the true facts relating ' to this situation. There was a brief discussion of why the feeling has suddenly flared up. Reston recognized that certain elements in the government had moved precipitously in late August and wondered whether CIA had supported this move or been informed in advance. He recognized that our reserved position and warning to go slow might cause pain to some of those who wished to rush ahead.

...

U. S. press representatives resident here were bitterly anti—administration. Halberstam dominates resident U. S. press community. He made- up his mind quite some time ago that war could not be won with Diem, Diem had to go, and that any American who did not agree with Halberstam was either a fool or unwitting traitor to his country. Halberstam and Sheehan live together, have identity of views and emotions, and fully exchange their information and leads with each other. Irnpression is also that Halberstam and Sheehan attempt to indoctrinate and dominate incoming U. S. reporters. Situation is difficult enough to justify adverse reporting and am not ascribing such reporting solely to influence‘ of one or two men. They merely constitute at least one small part of problem. ’ . In some ways we seem to have reached point in official American community that, if you think we can win with present government, you are simply not running in right direction with the majority. There is continual leakage from official sources to press, especially to Halberstam and to Sheehan. Realize pres-l sures may be so strong in U. S. and abroad that time for decision making might be limited. However, if this is not compellingly the case, continue to suggest that we attempt obtain time for further development of situation here and for more deliberate process of analysis and formulation of action recommendations.

...

 

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/luncheon meeting with mr.[14877264].pdf

It would be nice if you would tell us who wrote that memo for the record.

 

 

[James DiEugenio]

Glad Matt posted that memo.

The first paragraph is really interesting. And it explains a lot about later works by Halberstam and Sheehan.

See, what those two did later was really kind of a disgrace, and they were never called out on it since they were part of the MSM.

But the truth was rather simple:  they were hawks on Vietnam who did not think Kennedy was doing enough to win.  Halberstam was later so embarrassed by this fact that he went back and cut a very revealing portion out of his first book on Vietnam, The Making of a Quagmire.  The truth is they wanted Kennedy to escalate, and that part of Halberstam's book he later cut was explicit about this point. Kennedy actually wanted Halberstam rotated out of Saigon. 

Well, after Kennedy was murdered, they got their escalation.  And it turned out to be a disaster of epic proportions. In other words, Kennedy was right and they were wrong.

So what happened? In their books, The Best and the Brightest and A Bright Shining Lie, they tried to downplay their early hawkishness and somehow blame Kennedy for what happened in Vietnam. Halberstam's book is really bad as history today. Both men were greatly influenced by John Paul Vann who thought Saigon needed more American aid and not less.

For this deception they became paragons of the Establishment.

Sickening.

Edited May 25 by James DiEugenio

[Sandy Larsen]

On 5/23/2024 at 7:39 PM, Denise Hazelwood said:

I suspect you're only speculating, as was done in the main video of this thread.

 

Well, you suspect wrong.

 

Here is how the FBI learned of a communist conspiracy to kill Kennedy:

On 11/22/63, the FBI learned that Oswald had visited the Cuban Consulate and Soviet Embassy in late September 1963.

The following day, the FBI learned that the Cuban Consulate employee who had helped Oswald, Silvia Duran, had been arrested by the Mexican police and was being brutally interrogated. They also learned that a woman by he name of Elena Garro had accused Duran of having an affair with Oswald, and that Oswald was friendly with several of Duran's associates. Elena Garro was held in protective custody for eight days for this. According to testimony Silvia Duran gave the HSCA, the Mexican police had suspected her of being the center of a communist plot to kill Kennedy.

On 11/25/63, the FBI got a report that a man by the name of Gilberto Alvarado claimed to have seen Oswald accept $6500 in the Cuban Consulate to kill Kennedy. Much of his story corroborated Elena Garro's story. This story wasn't taken seriously at first because the date Alvarado gave was before Oswald's time in Mexico City. But later he corrected the date and the FBI took him more seriously.

Add to the above the fact that Oswald had reportedly met with Valeriy Kostikov at the Soviet Embassy while he was in Mexico City. The CIA said that Kostikov was the KGB assassinations chief.

Understandably, the FBI was worried that there might have been a plot between Oswald and Cuba and/or the Soviet Union.

In fact, on 11/29/63, Hoover told Lyndon B. Johnson on the telephone:

"This angle in Mexico is giving us a great deal of trouble because the story there is of this man Oswald getting $6,500 from the Cuban embassy and then coming back to this country with it. We're not able to prove that fact, but the information was that he was there on the 18th of September in Mexico City and we are able to prove conclusively he was in New Orleans that day. Now then they've changed the dates. The story came in changing the dates to the 28th of September and he was in Mexico City on the 28th. Now the Mexican police have again arrested this woman Duran, who is a member of the Cuban embassy... and we're going to confront her with the original informant, who saw the money pass, so he says, and we're also going to put the lie detector test on him."

None of this is speculation... I'm just reporting facts. If you do your homework, it's not too hard to figure out that it was the CIA whose operation it was to make it look like Cuba or the Soviet Union was behind the assassination.

 

Earlier in this thread you wrote, "The cover-up doesn't have to be because of 'CIA involvement in planning the assassination'." Well it certainly is something the United States has to cover up if they don't want to go to war with  Cuba or Russia.

 

If you want to see details on what I wrote above and sources, I suggest you look through this article:

Deep Politics III by Peter Dale Scott

Begin reading at this subtitle:  Oswald, Russia, and Cuba: How the Managed Oswald Stories Led to the Warren Commission